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1Chapter 1
Rationale
1.1 Introduction
The present thesis deals with various sources and costs of economic uncertainties,
such as sanctions and political risks, as well as the resulting behaviour patterns of
economic actors in the context of the global interaction between emerging and devel-
oped economies. A unique geopolitical environment revolving around the Crimea
in combination with a post-transition setting makes the present study interesting
from the point of modern economic history, and can help draw important political
implications. Under the effect of this geopolitical environment, it is not only the
Russian economy that is being altered but also Russia’s integration into the global
economy.
Geopolitical uncertainty is by far the most important factor in its potential to
hamper global investment flows (UNCTAD, 2017) by reversing their direction to-
wards developed countries and away from emerging ones (Caldara and Iacoviello,
2018). High geopolitical risks, one of the “uncertainty trinity” along with economic
and political uncertainties, can drive business and financial cycles by evoking a de-
cline of real output and a decrease in stock returns (Bussire and Mulder, 2000; Baker,
Bloom, and Davis, 2016; Balcilar et al., 2018).
Transition reforms in emerging economies are believed to lead to better firm per-
formance, resulting mainly from structural transformations, support of market in-
stitutions and openness to international trade and investment. The recent history of
reforms suggests that the productivity gap between firms in transitional economies
and those in developed economies has been gradually closing, though more slowly
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and more costly than expected.
The empirical evidence indicates that Russia’s transition path was somewhat
different than other Central and Eastern European countries. Thus, the initial eco-
nomic downturn in the 1990s and the reaction to the global financial crisis of the 2008
was significantly deeper, and the degree of global integration has been much lower
than elsewhere. It has been argued that weaker institutions, path dependence and
vested interest groups have defined this specific transition trajectory (Yasin, 2002;
Bessonova and Gonchar, 2015; Gurvich, 2016). To wit, the political landscape in
Russia began to change significantly after the 2008 crisis, followed by the reverse of
globalization, increased government regulation, and disappointment with the con-
sequences of its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2012, which
marked the climax of Russian globalization.
The current change in Russian economic policy, regulation, and firm behaviour,
induced by a reaction to increased political uncertainties, have complemented the
problems associated with an incomplete structural transformation. Thus, increased
uncertainties, weak institutions and structural problems seem to reinforce each other
and are further strengthened when combined with exogenous idiosyncrasies.
This thesis delivers a comprehensive contribution to several fields of studies,
including: international economics, political economy, international business and
industrial organization literature, as well as institutional and innovation economics.
Another unique feature of this research is related to the application of various econo-
metric and mathematical methods, including vector autoregressions, survival analy-
sis, input-output analysis, stochastic frontier analysis, instrumental variables regres-
sions etc., as well as the construction of unique data sets.
Chapters 2 - 4 form the empirical part of this dissertation. In Chapter 2, we begin
by quantifying the economic cost for the sanction sender, the EU-27, in the after-
math of the geopolitical crisis, triggered by Russia’s involvement in the Ukrainian
conflict. We find that direct costs are mainly born by the countries closely connected
with Russia in terms of trade, whereas indirect costs are mainly induced by the tight
embeddedness in the European trade network. The findings also imply that the as-
pired economic convergence within the EU can be threatened or reversed as a result
of geopolitical tensions.
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In the empirical part that follows, we turn to the question of whether politi-
cal risks affect the behaviour of multinational companies (MNCs) in Russia. The
research shows that political risks not only affect Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
exits in the host economy, but that their impact is intensified through sanctioning
policies. Since an increasing cross-border integration is an acknowledged factor of
productivity growth that can be implemented through integration into global value
chains (GVCs) via foreign direct investment, these findings have a direct implication
for the current sanction debate.
In our final empirical analysis, we take a different perspective that is still highly
relevant for an emerging economy stuck in the geopolitical crisis while simultane-
ously requiring reforms that would guarantee sustainable long-term growth. This
growth becomes possible by boosting productivity and building institutions that fos-
ter investment in human and physical capital, as well as innovation, in both the high
and low-tech manufacturing sectors. This type of investment should become Rus-
sia’s top policy objective, since it is a feasible source of productivity growth. Thus,
in the empirical study on the innovation-performance link, we scrutinize the factors
that might contribute to an improved efficiency of the Russian manufacturing sector.
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to lay the necessary ground work for
placing the empirical evidence presented in Chapters 2 – 4 in a broader economic
context. After a review of the main milestones in Russian economic history, we out-
line Russia’s integration into the global economy. We consider FDI and trade as the
most relevant components of Russia’s globalization process, a process that is cur-
rently being reversed as a result of geopolitical tensions. The Rationale concludes by
focusing on our research questions, and providing an outline of the three empirical
papers that make up the rest of this dissertation. Finally, we offer several comments
about the limitations and potential extensions of our research.
1.2 Russia’s newest economic history
To comprehend Russia’s current economic and geopolitical position, it is necessary
to begin before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Soviet Union’s economic
and political heritage played a significant role in defining the path of present-day
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Russian economic development, and is still relevant today. Many of today’s eco-
nomic concerns in Russia, such as the nature of path dependence, severe structural
imbalances and weak institutions, stem from the suboptimal trajectory of reforms in
the recent past. After briefly discussing the theoretical foundations of the transition
process, we will describe the main stages of Russia’s economic past.
1.2.1 Transition path
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, a large body of related economic
and political research emerged and can be subdivided into three major fields: anal-
ysis of policy design, theoretical analysis, and empirical studies. Because of their
shared objectives, the modern debate no longer separates the economics of transi-
tion from the sub-field of development economics (Olofsgård, Wachtel, and Becker,
2018). In spite of all of these studies and analyses, the literature remains inconclu-
sive.
At the beginning of the transition process, a centrally debated theoretical issue
was the “big bang vs. gradualism” dichotomy that revolved around the speed of the
transition (see Kornai, 1990; Blanchard et al., 1991; Fischer and Gelb, 1991; Roland,
2000). In a nutshell, the big-bang reform strategy proposed a rapid and simultane-
ous introduction of multiple reforms (Berg et al., 1999; Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Boy-
cko, 1992; Berg et al., 1992; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992; Balcerowicz, 1994;
Sachs, 1994; Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994; Woo, 1994 etc.). This sort of “shock
therapy” approach was considered by its proponents to be the most efficient way
of introducing a market economy and relied on specific policy and reform prescrip-
tions established by The Washington Consensus. These prescriptions are shared by
Washington-based international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the United States Department of the Trea-
sury and are designed for countries undergoing a transition or experiencing a crisis.
In their narrowest interpretation, these measures are designed to address macroeco-
nomic stabilization, privatization and liberalization (Williamson, 1990; Williamson,
2004).
In retrospect, however, this approach has been criticized for failing to deliver the
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desired results (Stiglitz, 1998; Rodrik, 2002; Rodrik, 2006). The inability of this ap-
proach to bring about substantive institutional reforms is often cited as a cause for its
failure (Murrell, 1996). Not surprisingly, the gradualist or evolutionary-institutional
mode has become more popular. It has been suggested that this approach is more
sustainable because it minimizes adjustment costs and public unrest (e.g. see Aghion
and Blanchard, 1994 for their theoretical model of optimal speed of transition; Blan-
chard and Kremer, 1997; Boeri, 2000; Marangos, 2005; Portes, 1991; McKinnon,
1993; Roland, 2000; Dewatripont and Roland, 1992; Dewatripont and Roland, 1995;
McMillan and Naughton, 1992; Murrell, 1995).
However, the ongoing scholarly debate dealing with the “big bang vs. gradual-
ism” dilemma suggests that considering only the speed of transition reforms is too
limited in its view. Focusing only on “speed” disregards other important dimen-
sions, for instance the timing and sequencing of reforms (e.g., Godoy and Stiglitz,
2006; Havrylyshyn, 2001). Furthermore, as the transition was underway a new theo-
retical approach emerged known as New Institutional Economics (NIE) (Williamson,
2000). The emergence of this approach shifted the focus from the optimal speed
or sequencing of reforms to implementing reforms that would create enduring in-
stitutions (Havrylyshyn, 2007). The core idea being that a successful transition to
a market economy can only occur if market institutions are functioning optimally
(Murrell, 2008).
Today, more than 25 years after the transition began, scholars are still arguing
about which transition strategy proved most successful, and even whether or not
the transition process has run its course. For example, Sonin presents a summary
outlining the end of the transition process (Sonin, 2013), while Pistor presents op-
posing arguments suggesting that the process is still ongoing (Pistor, 2013).
In the meantime, numerous empirical studies on the effects of the speed of transi-
tion on economic growth have struggled to shed unequivocal light on the theoretical
debate. There are any number of studies that argue in favour of either approach (e.g.,
Havrylyshyn, 2007; Gros and Steinherr, 2004 for big-bang proponents, or e.g., Popov,
2007; Berr, Combarnous, and Rougier, 2005 for gradualist proponents). Dell’Anno
and Villa suggest that a big bang approach entails higher initial adjustment costs
that are, however, compensated by long term benefits (Dell’Anno and Villa, 2013).
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Fidrmuc and Tichit, 2013, looking at a sample of post-communist countries, show
that the severity of crisis after the start of the transition has a positive effect on the
ensuing pace of economic reform, economic growth and a subsequent investment
and institutional change. Obviously, there is no “one size fits all” solution, as real
life shows. Whereas some countries adopted the gradual approach (e.g., Hungary,
Romania, Slovenia, Kazakhstan), others opted for the big-bang strategy (e.g., Czech
Republic, Estonia, Poland).
Table A.1 in the Appendix presents the list of all transition economies according
to the type of transition. The list includes both Central and Eastern European coun-
tries (CEECs), and countries that were part of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Apart
from this criterion, we depict the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment transition measure (EBRD, 2019), as well as the ratio of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) at the beginning of the transition and GDP in 2000 and 2017, 25 years after
transition (Di Weder Mauro, 2001; Gros and Steinherr, 2004). Sorted by the average
EBRD indicator in 2014, the top five countries (Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania
and Slovak Republic) are big-bangers and also CEECs. They are followed by Hun-
gary and Croatia, both of which underwent a gradual reform process. Similar re-
sults occur when sorted according to the highest GDP 1992/GDP 2000 ratio. The
data clearly highlight that CEECs outperform FSU, no matter which transition path
was chosen. This is in line with Balcerowicz, 1995 who argues that economic out-
comes are not only determined by the reform policies, but that the initial economic
situation and exogenous economic developments also play a role. Brenton.1997 sug-
gest that the compatibility of the initial informal institutions with the specific reform
measures was more crucial than the speed of the transition.
It was initially assumed that Russia was a big-bang implementer, but because
the initial rapid market reforms were ineffective in achieving macroeconomic sta-
bility, this approach was partially reversed. In spite of extensive transition reforms
in the beginning of the 1990s, and the fact that Russia inherited a rather vast in-
dustrial base of the Soviet Union, its restructuring proved to be difficult because of
the size, specific market structure, technological specificity, priorities given to de-
fense consumption, and internal barriers to capital and material flows (Gonchar and
Kuznetsov, 2008).
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As Figure 1.1 shows, Russia’s most recent economic history can be subdivided
into four major periods with the end of each period being marked by an economic
crisis. Crude oil prices are also depicted in Figure 1.1, since Russia’s industrial and
export base still mostly relies on energy sources (Šmelev and Popov, 1990; Bragin-
skij and Javlinskij, 2000; Gaidar, 2012). Both curves clearly show similarities and
also share common slumps. Abundant in natural resources, Russia’s economic de-
velopment was always closely related to the oil prices. One of the main reasons for
the collapse of the Soviet Union was a drastic drop in oil prices in 1986, which also
held back the transformation process in the early 1990s. As Russia’s GDP hit rock
bottom, so did the oil prices. In August 1998, the zenith of Russia’s economic cri-
sis, it amounted to $8 per barrel. After 1999, oil prices began to recover, and so did
the Russian economy. The second phase of the post-transformation development
is characterized by continuous growth, not least because of the impressive oil rev-
enues streaming into the Russian treasury. After a brief drop in 2008-2009, oil prices
remained at a constantly high level during the years of 2011-2014 (over $100 per bar-
rel in current prices). This period was followed by another dramatic fall to less than
$50 per barrel in 2015-2016.
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The first of the four stages, 1992-1998, is a period of active market transforma-
tion that resulted in the currency default crisis. However, it was also during this
period that market reforms started to become effective. The second stage, between
1999 and 2008, also called “the fat years”, is marked by high hydrocarbon revenues
and a continuous regenerative economic growth. Overall, GDP increased by 83%
during these years. The end of this stage coincides with the global financial crisis,
which significantly impacted Russia and brought about a 7.8% plummet in GDP. The
third stage is characterized by relatively slow initial economic growth followed by
a period of stagnation. Geopolitical tensions combined with the plunge of oil prices
in 2014 resulted in another GDP drop in. The fourth and final stage begins with a
slight upturn in economic growth, but it is too early to determine if this upturn can
be sustained. We will now consider each period in more detail.
1.2.2 First stage: a period of transition reforms
The downfall of the Soviet system was triggered by political reforms. The decay of
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon, an economic organization
of the communist states under the flagship of Soviet Union) led to a disintegration of
the Soviet market, which in turn significantly decreased demand for Russian goods
in the former common Soviet market. The economy opened, the defence industry
was shocked by the severe decrease of military procurement, and attempts to ad-
just defence technologies to meet civil needs mostly failed. There was a concomitant
deficit of consumer goods and services, and labour income and savings were criti-
cally devalued (Akindinova, Kuzminov, and Yasin, 2016). It became apparent that
the Soviet system, unable to provide long-term economic growth or even basic sta-
bility, was in need of reform.
The initial intention was to transform the planned Soviet economy into a market
economy within 500 days, starting October 15, 1990 (Nellis, 2016). Although this
goal was not met, Russian reformists continued to pursue a big-bang transforma-
tion strategy relying on the above-mentioned pillars of the Washington Consensus:
macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, liberalization (Yasin, 2002). However,
the prevailing negative political and social environment led to poor implementation
and hindered the most important market transformations and social reforms.
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Based on the Washington Consensus notion of liberalization, Russia began a
transition from state-controlled trade and prices to free trade and free prices. In
particular, the systems of planned distribution and allocation were removed, and
the state foreign trade monopoly was abolished. A further step was the creation of a
free, non-regulated national currency that was convertible is introduced. Price liber-
alization is closely tied to a restructuring of the economy that takes place in stages.
New market prices indicate a real demand. Resources, no longer being allocated
as a part of a planned economy, are allocated into specific sectors based on market
mechanisms. Against the background of the restructuring processes, while inef-
ficient production facilities became uncompetitive and were forced to shut down,
new efficient firms began to appear and grow.
Price liberalization was implemented in Russia on January 2, 1992, also known
as D-day. This process entailed removing price controls on 80% of wholesale and
90% of retail commodities. In addition to price liberalization, import restrictions
were temporarily lifted and a zero import tariff was set (Yasin, 2002). As a conse-
quence, inflation initially surged at exorbitant rates, finally settling down by June
1994. Overall, this period of great economic and political reforms was characterized
by severe economic hardships, financial instability, dwindling output accompanied
by rising unemployment, and social calamities (OECD, 1997). Wage liberalization
led to increasing inequality (Gruen and Klasen, 2012), and already by 1994, the Gini
coefficient amounted to 0.4 (Yasin, 2002). Wages, despite their deregulation, could
not keep pace with inflation and most of the population became impoverished.
Liberalization is expected to cause a certain amount of instability and hardship.
Because of this expectation, macroeconomic stabilization reforms represent an effort
to achieve price, production and employment stability after these parameters have
become unbalanced. Stabilization in the Russian experience was only achieved after
the "Black Tuesday" of October 11, 1994, when the ruble fell by almost 30 percent-
age points in one day. Finally, by 1996, consumer prices rose by only two-digits
(21.8%) during the year, marking the completion of macroeconomic stabilization
(Yasin, 2002).
The notion of private property and ownership is an important aspect of any mar-
ket economy. At the beginning of the 1990s, 90% of production capacities were in
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state ownership (Gaidar, 2012). Privatization refers to the transfer of responsibility
and risk from the state to private owners. By offering most of the state property
to the private sector, a new system of economic incentives and full-fledged market
agents is created. Privatization in Russia occurred in two stages. The first stage,
or voucher privatization, took place between mid-1992 and mid-1994. As a result,
approximately two thirds of the GDP were generated by the private sector. The
second stage involved consolidation of private property. The process of consolida-
tion is the most controversial part of the Russian privatization program. Loans for
shares schemes were applied to selected cases of privatization for large properties in
commodities. The lack of transparency and open competition draws into question
the legitimacy of some of these deals (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Treisman,
2010). It is this very privatization method that gave rise to a class of oligarchs who
are accused of stripping the state of its assets at effectively no personal cost (Aven
and Kokh, 2013).
Consequently, privatization debate remained in place many years after the priva-
tization itself took place. Denisova, Eller, and Zhuravskaya, 2010 claim that by 2006
about half of the population was still very dissatisfied with the transition results.
There was a significant demand from the population for a “strong state”, request-
ing state intervention in all spheres of economic life. Astonishingly, this demand
coexists with a deep mistrust of state institutions. This puzzling finding is explained
by Aghion et al., 2010 by the low levels of trust and civic capital, when the opti-
mal behavioural strategy in society is to not be active in civil society (see Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1993 and Roland, 2000, for a basic theoretical model of equi-
libria existence). Another study on the attitudes toward privatization in Russia by
Dower and Markevich, 2014 draws a connection between privatization in the 1990s
in contemporary Russia and a mass privatization reform in Imperial Russia, the 1906
Stolypin land reform, and relates historical privatization antagonism with favouring
state ownership today.
Although by 1996 a degree of financial stability, signs of economic growth and
merely double-digit inflation indicated that the initial market reforms had been suc-
cessful, by 1998 several alarming fiscal trends had developed. These included: a
malfunctioning tax system, the concentration of financial and economic activities
Chapter 1. Rationale 11
within groups closely related to the government, and economic policies that lacked
transparency with respect to competition and privatization, among other develop-
ments. The existing problems made the Russian economy highly vulnerable to ex-
ternal and internal shocks. The considerable government debt could not be served
due to a shift in global prices, and in 1998 the financial crisis broke out. The main
economic indicators fell again, and monthly inflation jumped. In fact, 1999 is the
year that marks the beginning of more stable positive trends.
Shleifer and Treisman, 2000 were important witnesses to the Russian reform pro-
cess. They consulted with the Russian government in the 1990s, and conclude in
their writings about the Russian reforms that the privatization process that began
in 1992, and the macroeconomic stabilization in 1995–1996, can be considered to be
successful. By contrast, other reforms (e.g., fiscal reforms) were less successful when
compared to other transition economies. Yasin, 2002 cites several reasons why Rus-
sia’s transformational crisis was deeper and longer than other transition countries
(Yasin’s observations do not include countries belonging to the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS)). First, the Russian socialist experience spanned over 70
years, compared to only 40 years in the CEECs. Yasin also notes that for Russia so-
cialism was not an imported ideology, but a grassroots nationalist movement. Sec-
ond, market reforms were implemented against the background of the collapse of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Third, a huge share of the expendi-
tures for the military-industrial complex (in comparison with other countries) be-
came a serious burden for Russia. Moreover, the conditions of the Russian transition
were complicated by a quick rise of oligarchs that resulted in the largely negative
social perception of capitalism and a market economy.
1.2.3 Second stage: a period of recovery growth
Starting in 2000, Russia entered a new phase of its economic development, also
called the recovery growth or modernization phase. It is no coincidence that this
phase coincides with the increase in export prices for hydrocarbons. Russia’s growth
rate between 2000 and 2008 averaged 6.9%. In the group of developing and emerg-
ing economies, only China had a higher rate of 10.4% (Kudrin and Gurvich, 2015).
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This period was characterized by continuous productivity growth and a healthy
integration into the global economy. The newly elected government embarked upon
a new reform programme and created new rules of the game: customs procedures
were simplified, a flat income tax rate was established, and most importantly nu-
merous trade barriers were removed or abolished as part of the negotiation process
with the WTO. The oligarchs were deprived of their political power and eventually
their strategic assets. Energy assets were re-nationalized. All these measures and
achievements helped to stabilize Russia’s budget, raise effective household demand
and strengthen Russia’s position on the global market by integrating Russian busi-
nesses and banks into the system of global capital markets.
1.2.4 Third stage: a period of economic stagnation
Russia’s economy was seriously impacted by the 2008 global financial crisis. Even
though the GDP fell by 7.8% in 2009 (higher than most other transition countries),
the economy managed to recover relatively quickly due to a slow growth of dispos-
able incomes. The recovery, however, was relatively stagnant with growth of only
1.5 percent between 2009 and 2013 (for comparison, Chinese GDP growth was 8.9
percent). This sluggish growth persisted in spite of the recovery of oil prices (IMF,
2014).
One explanation offered by the literature for slow economic growth is an inade-
quate change in the institutional environment (North, 1990; Rodrik, 2005; Acemoglu
and Johnson, 2005). Institutions that provide investment incentives are considered of
high importance (North, 1990; Williamson, 1985; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson,
2002). Empirical literature also shows that an inferior institutional environment hin-
ders global integration and decreases FDI (Javorcik and Wei, 2009) and a country’s
competitiveness in foreign trade (Nunn and Trefler, 2014). High quality institutions,
on the other hand, provide incentives for innovative activity (Tebaldi and Elmslie,
2013 and Silve and Plekhanov, 2018).
The rigidity of Russian institutions is supposed to be the reason why the large-
scale developing programs that were undertaken during the first decade of the twenty-
first century did not deliver the desired results (Gurvich, 2016). Kudrin and Gur-
vich, 2015 identify several key problems with the Russian economy that led to the
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stagnation of the 2009-2013 period. These issues can be summarized as follows:
an exorbitant proportion of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), a policy of industrial
paternalism (e.g., soft budget constraints and non-functioning creative destruction
mechanism, which implies the unreasonable backing of inefficient industries and
companies) and an inefficient public administration mechanism. Gurvich, 2016 adds
weak property rights protection and vulnerability of property, as well as an ongoing
struggle for rents to the list of key institutional limitations.
Although the issue of weak Russian institutions became obvious in this period,
it is still of high relevance for Russia today. The Soviet legacy that shaped mod-
ern informal and formal institutions malfunctioned in terms of market allocation.
The quality of social goods (support for retirees, unemployed persons, educational
and other institutions) delivered by the state remains insufficient. In recent years, a
continuous decline of Russian regional democratic institutions took place, and coin-
cided with an all-embracing trend of political and economic centralization (Alexeev
and Mamedov, 2017).
1.2.5 Fourth stage: a period of geopolitical uncertainty
In 2014 the Russian economy entered another recession that coincided with the de-
cline of oil prices and culminated in a GDP decrease of 2.8 percent in 2015 (1.1). In
the second half of 2014, oil prices began to decline rapidly, and by January 2015 they
fell to the lowest level since March 2009. According to the World Bank report, several
factors contributed to this decline: a change in expectations of demand and supply
mainly due to the growth of shale oil production in the USA, a shift of the OPEC tar-
gets from maintaining prices to maintaining market share, resistance of oil supply
towards existing geopolitical risks in the Arab world, and the strengthening of the
United States dollar against other currencies (World Bank Group, 2015). Although
oil prices are bound to follow boom and bust cycles, some experts believe that there
are fewer reasons to expect a rapid and continuous growth of oil prices (Akindinova
and Yasin, 2015). The shale oil revolution created the conditions for the expansion
of oil production in the U.S. and other non-traditional hydrocarbon exporters, and
reduced OPEC’s influence on oil market pricing and forced the cartel to move from
a policy of maintaining high prices to retaining its market share.
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An additional factor that burdened the Russian economy during the latest eco-
nomic crisis is the fall of the ruble against the dollar and the euro beginning in the
autumn of 2014. The Bank of Russia introduced a floating exchange rate regime in
November 2014 and drastically increased the key interest rate. These measures en-
abled the stabilization of the exchange rate. Simultaneously, a painful increase of
the key rate, although amplified the borrowing costs, improved the attractiveness of
deposits, halting the capital flight. It was a necessary step since capital flight was
yet another major issue of the latest crisis, underlying the radical deterioration of
Russia’s investment attractiveness.
Ruble devaluation, together with the effect of the introduction of trade restric-
tions on imports of goods from countries that joined the sanctions against Russia,
led to an acceleration of inflation to 11.4% in 2014, as well as an increase in inflation-
ary expectations. In 2015, the inflation rate amounted to 15.6%. The implementation
of a tight monetary policy helped decrease the inflation rate to 7.1% in 2016. High
inflation is a significant obstacle to economic development, since it devalues savings
and makes investments unattractive. Compared to 2015, disposable incomes in 2016
continued to contract. In 2016, the poverty rate increased by 0.2%. Nearly 20 million
people, or 13.5% of the population, were living below the subsistence level in 2016.
As Akindinova and Yasin, 2015 note in their paper, even if we consider the reso-
lution of the currency crisis to be the end of the first phase of the latest 2015 crisis, the
next phase will be longer and more painful. The authors anticipate that overcoming
the negative consequences of this stage will be associated with a restructuring of the
economy on the basis of acquired competitive advantages, the extinction of unprof-
itable and inefficient enterprises with a transition capital leading to the growth of
promising industries. This difficult and painful process must be completed before
new sources of private investment and the implementation of economic, legal and
political institutional reforms can take place.
1.3 Mapping Russia on the economic globe
After having looked at the recent economic history of Russia, we now turn to today’s
economic development, which is closely connected to entering the global market.
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In order for the Russian economy to move forward, it must create a common
worldwide economic space, theoretically leading to a productivity increase and eco-
nomic prosperity (e.g., Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2006; Dreher, 2006). The pro-
cess of globalization is multifaceted, the scope and focus of our thesis allows us
to examine only a few of these facets. Our primary focus will be on Russia’s in-
volvement in global trade and global capital flows. Although integration in global
financial systems is an inherent part of globalization, our specific focus precludes
us from its consideration (for a recent work on financial globalization, Broner and
Ventura, 2016). To list just a few other facets we will not investigate: the drawbacks
and failures of globalization associated with increased inequality (e.g., comprehen-
sive literature surveys by Helpman, 2016 or Ravallion, 2018; Bergh and Nilsson,
2010; Mills, 2009; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007), existing institutional discontinuities
(Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004), environmental issues (e.g., Newell and
Roberts, 2017; Frankel and Rose, 2005; Böhringer et al., 2015 for a study on Russia),
and even the growth of political populism generated by globalization (e.g. Burgoon,
Oliver, and Trubowitz, 2017; Rodrik, 2018).
Throughout the transition process, Russia gradually became more integrated
into the global economy. Russia was able to access foreign financial resources and
technology through GVCs, FDI and direct trade relations (Golikova et al., 2017).
During the first period of the Russian economic history (1992-1998) that we consider,
the newly founded country applied for membership in international organizations
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In 1993 Russia ap-
plied for membership in the World Trade Organization, and after a tedious process
was admitted in 2012, thus laying another foundation stone in the globalization pro-
cess.
Most of the studies that analysed the impact of joining the WTO conclude that
there has been a positive net effect for Russia. The welfare gains are considered to
amount to 3.3% of Russian GDP in the medium run, and up to 24% in the long run
(Rutherford, Tarr, and Shepotylo, 2005; Jensen, Rutherford, and Tarr, 2006; Jensen,
Rutherford, and Tarr, 2007; Rutherford and Tarr, 2008; Rutherford and Tarr, 2010).
Furthermore, 72% of all globalization gains are calculated to be due to FDI in ser-
vices (Jensen, Rutherford, and Tarr, 2007). The reason why FDI liberalization is so
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important is connected to the fact that FDI is often considered to be the fastest way to
access advanced technology and managerial know-how from foreign investors. Sec-
tion 1.3.3 of this chapter will pay special attention to the theoretical and empirical
evidence of FDI spillovers.
1.3.1 Globalization-induced technology transfer
Globalization is commonly considered to be a vehicle that enables the creation and
dissemination of technology through various viable conduits: exporting and import-
ing activities, foreign licensing agreements and FDI (Hoekman, Maskus, and Saggi,
2005). Imitating and adopting foreign technology is especially relevant for emerging
and developing economies, because firms in these economies rarely engage in their
own R&D activities (Fatima, 2017). Thus, even though these firms may contribute
little to technological innovation, a cross-border technology transmission enables
them to approach the world technology frontier (Dahlman, 2007).
Empirical evidence on the relationship between globalization and technology
adoption for developing countries is vast and addresses some specific if not all
aspects of globalization. Alvarez and Robertson, 2004 find that exports are posi-
tively connected to innovation, and that imported intermediates are likely to boost
product innovation (Goldberg et al., 2010). Several other studies endorse export-
ing and importing activities, and suggest that minority-owned foreign firms and
foreign licensing agreements are important channels for technology transfer in de-
veloping and emerging economies (Gorodnichenko, Svejnar, and Terrell, 2010; Fa-
tima, 2017). Evidence on Russia suggests that foreign-owned manufacturing firms
become rather pro-active in investment and innovation than domestically oriented
firms (Bessonova, Kozlov, and Yudaeva, 2003; Gonchar and Kuznetsov, 2018).
1.3.2 International trade
Free trade has been increasingly favoured under the WTO regime. In spite of the still
existing belief that a country participating in international trade is better off than a
country not actively embedded in the global trade network (Samuelson, 1938), it
remains a rather inconclusive theoretical and empirical debate (Deraniyagala and
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Fine, 2000). This debate will be briefly introduced in this section, before we tackle
the major stylized facts in Russia’s trade integration.
The classical trade theories originate in the works of Adam Smith (1723-90) and
David Ricardo (1772-1823). Smith endorses the trade in what a country specializes.
Ricardo, whose theory dominated the field until the Second World War (WWII), ar-
gues that gains from trade arise when a country increases production in what it
relatively does well, thus underlying the notion of comparative advantage.
The Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) trade theory builds on the Ricardian theory and dom-
inated the field of international trade and the policy debate in favour of trade liberal-
ization between 1920 and 1980 (Flam and Flanders, 1991). According to the H-O the-
ory, a country’s exports depend on its relative factor endowment. This implies that
developing countries are likely to specialize in the production of labour and natural
resources intensive goods, whereas developed countries are more likely to specialize
in human capital and capital-intensive production. Apart from factor endowment,
the product cycle theory and the new trade theory incorporate other factors that
affect a country’s export performance.
The product cycle theory was initially developed to analyze US postwar trade
after World War II (Vernon, 1966; Markusen, 1984). When explaining trade patterns,
it focuses on the characteristics of the domestic market and includes three stages:
1) a new product is introduced, and exported to other developed countries, 2) do-
mestic product demand increases and moderate demand from developing countries
appears (i.e., the US exports not only to advanced, but also developing countries), 3)
market saturation (i.e., the US becomes a net exporter of the standardized product).
It is a viable alternative to the H-O trade theory since it is able to explain the Leon-
tief paradox (Leontief, 1953) of exporting labour-intensive products by a capital rich
country through the location in the first and the second stages of the product cycle.
The deterministic nature of this model is its main limitation.
The new trade theory (NTT) was introduced in the 1980s (Ethier, 1982; Krugman,
1985; Grossman and Helpman, 2001) and tries to overcome the shortcomings of stan-
dard trade theory by accounting for more complex aspects of modern trade, such
as market imperfections or strategic behavior, as well as new industrial economics,
new growth theory and political economy (rent-seeking) arguments (Deraniyagala
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and Fine, 2000). NTT explains the fact that the large bulk of world trade takes part
between countries with similar factor endowments (Poon et al., 2000), because of in-
creasing returns to scale and imperfect competition (Krugman, 1985; Helpman and
Krugman, 2002).
Much of the NTT literature deals with its nexus to new growth theory through
the channel of technology and knowledge spillovers (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Ir-
win and Terviö, 2002). Grossman and Grossman and Helpman, 2001 endorse the no-
tion that international trade leads to an expansion of the R&D sector, which in turn
drives economic growth. Countries that have a more established position within the
global trade network (i.e., stronger trade relations with better connected and/or nu-
merous amount of countries) tend to have higher growth and development rates
(Önder and Yilmazkuday, 2016). It should be noted that this effect is strongest
for countries with higher institutional quality and vaster human capital (Herzer,
2013). Other studies emphasize the positive effect of international trade through
new technologies that are embodied in imported capital goods that promote eco-
nomic growth (Romer, 1994; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Lee, 1995; Pissarides, 1997).
This mechanism is however conditional on the absorptive capacity, and in the long
run, the growth of output is forced down to the rate of human capital growth, as
Keller, 1996 shows in his work.
Stylized facts on Russia-related trade
Russia’s participation in world trade and its relative importance to the country is
still very modest. Russia’s primary trade partners are high-income countries. Many
of these countries are also involved in the Russian sanctions conflict. What follows
in this section is a description of several stylized facts on Russian trade patterns and
will provide a foundation for the empirical analysis in Chapter 2 of the thesis.
Even after the onset of the geopolitical crisis, EU-28 countries remain Russia’s
most important trading partners. Among these countries, trade with Germany is the
most substantial. Russia imports mainly capital goods from the EU. From an EU per-
spective, the relative importance of Russia as a trading partner varies significantly
across EU countries. The Russian market is quite relevant for German machinery
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and equipment commodities, whereas the Baltic and CEECs countries export pri-
marily agricultural products to Russia. As an exporter, Russia is integrated into
the global economy mainly through hydrocarbon and other minerals resources, on
which the EU is highly dependent. The dynamics of Russian exports in general, and
oil exports in particular, are heavily dependent on global commodity prices. Rus-
sian exports are especially vulnerable to cyclical price movements and idiosyncratic
challenges such as geopolitical tensions.
In 2017, the Russian share of total world exports amounted to less than 2% (in
2013 this indicator stood at 2.75%), whereas the import share is even more modest
at 1.32% (vs. 1.8% in 2013). The Russian trade-to-GDP ratio, which measures the
relative importance of international trade and is calculated as the sum of exports and
imports divided by the GDP, amounted to 46.8% in 2017 and showed a downward
trend beginning in the early 2000s (Appendix, Figure A.1). This is the smallest value
among other transition economies, many of which exhibit a ratio of over 100, an
indication that they are more tightly integrated into the global economy (Appendix,
Figure A.2).
According to Johnson, 2014 value-added exports (domestic value added con-
tained in final expenditure in each targeted country) amounted to 92% for Russia
in 2008, which is equal to 8% of intermediate inputs, suggesting that Russia is rel-
atively independent of the global market. It also implies a relatively small share of
Russian manufacturing in exports.
Figures A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix show the worldwide distribution of Rus-
sia’s export and import partners. The EU is the largest export and import market
for Russia, followed by China, Kazakhstan and the U.S. Since the expansion of the
EU in 2004, its importance as a trading partner has been increasing. And even
today, although the cooperation between the EU and Russia is hampered by mu-
tual sanctions, the prominence of bilateral trade relations cannot be underestimated.
Germany is the most important importer in 20 out 33 sectors of the Russian econ-
omy, including technological, agricultural, metalworking equipment and machinery
(Khoroshun, 2015). Germany’s total share in Russian imports amounted to over 10%
in 2016.
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Russian imports from European and, in particular, German market, are dom-
inated by machinery and transportation equipment, which make up around one
third of all imports from both the EU and Germany, respectively. Chemicals are re-
sponsible for 18% of all European exports to Russia. Other important products flow-
ing from the EU-28 to Russia, are crude materials and manufactured goods (18%,
and around 5%, respectively). Figure B.5 in the appendix shows the structure of
EU exports. As can be seen, there has been little change since the beginning of the
geopolitical crisis in 2014.
According to the 2016 World Bank trade data, fuels account for nearly half of
all Russian exports to global markets. For the EU, the share of mineral fuels, lubri-
cants and related materials imported from Russia amounts to 75% for these types of
imports together, (Appendix, Figure B.5). It pinpoints the fact that the EU remains
Russia’s most important energy market. The share of mineral fuels, lubricants and
related materials imported from Russia to Germany is roughly the same. Metals
(13%) and by chemicals and related products (around 3%) make up the next largest
share of Russian exports to the EU.
From the EU perspective, there was an export boost to Russia at the beginning of
the 2000s. This was followed by a period of relatively stability of European exports
in absolute values that continued until the financial crisis of 2008-2009. After a sharp
recovery, however, European exports to Russia started to deteriorate beginning in
2012. The share of EU-28 exports to Russian fell to less than 5% at the beginning of
the geopolitical crisis in 2014 and has not since recovered. Figure B.1 in the Appendix
depicts the development of this share. Compared with 2013, EU-28 exports to Russia
have decreased by nearly 30% by 2017. At the same time, exports by European
countries outside the EU increased by more than 8%, making the EU share even
smaller in total export volume. One possible reason for this considerable increase
by extra-EU countries is the 2014 devaluation fact of Euro. This devaluation made
European exports cheaper when compared to the rest of the world.
Economic sanctions against Russia that were first imposed in 2014 and are cur-
rently in force, primarily address military equipment and related materiel and uses,
equipment used for the exploration of oil and gas (including technologies used in
deep water, Arctic and shale oil extraction), as well as restrictions on capital market
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issuance of and trade in certain bonds, equity or similar financial instruments. As a
response to the Western sanctions, Russia boycotted agrarian products, foodstuffs,
and raw materials from countries that adopted sanctions against Russia, namely:
EU, US, Norway, Canada and Australia. At the moment of writing this thesis, the so
called counter-sanctions by Russia are still in effect.
Although Russia is the second largest market for European agricultural products,
the GDP share of agriculture in the EU as well as its export of agricultural products
was relatively low (1.7% and 6.6% respectively in 2013) when Russia adopted its
counter-sanctions. It is expected that Nordic and Baltic states will be impacted the
most towards by Russia’s boycott. Out of all EU countries, Germany can be affected
considerably in absolute terms because it is Russia’s main trade partner. Relatively
to other German export destinations, the expected losses are manageable. The situ-
ation might be different for other sanctioning countries that are Russia’s immediate
neighbours – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Latvia, Lithuania and Eastland. For them,
Russia remains one of the most important destinations. Their exports to Russia ac-
counted for more than 5% of their GDPs in 2013.
1.3.3 Foreign Direct Investment
Due to its growing importance in the globalization process, FDI has becoming a
prominent field of academic research during the past three decades. This section
deals with the study of the role of FDI in transition economies, with a special focus
on Russia. Two main questions are addressed: (1) How has FDI affected the na-
ture and pace of transition reforms since the early 1990s; (2) What factors influence
the investment and disinvestment decisions of multinational corporations (MNC’s).
First, we review the broad theoretical foundations developed by FDI studies, before
turning to the specific effects of FDI in host economies and how decisions are made
by MNC’s concerning the choice of location for investment and disinvestment. We
also present the results of empirical literature that tests the above theories based on
datasets developed for emerging countries. Finally, we discuss the primary stylized
facts concerning the latest developments in international capital flows in Russia.
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Theoretical foundations
The theoretical foundation of FDI literature is vast, and as Ietto-Gillies, 2012 con-
cluded in her literature survey, there are at least twelve important theoretical frame-
works that seek to explain why a firm makes a decision in favour of foreign pro-
duction rather than exporting or contracting (Heckscher, 1991; Ohlin, 1933; Melitz,
2003), why it chooses to become an international firm in general (McManus, 1972;
Buckley and Casson, 1976; Teece, 1977; Rugman, 1981; Caves, 2007), how it chooses
the host location (Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 1984; Krugman, 1985; Krugman, 1987;
Krugman, 1991; Krugman, 1998; Markusen and Venables, 1998), why some firms be-
come more successful than others in their internalization activities (Cantwell, 1995;
Cantwell and Iammarino, 2005) and whether the firms in the host economy benefit
or are hurt by the market steeling effect and fierce competition of technologically
more advanced newcomers (Findlay, 1978; Borensztein, Gregorio, and Lee, 1998;
Wang and Blomström, 1992; Markusen and Venables, 1998; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996).
After discussing main theoretical literature, we will examine two families of mod-
els in more detail. These models address the nature of spillover effects in catch-up
economies and decisions made by multinationals concerning the location of over-
seas affiliates.
FDI theories have their origins in the classical trade theory and its comparative
advantage concept as a result of differences in relative production costs (Ricardo,
David, 1772-1823, 1817). Drawing on these considerations, Heckscher and Ohlin de-
veloped the neoclassical theory of international trade in the 1920s (Heckscher, 1991;
Ohlin, 1933). In the neoclassical 2x2x2 model (two countries with two factors of pro-
duction, each producing one product), strict homogeneity assumptions concerning
countries‘ technologies, knowledge, production methods and perfectly competitive
markets with constant returns to scale are held. Under the assumption of production
factor immobility and product mobility, capital movements are mainly explained by
interest rate disparities (Iversen, 1935) in the world when no transportation costs,
trade barriers and uncertainty exist. Thus, up until the 1960s, there was no differ-
entiation between international portfolio investment and FDI. FDI was seen a by-
product of the neoclassical theory of international trade (Ietto-Gillies, 2012).
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Contrary to trade theories, which assume a perfect market system and immo-
bile factor inputs across countries and non-existing incentives for resource mobility
across nations, firms choose to become MNCs and venture abroad to exploit market
failures in host countries. It was the seminal work of Hymer that brought this no-
tion into focus. He also provides a critique of the unrealistic neoclassical approach
and acknowledges market imperfections (Hymer, 1960). Based on the concept of
control over operations abroad, he strictly separates portfolio investment from di-
rect investment. He develops an important theory of determinants of FDI, the main
components of which are firms’ advantages and a removal of conflicts. This indus-
trial organization approach emphasizes possible externalities from FDI inflows.
The dynamic theory of international production (Vernon, 1966) originates in tech-
nological gap theory (Posner, 1961) and the product life cycle theory (Kuznets, 1953;
Hirsch, 1967). It considers the changes in a firm, industry and market and links the
stages in the product’s life to geographical location of production and the compet-
itive structure of the industry. The countries are placed hierarchically with respect
to their state of economic development and innovative capacity, which breeds the
idea of technology transfer. Based on Vernon’s theory, Knickerbocker, 1973 attempts
to explain the geographical clustering of FDI. He assumes an oligopolistic structure
and conflicts between rivalling oligopolists.
Coase’s seminal paper on the opening of the obscure “black box” of a firm (Coase,
1937) gave rise to a work by Williamson, 1975 who introduces the concepts of bounded
rationality, opportunistic behaviour and asset specificity. These concepts highlight
the internalization strategies of firms and how these strategies relate to operations
in the home market. The theory was extended to international firms by Buckley
and Casson, 1976, Teece, 1977, Rugman, 1981, Casson and Caves, 1984 and Hennart,
1991, all of whom put an emphasis on the organization of production, and analyse
internalization of knowledge-based products in the post-WWII period.
The International Business (IB) literature with respect to FDI is usually domi-
nated by the eclectic OLI-paradigm developed Dunning, 1977, and is largely based
on Hymer’s work (Hymer, 1960). It represents a fundamental analytical framework
for the determinants of FDI. The paradigm comprises various factors based on mul-
tiple strands of economic literature: firm-specific ownership advantages (O) (e.g.,
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patents, trademarks, human capital, managerial and technological expertise), loca-
tion advantages (L) (such as, local endowments, institutional framework, labour
market characteristics) and internationalization advantages (I) (allowing Multina-
tional Enterprises (MNEs) to reduce transaction costs through the internationaliza-
tion of input use).
A more recent strand of literature acknowledges the heterogeneity of MNEs and
as a consequence, their varied impact on the host economy. According to Penrose’s
resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 2009), there is an unequal distribution of
resources across firms. Simultaneously, firms are concentrated on the exploitation
of its existing potential for growth by expansion into new markets. In contrast to
the neoclassical, incentive alignment and transaction cost perspectives, this view ac-
counts for different production cost levels of firms due to various competences and
capabilities. Penrose’s ideas gave rise to the competence-based theory of the firm
(Nelson and Winter, 1982b;Winter, 1984; Cantwell, 1989; Nelson, 1991; Teece et al.,
1994; Cantwell, 1995), which sees a firm as an institution with internal learning pro-
cesses that take the form of evolutionary experimentation (Cantwell and Piscitello,
2000).
Cantwell’s analysis (Cantwell, 1989) deals mainly with the question of why some
firms are more successful than others and focuses on their endogenous ownership
advantages, as well as interactions within both internal and external networks. Inno-
vation activities foster spillover effects to the host domain and the industry. Location
advantages are, therefore, also endogenously created and lead to positive agglomer-
ation effects. Thus, Cantwell links innovation and internalization (as does Vernon),
but contrary to Vernon’s approach, Cantwell sees the MNC as the innovation leader
rather than some specific country. Cantwell also considers FDI to be not only a cross-
border transmitter, but at the same time a creator of technology and related corporate
competences (Cantwell, 2017).
Technology diffusion and adoption is, however, conditional on, e.g., absorptive
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and own technological efforts (Lall, 2001).
Technology transfer is associated not only with FDI, but also with imports, inter-
nationalization of R&D activities by MNCs, inter-firm and intra-firm networks and
integration into global value chains (Fu, Pietrobelli, and Soete, 2011)
Chapter 1. Rationale 25
The new economic geography (NEG) approach (Krugman and Venables, 1995;
Krugman and Venables, 1996) is based on a general equilibrium model with increas-
ing returns to scale. It considers transportation and other spatial transaction costs,
and underlines the role of agglomeration forces in the decision-making process of
foreign firms. Increasing returns are either internal (related to the plant/firm) or ex-
ternal (spillovers related to the industry). Contrary to neoclassical theory, potential
trade barriers are assumed. Home and host countries are differently endowed en-
dogenously, which helps to explain FDI location either in developed or developing
countries. Three factors of agglomeration are underlined: technological spillovers,
the labour force condition and the proximity to upstream and downstream indus-
tries. The industrial concentration is conditioned through proximity to markets and
suppliers.
FDI’s role in a transition economy
In this section we will relate some of these theories to how foreign capital flows im-
pact transition economies, many of which are located in today’s CEECs Host loca-
tions are typically characterized by weaker institutions and economies, technology
gaps, some significant factor endowments, weaker bargaining power and volatile
markets. Some of these factors may mitigate the usual consequences of FDI entry,
mostly impacting FDI flows from developed economies.
The impact of MNEs in host countries has been studied extensively in the re-
cent past. According to the neoclassical perspective, FDI increases capital stock,
contributing to economic growth through the channel of capital formation. Un-
der the assumption of diminishing returns to capital, economies converge to some
steady-state growth rate in the long run, even if exogenous capital expansion via FDI
temporarily increases production. Thus, FDI impacts short-run growth only, leav-
ing long-run growth unaffected (Solow, 1957). In contrast, the endogenous growth
model underlines the role of technological change (Romer, 1986). By adopting new
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technologies, developing countries have a chance to catch up. One of the most im-
portant sources of technological diffusion and human capital is FDI. Within this the-
oretical framework, capital enters the economy in the form of human capital accu-
mulation and R&D. Externalities that arise from these types of capital are empha-
sized. Technologies introduced by foreign firms may spillover to domestic firms.
Positive spillover effects and higher productivity created by foreign capital rather
than domestic capital offset diminishing capital returns, allowing FDI to stimulate
economic growth.
A number of scholars argue that FDI’s impact on economic growth is condi-
tional on a variety of factors, e.g., size of the host’s sufficient absorptive capacity
in form of the accumulated human capital stock (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994) or
some threshold development level of the financial system of the host (Hermes and
Lensink, 2003).
There is an empirically established bidirectional dynamic relationship between
FDI and economic growth (Iamsiraroj, 2016). Caves, 1974 laid the empirical foun-
dation for numerous other studies. These studies indicate that FDI is an important
source of: employment and knowledge transfer (Aitken and Harrison, 1999), eco-
nomic growth in catching-up economies (Fillat and Woerz, 2011; Damijan, Kostevc,
and Rojec, 2013; Weber, 2011) and the development of local institutions (North,
1990). Kolk and van Tulder, 2006 show that these effects may be caused by MNEs
raising various standards. There is, however, some indication that MNCs might si-
multaneously crowd out local firms. It is also important to note that technology and
knowledge transfer are neither sustainable in the long run (Aitken and Harrison,
1999), nor necessarily efficient in alleviating poverty (Oetzel and Doh, 2009).
During the Soviet era, firms in today’s transition economies often lagged behind
the world technological frontier, except for some strategic fields, e.g., nuclear tech-
nology, space engineering and military hardware. By attracting FDI after the fall of
the Soviet Union, domestic firms in transition economies seek knowledge transfer
opportunities that are directly embodied in FDI. These transfers can then become an
integral part of the production process. This is the logic behind the idea that FDI is
a mechanism that acts as an important driver of economic growth in the transition
economies.
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The empirical literature, dealing with the role of aggregate FDI, particularly
in transition economies, usually distinguishes between direct (i.e., performance-
related) and indirect (also called spillover) effects (Hanousek, Kocˇenda, and Mau-
rel, 2011; Iwasaki and Tokunaga, 2016). One aspect of direct effects is how foreign
ownership impacts transition economies. Most empirical studies show than foreign
firms outperform local ones, usually exhibiting higher levels of productivity com-
pared to domestic firms. It has been shown for most CEECs that foreign ownership
improves total factor productivity (TFP) and/or labour productivity (e.g., Sgard,
2001 for Hungary; Djankov and Hoekman, 2000 for the Czech Republic; and Kon-
ings, 2001 for Romania, Bulgaria and Poland). Yudaeva et al., 2003 provide empir-
ical evidence about how FDI acts as a source of productivity improvement among
Russian manufacturing. A link has also been established between FDI and regional
economic development in Russia, as well as support for the absorptive capacity hy-
pothesis. It has been shown that local R&D potential exhibits a strong synergistic
relationship with FDI (Iwasaki and Suganuma, 2015).
Determining whether technology transfers from foreign firms spillover to do-
mestic firms not affiliated with foreign owners, is the primary focus of empirical
studies dealing with indirect effects of FDI. Positive spillover effects through val-
ued added chains might occur, but domestic firms might also benefit from imported
managerial experience. Foreign companies contribute to the development of the
value chain and creating skilled jobs in the source country. Exposed to tough for-
eign competition, domestic firms are often forced to innovate in order to survive.
This leads to a catching up process towards the production frontier and FDI is seen
as an accelerator of technical progress at the macro-level (Javorcik and Spatareanu,
2011; Sánchez-Sellero, Rosell-Martínez, and García-Vázquez, 2014). However, at the
micro-level negative spillover effects can also take place. If the competitive pressure
created by FDI is too high, domestic firms can be confronted by shrinking markets
(Aitken and Harrison, 1999).
Usually, studies distinguish between horizontal (intra-industrial) and vertical
(inter-industrial) spillover effects. Vertical effects imply technology transfers that oc-
cur along the production chain. These transfers occur either through forward link-
ages or backward linkages. Forward linkages relate to the upstream industries in
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the sense that domestic firms benefit from intermediates by foreign firms. Backward
linkages relate to downstream industries given the scenario of local firms selling
to foreign-owned firms. Horizontal spillovers are specific to firms operating in the
same sector. Studies looking at these relationships are interested in determining
whether domestic firms are able to catch up and/or benefit from FDI presence in
markets.
The evidence presented by studies on spillover effects in the CEECs is manifold
and mixed, ranging from positive effects to no (see e.g. Kinoshita, 2001 for Czech Re-
public or Konings, 2001 for Bulgaria and Romania) or even negative spillover effects
by FDI (see e.g. Konings, 2001 for Poland). Positive spillovers are often conditioned
by some factors, e.g., the adoption of new technologies by domestic firms (Javorcik,
2004 for in the Czech Republic and Latvia), the export-oriented nature of FDI, or the
absorptive capacity of domestic firms (Tytell and Yudaeva, 2006 for Russia, Ukraine,
Poland, and Romania). Sgard, 2001 provides evidence for positive spillovers in Hun-
gary, driven by export-oriented foreign-owned firms. Gorodnichenko, Svejnar, and
Terrell, 2013 demonstrate consistent positive backward spillover effects based on a
vast sample of 17 transition economies. Yudaeva et al., 2003 find positive horizontal
spillover effects for Russian manufacturing firms due to, among other things, the
stock of human capital attracted by FDI to specific locations. However, negative
spillovers occur to domestic firms that are vertically connected to foreign firms.
Additionally, the intensity of spillover effects may be conditioned by various
firm- or country-specific characteristics, such as size of affiliate, ownership structure,
industry, FDI source, institutional environment, firm’s distance to the technological
frontier, etc. (Gorodnichenko, Svejnar, and Terrell, 2013). Small firms benefit more
from the presence of FDI (Sinani and Meyer, 2004) and firms wholly owned by a
foreign investor generate positive horizontal spillovers compared to joint ventures
(Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008 for Romania).
Other features contribute to the moderation of expected FDI spillover effects.
These features include MNCs selecting the most productive local firms in the process
of acquisition, and gaps in technological development and human skills between
the home and host locations that are too wide. Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti,
2003 and Aghion et al., 2005, for example, refer to a Schumpeterian model claiming
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that firms located closer to the efficiency frontier are more likely to benefit from the
foreign presence and increased competitive pressure than technological laggards.
MNC behaviour
The next family of theoretical and empirical FDI literature deals with location choice
and disinvestment. This stream of literature analyzes factors that influence the deci-
sions concerning the place, size and time of FDI. This research is important for policy
makers in transition countries, and deals with how foreign multinationals respond
to the circumstances that attract/repel MNCs to/from host markets.
Theoretically, entry decisions for FDI are usually explained through two main
motives (see literature survey by Faeth, 2009): horizontal market-seeking (HFDI)
and vertical resource-seeking (VFDI). Foreign establishments from the first category
utilize host market opportunities when there are high trade costs combined with
a sufficient local demand and intra-industry firm heterogeneity. MNCs motivated
by VFDI exploit factor endowments, such as lower wages, natural resources etc.
(Markusen, 1984; Helpman, 1984; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004). A combina-
tion of horizontal and vertical factors is considered to be a hybrid and fits within
the knowledge-capital model (e.g. Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001). This model
takes into account a wide variety of factors, including: natural resource endowment,
labor costs, market size and saturation, third country effects, agglomeration exter-
nalities, institutional factors.
In the real world, the types of motivations influencing decisions for FDI usually
overlap and may change over time and in scope. Over time there has been a shift
towards horizontal motives for FDI that flows into CEECs (Stack, Ravishankar, and
Pentecost, 2017). Ledyaeva, 2009 comes to the opposite conclusion with respect to
Russia, and claims a shift towards VFDI after the crisis of 1998.
Additional empirical evidence on Russia shows the critical role of the vertical
motives (i.e., the natural resource endowment) for FDI location decisions (Iwasaki
and Suganuma, 2015; Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Ledyaeva, 2009). The issue of a “re-
source curse” is often considered in connection with FDI location decisions. The
basic premise is that resource-seeking FDI crowds out non-resource-seeking FDI.
A plethora of resources is often penalized by decreasing levels of aggregate FDI.
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Studies dealing with issues related to vertical FDI consider the side-effects of the so
called Dutch disease. In this scenario, resource-seeking FDI invests in businesses
with primary resources, crowding out investment in other industries that are capa-
ble of generating higher spillover effects. (Corden and Neary, 1982; van der Ploeg
and Poelhekke, 2009).
Using micro data, Gonchar and Marek, 2014 diverge from the established vertical
hypothesis drawn from Russian data, and provide evidence for a more complex link
between FDI flows and resource endowment in emerging economies. Namely, they
find that factor endowment adequately explains the behaviour of export-platform
firms that sell in third markets rather than host or home markets, and prove that
even in resource-rich regions, there is ample service investment. Generally speaking,
the authors dispel the crowding out argument.
Across Russian regions, a sluggish judicial system and the strong political power
of local authorities combined with poor governance quality are key institutional
characteristics that discourage entry decisions by multinationals. However, MNEs
tend to adjust to weaker local courts though structural mechanisms, i.e., larger size
and partnership (Bessonova and Gonchar, 2017; Kuzmina, Volchkova, and Zueva,
2014). Ledyaeva, Karhunen, and Kosonen, 2013 confirm the importance of a shared
political culture between the foreign investors and specific Russian regions. Specif-
ically, FDI from less corrupt and more democratic countries flows into less corrupt
and more democratic Russian regions, and vice versa. However, round-tripping FDI
is positively associated with the host region corruption (Ledyaeva et al., 2015).
Less discussed in the literature is the issue of disinvestment decisions of multina-
tionals that is not only linked to location, institutions and political risks, but is also
subject to delays and a configuration of different factors that influence the decision
to exit or to enter. The above debated advantages offered by foreign firms to host
economies (Section 1.3.3) evaporate when they decide to disinvest. Chapter 3 of this
thesis provides an empirical analysis of divestment decisions by MNCs in Russia.
Besides firm characteristics established in the literature, we find that political risks
in both host and home countries have significant effects on the MNC’s decision to
exit. In this sense, if the MNC has established a large subsidiary or a greenfield
investment the exit probability is reduced.
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The following section presents major FDI trends connected to location-choice
decisions with Russia being a home country (outward FDI) as well as host country
(inward FDI).
Stylized facts about FDI in Russia and data description
Russia as an interesting setting for the empirical analysis of the multinationals’ be-
haviour.
Russia is an interesting setting for the empirical analysis of multinationals’ be-
haviour. First, compared to other transition economies, Russia was a latecomer to
international investment flows. Several factors mattered: problematic investment
climate; low prices on commodities in the 1990s; a ban on the participations of for-
eign investors in mass privatization; a lack of corresponding infrastructure. As a
result, Russia lagged behind peers in per capita accumulated flows, though it led
in absolute flows and the size of selected deals in the natural gas and oil sectors.
Second, this is the largest recipient in CEECs and FSU in absolute terms and a home
market for mega-deals in the oil and natural gas sector, which did not cease to be
concluded in the aftermath of the global financial crisis as of 2008 and geopoliti-
cal crisis starting from 2014. Third, contrary to the smallest transition economies,
the overall economic importance of FDI in Russia is fairly marginal, being however
large enough in some sectors and sub-national territories. Fourth, the modern eco-
nomic history of Russia has witnessed significant ups and downs in the inflow and
outflow dynamics, driven by various factors, including the global economic crisis
as well as trends in commodity prices. The recent FDI trends are dependent on the
growth of political risks that result in decrease of inflows and departures of MNCs
from the country. Fifth, FDI outflow is a new phenomenon and has the following
features: (1) outflow takes place mainly to financial hubs, and havens for the conclu-
sion of exporting deals; (2) an existence of the round-tripping capital; (3) OFDI takes
place mainly in search of access to technologies and less so – markets.
In order to place the empirical results presented in Chapter 3 of this disserta-
tion in a broader economic context, we will examine the above mentioned trends in
more detail. The investment climate in Russia has always been rather unwelcoming
(Radziwill and Vaziakova, 2015). After the introduction of sanctions and conflicts
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between Russia and Ukraine, Russia’s country risk heightened, and its creditworthi-
ness was downgraded by ranking agencies such as S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. Russia’s
country risk, measured by the PRS group, shows a risk increase of over 4.3% in 2014.
This amounts to around a 30% increase compared to 2007. As Chapter 3 shows, there
is a negative relationship between FDI and country risk levels. Table A.2 in the Ap-
pendix presents the connection and development of country risk and FDI in Russia
between 2007 and 2017.
After the transition began in the early 1990s, the inflow levels of FDI remained
low for a while compared to most CEECs. On average, between 1990-2002 inflow
levels were around 16 Euro per capita, or less than 1% of GDP. Whereas the Czech
Republic, for example, received 276 Euro per capita, or 5.3% of GDP, and Hungary
received 242 Euro per capita, or 6.4% of GDP. This situation changed around 2003,
when the oil prices rose substantially, making the oil- dependent Russian economy
an attractive location for FDI. FDI inflows have become 13 times greater within a
span of 6 years between 2002 and 2008, with 2008 being the year with maximum
FDI inflows, to this point. FDI inflows amounted to 4.6% of GDP, compared to 2017
when it was only 1.7% (wiiw, 2019). Overall, in spite of relatively low levels of
accumulated FDI, in absolute terms, Russia became an attractive FDI location, even
under conditions of poor institutions and increasing political risks, as Figure A.6 in
the Appendix shows. Moreover, Russia is among top 20 FDI hosts worldwide and
the most attractive location among the transition economies (see Table A.3 in the
Appendix).
If we examine characteristics of the most recent economic crisis, the economy
started to recover after the contraction in GDP in 2015 and the Russian Federation
saw its FDI inflows surging back to 33.6 billion Euro in 2016. Nevertheless, bilateral
trade restrictions motivated the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 have hampered FDI flows.
The flows recorded in 2016 were still only slightly higher than half of the 2008 record
of 51.7 billion Euro, and 16% below the 40.2 billion Euro recorded in 2013. The
current investment drought Russia is experiencing might lead to an ever increasing
technological gap in Russia, increase the structural shortcomings of the economy.
This is especially true when taking into account the high dependence of Russia’s
economy on foreign technologies and international borrowing.
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The structure of FDI in Russia is illustrated in Table A.2 in the Appendix. The FDI
inflow to the oil and gas sectors, in spite of several mega-deals, has decreased, fol-
lowing the drastic fall in oil prices, the political crisis, the ban on technologies trans-
fer and the deteriorating conditions of international borrowing for Russian compa-
nies. The introduced Western sanctions limit Russian cooperation with foreign oil
companies, which should have expanded oil exploration in Russia’s Arctic shelf in
the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea by Rosneft. Because of the sanctions and a more
complicated equipment supply, an expansion of the currently stagnating oil produc-
tion far to the east is also not probable (Cˇwiek-Karpowicz and Secrieru, 2015).
The EU is the biggest supplier of FDI to Russia. Since 2010, EU’s FDI stock has
never dropped below 30% of all FDI stock (wiiw, 2019). However, an average in-
vestment flow to Russia between the years 2010 and 2017 amounted to 0.1% of the
EU’s GDP. In 2013, the average investment flow reached 0.2%, and after hitting rock
bottom in 2015 slowly recovered to 0.04% in 2017. The largest FDI flows come from
the European countries that are tax havens. Cyprus and Luxembourg accounted for
nearly 60% and 22% of all European FDI to Russia in 2017. Since 2010, based on aver-
age percent of GDP, the FDI flow to Russia from Luxembourg and Ireland amount to
5.4% and 1.5%, respectively. In the previous decade, the three largest EU economies
(Germany, Great Britain and France) provided FDI to Russia that is less than 0.12%
of their GDPs. In absolute terms regarding each individual country, Germany is the
largest supplier of FDI in Russia excluding European tax heavens. Over 15 billion
Euro of German capital had accumulated in Russia by 2017. More than 2000 German
subsidiaries operated in 60 Russian regions in 2017, producing goods worth around
51.3 billion Euro and employing over 170 000 people (Orbis, 2019). After Germany,
the major EU investors are France (FDI stock of 12.6 billion Euro in 2017), Austria
(4.7 billion Euro) and Sweden (4.3 billion Euro).
Investments in the Russian Federation by MNEs from developing economies in-
creased beginning in 2014. China increased FDI to Russia by nearly 1.5 time in 2014
compared to the previous year. Compared to 2013, Turkey invested nearly 70% more
in Russia in 2015. In the same year, Kazakhstan increased its FDI flows by nearly 1.5
times. An increase of FDI from China and Kazakhstan continued in 2016, by an
increase of over 100% in each case against the previous year.
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Globally, the terrain of outward FDI (OFDI) is still heavily dominated by de-
veloped countries, accounting for over 70% of the world’s outward investment in
2017 (Figure A.7 in the Appendix). Russia remains, however, the world’s largest
outward investing transition country, contributing about 1.2% of the world OFDI,
compared with 25% held by the biggest investor worldwide, the USA (Table A.4 in
the Appendix). Russia’s more than 12 times larger OFDI, lies far beyond the second-
ranked Poland in 2017, and holds around 338 billion Euro of outward investment
stock. Although (based on 2000-2015 averages) Russia possesses about 70% of the
total OFDI stock from post-transition economies , compared to the biggest global
investors, its stake remains more than modest, less than 5% of OFDI stock from the
US and 3.6% of OFDI from the EU-28 in 2017 (UNCTAD, 2018).
The development of Russian OFDI in the 1990s was rather modest and never
exceeded 20 Euro per capita (wiiw, 2019). It sky-rocketed between 2000 and 2008 by
more than 13 times to over 38 billion Euro in 2008. The crisis of 2008 had a dramatic
effect on Russian OFDI, not only due to disinvestment, but also due to a dearth of
external financing. Within the space of one year, outward investment decreased by
a dramatic 36%. Russian OFDI took off again in 2010. Despite a dramatic surge in
2013 (rising to over 53 billion Euro, a 140% increase over 2012), by 2017 it remained
close to the pre-crisis level of 2007. This can be explained in part by the geopolitical
crisis that occurred between 2014 and 2016 when OFDI retreated significantly and
amounted to around half of 2013 OFDI (wiiw, 2019).
Although not directly subjected to Russian counter-sanctions, state-owned en-
terprises still have to comply with the country’s sanction policy as some of them
are directly hit by Western sanctions. This is especially critical when taking into
account that Russia’s largest MNE, Gazprom Germania GmbH (a turnover of over
20 billion Euro in 2017), is directly sanctioned. Sanctions against Russia target spe-
cific persons and important firms (e.g., Rosneft, Gazprom) or banks (e.g., Sberbank,
Vneshekonombank,) directly. It should be noted, however, that increasing interest
rates and a deteriorating exchange rate, both of which cripple OFDI, might exert an
even higher impact on Russian OFDI, compared with the decreasing effect of sanc-
tions (Liuhto, 2015).
A 30% OFDI growth in 2017 offered the first signs of recovery and propelled the
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country to the twelfth largest home country for FDI, improving its 2016 position by 4
ranking points. Round-tripping OFDI is a typical capital runaway strategy for Rus-
sia among other post-communist transition economies (PTEs) (Liuhto and Majuri,
2014). The geographical distribution of Russian OFDI favours the EU, with an aver-
age of 14% flowing into the EU-27 between the years 2009 and 2017 (excluding the
tax heaven Cyprus, with 55% in 2017). Russian OFDI into PTEs as host countries re-
mained extremely moderate throughout 2009-2017 and amounted to 0.3%, on aver-
age. Russian investors employ both market-seeking and resource-seeking strategies
when making OFDI decisions. Market-seeking strategies are implemented in mar-
kets that share a Soviet heritage (e.g., CIS and CEECs countries), as well as certain
Western European countries. Resource-seeking strategies in the CIS and Africa are
oriented towards oil, gas, mining.
1.4 Conclusions
The benefits of the global integration for emerging and transition economies are
widely recognized in the literature. However, Russia is characterized by still highly
underdeveloped globalization potential compared to other transition economies.
This chapter considers data trends, theoretical frameworks and existing empirical
evidence that support this notion.
The ongoing globalization process in Russia has been interrupted and partly re-
versed as a result of a geopolitical crisis caused by tensions related to the annexation
of Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The bilateral sanctions that were in-
troduced in response to the crisis partially reversed the gradual improvement of do-
mestic institutions, and led to the deterioration of newly established institutions that
facilitated global integration (Romanova, 2016). Beginning in 2014, Russia found it-
self caught simultaneously in a domestic economic crisis as well as a geopolitical
crisis.
The foundation laid in this Rationale provides a solid basis for a further empir-
ical investigation on Russia’s transition economy. The great paradox is that, on the
one hand, Russia’s economy is in need of technology transfer, yet on the other hand,
Russia’s political landscape is responsible for isolating the country from the global
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economic system. It is the goal of this thesis to empirically study the behaviour of
various economic agents given Russia’s current (geo)political and economic circum-
stances that have dramatically increased uncertainties and have forced domestic and
foreign firms to shift their decision-making processes.
The next section will highlight the main contributions of the present thesis on the
issue of the costs of economic sanctions born by the sender (Chapter 2), the role of
the political risks in altering the behaviour patterns of MNCs in the host country a
subject to international sanctions (Chapter 3) as well as factors, associated with the
movement of individual firms towards the production frontier that is highly relevant
for the transition economy (Chapter 4).
1.4.1 Results, limitations and further research
The encompassing objective of this thesis is driven by the desire to understand the
relevance of increased global uncertainties and concomitant economic instabilities
on Russia’s emerging economy. After the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2014,
the European Union and Russia imposed bilateral sanctions on each other. Most ex-
isting empirical studies quantify the economic loss for Russia as the targeted country.
However, the theoretical models also predict welfare losses for the implementer of
the sanctions (Dorussen and Mo, 2001; Baldwin, 2000; Caruso, 2003; Hufbauer et al.,
2010). Chapter 2 of this thesis paper focuses on the impact of sanctions on one of
their imposers, the EU-27. To that end, we address the following first set of research
questions:
(1) What are overall production effects of the EU sanctions on EU-27?
(2) How strong are spillover effects within EU-27 within the magnitude of the
crisis?
(3) What does a ranking of European loss bearers look like?
We first apply a two-step methodology that allows us to disentangle the losses
for each individual economy that occurred as a result of sanctions, from the losses
that would have occurred anyway due to stagnating growth in Russia and a collapse
of oil prices in 2014. In a second step, we consider indirect losses along the supply
chain in each economy, as well as spillover effects within Europe.
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To the best of our knowledge, this empirical investigation is the first attempt to
comprehensively quantify EU-27 losses caused by sanctions against Russia. This
analysis not only accounts for direct trade relationships with Russia on a highly
disaggregated two-digit sectoral level, but also for the complex trade network within
the EU-28 and the sector interconnectedness of the economies of each member of the
EU-28.
The results indicate a clear division of EU-27 countries into two groups: Western
European countries that recovered from the sanctions shock by the end of 2016, and
Eastern European and Baltic countries where the negative consequences are still in
effect. The sectoral losses are distributed as predicted, with the highest losses in the
food and beverages sector, and the lowest in the service sectors.
The datasets used in this study only extend to the year 2016. However, in the
meantime new developments have taken place, producing further sources of uncer-
tainty. Thus, further research on this topic would benefit from extending the time
series until at least 2018. This extension would not only expose new opportunities
for different research strategies, but might also reveal exciting insights on the out-
comes of relevant policy considerations. Moreover, this study does not account for
the high heterogeneity that characterizes European firms serving the Russian mar-
ket. Therefore, taking a micro perspective when studying the impact of the sanctions
on the EU represents another important research extension.
Box 1. Highlights of the study
• In 2014, mutual sanctions between Russia and the EU were imposed
• The sanctions impact during 2014-2016 on the EU-27 is investigated
• Among biggest losers are Baltic and Eastern European countries
• Germany is strongly affected due to the spillover effects within the European
Union
• Methods used: VAR and input-output modelling
We shift our perspective in Chapter 3, not only on a nation state level, but with
respect to the data disaggregation. While we are still interested in examining the
broader topics of economic uncertainty and international relationships of Russia,
we focus on how MNCs located in Russia react to increasing political risks. The
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growing interest in political risks as a driver of FDI disinvestment decisions is mostly
propelled by the increased interaction of firms from countries with weak or strong
institutions. This process of globalization confronts MNCs with increased risks, such
as corruption, political interventions, or even being taken over by the host state.
Guided by multiple strands of literature, including: industrial organization (Dunne,
Roberts, and Samuelson, 1988; Caves, 1998; Li, 1995), institutional economics (North,
1990), real options approach (Dixit, 1995; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), power bargaining
(Vernon, 1971; Teece, 1986b; Moon and Lado, 2000), and resource-based FDI (Kobrin,
1987; Moran, 1975; Henisz, 2000), we pose the second set of research questions:
(1) How do political risks affect the decision to exit by multinationals?
(2) Does the effect of political risk on exit depend on the political differences
between the home and host locations?
(3) What mechanisms can protect a multinational subsidiary in a host country
that is characterized by weak institutions and high political risks?
(4) How do national and sub-national risks interact in determining an exit strat-
egy?
(5) Have sanctions catalysed the effect of political risks?
Using multinational plant-level data for Russia in the period 2000-2016, and ap-
plying the Cox hazard proportional model, we find significant effects of political risk
on exits. Multinational companies (MNCs) are particularly sensitive to problems
associated with low democratic accountability, a military presence in the political
arena, as well as conflict and corruption. We also show that, as the political pressure
to exit Russia increases, institutional similarity does not tend to reduce the hazard
of MNCs leaving the market of developing countries. This is especially true for sub-
sidiaries that originate from countries with higher home risks compared to Russia.
"Round-tripping" investments are the only exception: subsidiaries established by
multinationals of Russian origin through international financial hubs and tax havens
do not react to the growth of host political risks by exiting the market. Their disin-
vestment decision probably depends on types of political harassment by the host
government not studied in this paper. We also find that sanctions significantly catal-
yse the effects of home political risk on exits, and are particularly threatening for
subsidiaries from implementing states with weak institutions. Large subsidiaries,
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or organizations developed as a greenfield or joint-venture with a local partner, as
well as the existence of an intergovernmental investment treaty help subsidiaries to
build resistance against the political risks of host countries. These findings provide
empirical evidence that help draw conclusions in the debate about FDI volatility in
countries with high levels of risk.
Our thesis delivers a valuable contribution not only to the above mentioned
strands of theoretical literature, we also reveal a vast palette of factors affecting exits
beyond political risks and explore mechanisms that might protect firms from ex-
iting the market, we also engage in the sanctions debate. The finding that MNCs
that originate in weaker states are penalized more when they impose sanctions is re-
lated to the separation of European countries into two groups based on the evidence
presented in Chapter 2. In that instance, we see that European countries with tradi-
tionally weaker institutions were more detrimentally affected by the imposition of
sanctions.
Another research extension might deal with a comparison between domestic
and foreign firms with respect to their productivity levels and forces that shape in-
dustry dynamics in response to a changing geopolitical environment. Along those
lines, an in-depth analysis of domestic firms’ survival strategies might reveal hidden
strengths or weaknesses of domestic human capital.
Box 2. Highlights of the study
• Political risks have significant effects on MNC decision to exit
• Firms are most sensitive to low democratic accountability, military in poli-
tics, conflict and corruption
• Institutional similarity does not tend to reduce hazard of exit for MNCs from
developing countries
• Sanctions catalyze the effects of home risk and are particularly threatening
for subsidiaries from sender states with weak institutions
• Large size, organization as a greenfield or joint-venture with a local partner,
an investment treaty help to build resistance against host risks
• Methods: Survival analysis
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In the final empirical Chapter of the thesis (Chapter 4), we address an important
issue that stands as a high priority on the agendas of emerging countries, namely
the sources of productivity growth that would allow them to approach the world
frontier. The research presented in this thesis draws on the Schumpeterian and evo-
lutionary school of thought (Dosi, 1988; Klepper and Thompson, 2006; Nelson and
Winter, 1982b; Pavitt, 1999), since we believe that this theoretical framework is es-
pecially relevant for the emerging economies that might take advantage of existing
advanced technologies prevalent in developed countries. Therefore, we formulate a
third set of research questions:
(1) Which performance characteristic - productivity gains, output growth, or sur-
vival - is rewarded by innovation in the presence of relatively low competition, high
uncertainty, and a weak market selection mechanism?
(2) To what extent is performance influenced by various forms of innovation?
(3) How does the effect differ across different sources of knowledge inputs?
(4) How do size, location, and market selection intervene in the innovation /
performance relationship?
Using survey data drawn from Russian manufacturing firms and merging that
data with registry data, this thesis studies how firm innovation strategies affect vari-
ous features of firm performance. A multi-stage structural model is used that relates
the firm’s decision to undertake R&D to its innovation output, technical efficiency
(TE), labour productivity, and growth. Additionally, we include imports into the
knowledge production function, because catching up economies may adopt tech-
nologies that are part of imported hardware. The Cox proportional hazard model is
employed to link productivity and innovation output to survival.
We find that both types of knowledge input – R&D and imports – strongly deter-
mine innovation. Innovations yield the strongest performance return for those firms
that are catching up to the technological frontier (TE). Product innovation is more
beneficial than process innovation in all performance features except for labour pro-
ductivity. However, higher efficiency does not improve the growth rates or survival
time of manufacturing firms. Taken together, these results show that innovation is
not uniformly rewarded across all features of firm performance. Therefore, firms
that maximize output or market share, rather than their technological advance, may
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make different R&D and innovation decisions. This pattern most probably influ-
ences further strategic choices of Russian manufacturing firms in, as well as the evo-
lution of the industry and the product market structure.
This study contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature by introducing
four important novelties. First, we compile a unique dataset comprised of matched
survey and registry data that allows us to compare the innovation impact on three
performance indicators: productivity, growth, and survival. Second, we account for
Russia’s globalization process and thereby include the knowledge input generated
by imports of machines and equipment – the most typical source of technologies for
the firms in emerging economies. Third, when calculating the impact of innovation
on firm performance, we refine technological and cost competitiveness features by
introducing technical efficiency (TE) in terms of firms’ distance to the production
frontier by using a more intuitive and simple productivity measure, namely, labour
productivity. Finally, we extend the framework of the innovation/performance link
by accounting for two crucial performance characteristics: survival and growth.
In the thesis, we acknowledge several limitations. First, the dataset is biased to-
wards larger firms. Although the sample is weighed where possible, it is difficult to
account for the bias because the full population of small firms in Russia is not well
known. Second, although we use the most detailed level of price deflators (4-digit)
that is available for Russian manufacturing sector, the results involving growth rates
should be interpreted with caution. Further research on this topic will benefit by
extending the time series, since the short panel employed in this thesis might under-
estimate the notion of firms’ natural life cycles. Also, by extending the time period,
a more refined econometric strategy could be applied. It would be interesting to
find out whether the obtained results hold for a growing rather than for a stagnating
industry when the growth is balanced by commodities’ prices and more favourable
terms of trade. The duration of the performance effects of innovations is another
interesting topic for further analysis, especially using a comparative perspective.
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Box 3. Highlights of the study
• Firm’s decision to undertake R&D to innovation output, technological effi-
ciency (TE), labour productivity and growth is studied
• Both types of knowledge input – R&D and imports – strongly determine
innovation
• Innovations bring the highest performance return when catching up to tech-
nological frontier
• More productive and faster growing firms have higher survival rates, and
innovation decreases mortality, especially for small firms
• Positive relationship between firm growth and both product and process in-
novation is revealed, however, the “growth of the fittest” doesn’t hold un-
conditionally
• Methods: Survival analysis, stochastic frontier analysis, 2SLS IV, Heckman
two-step estimation
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EU and Russian sanctions: how big
is the economic impact within the
European Union?
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Abstract1
Followed by the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2014, the European Union
and Russia applied bilateral sanctions towards each other. This paper focuses on
the impact of sanctions on one of their senders, the EU-27. An applied two-step
methodology allows in the first step to disentangle losses resulted out of sanctions
for each individual economy from the losses which would have occurred anyway
due to a stagnating growth in Russia and a collapse of oil prices in 2014. In the sec-
ond step, indirect losses along the supply chain in each economy as well as spillover
effects within Europe are considered. The results indicate a clear division of all EU-
27 countries into two groups: Western European countries which meanwhile recov-
ered from the sanctions shock, and Eastern European and Baltic countries where the
negative consequences by the end of 2016 are still very sustainable.
JEL classification: F17, F15, E65
Key words: economic sanctions, trade policy, politics and economics of EU-27
1I would like to explicitly thank Jutta Günther for her scientific guidance on this project. I am also
indebted to helpful comments from Erik Dietzenbacher, Udo Ludwig, Marco Sunder as well as par-
ticipants of the 14th Biannual Conference of European Association for Comparative Economic Studies
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2.1 Introduction
The Ukraine conflict in 2014 launched a crisis between the European Union (EU)
and Russia, which some scholars consider as the most critical and controversial con-
frontation in Europe’s latest past (Howorth, 2017; Orenstein and Kelemen, 2017;
Schilde, 2017). The EU members applied various sanctions to Russia, and conse-
quently, Russia responded with different sectoral restrictions towards the imposers.
Apart from the financial restrictions, economic sanctions by the EU include arms and
related materials, dual use goods for military purposes or military end-users, and
equipment for the oil and gas sectors for use of the exploration, extraction of deep
sea, Arctic and shale oil. Russian counter-sanctions ban the agri-food and raw ma-
terial imports. Due to close trade, energy and investment relations between Russia
and the EU, the introduced bilateral sanctions affect noticeably not only the Russian
economy, but also have large-scale effects on many EU economies as well. Taking
into account continuous extensions of the sanctions on both sides (European Coun-
cil, 2018), it’s becoming of ever higher importance to understand what economic
effects these political settlements are accompanied by.
European exports into the world increased by 6% between 2013 and 2016, whereas
the exports to Russia dropped by nearly 40% within the same time period. As a re-
sult, the relative meaning of the Russian market became less significant for the EU-
27. In 2013 the relative share of exports to Russia amounted to 2.61% of all world
exports from the EU. The equivalent share in 2016 hardly reached 1.5%2.
A comparison of the European exports to Russia in absolute numbers before and
after the crisis, reveals that Germany remained the only country, which sustained
the amount of the exports over 10 billion Euro throughout the crisis, namely 21.7
billion Euro in 2015 (although the pre-crisis number of the year 2013 equals 35.8,
which still indicates a substantial loss of nearly 40%)3. An even clearer pattern of
the crisis consequences can be recognized when looking at the relative numbers.
Figure 1 compares a relative importance of the EU-27 exports to Russia before the
Ukraine conflict and afterwards. Obviously, Eastern European and Baltic countries
remained strongly tied to Russia, whereas the Western European countries became
2The export share dynamics over 2000-2016 can be found in Figure B.1 of the appendix
3The corresponding figure B.2 underlying this comparison can be in the appendix
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less dependent on Russian exports. We expect this trend to be traced when the total
losses are calculated.
However, apart from the political crisis and an introduction of the sanctions, the
Russian economy was recently exposed to a number of other factors which would,
supposedly, have depressed its trade relations with Europe anyway, such as a stag-
nating economic growth by 2014 as well as a drastic fall of oil prices which entailed
a weakening of the Russian national currency, the rouble. Therefore, the contribu-
tion of this paper is to provide a comprehensive empirical framework for capturing
both direct and indirect losses that have incurred in the European economies during
2014-2016, by taking into account the exogenous factors apart from sanctions which
played a role during the time of the crisis and their consequences as well as the inter-
connectedness of the European economies. For this purpose, in the first step a vector
autoregression methodology (VAR) is employed, which allows to separate the sanc-
tions’ effect from the losses, due to a weakening ruble; a stagnating growth in Russia;
and, a collapse of oil prices – estimating this way a direct loss due to sanctions. In
the second step, an input-output method is applied for estimating additional indi-
rect effects as well as spillover effects resulting through the interconnectedness of
the European countries with each other.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section two provides the
definitions of the key concepts, applicable to the conflict under study, followed by a
brief literature review on economic sanctions in general and the Ukraine conflict in
particular. Section three establishes an empirical framework and gives an overview
on data used in the study. In section four the results are presented. Finally, section
five concludes.
2.2 Literature review and theoretical framework
2.2.1 Theoretical foundation
Economic sanctions, understood in this paper as a political instrument whose aim
is to coerce the target state into changing its political behaviour by lowering target’s
economic welfare through various economic restrictions (Pape, 1997; Hufbauer et al.,
2010), have become the most frequently deployed instrument of the contemporary
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FIGURE 2.1: EU-27 exports to Russia as a share of total world exports, in %
Note: EU-27 exports to Russia relative to total world exports before the Ukraine conflict in 2013 (left) and in the second sanctions year, 2015 (right). The number of countries in
each category is shown in parenthesis in the legend.
Source: Eurostat
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foreign policy toolbox in the post-cold war world since they are often considered
as nearly a single possible alternative to a military statecraft (Blanchard and Rips-
man, 1999). For example, the EU is currently engaging in 39 sanction episodes, both
against states and organizations, for instance, Al Qaeda or ISIL (European Union. Re-
strictive measures (sanctions) in force 2016). The growing popularity of sanction activ-
ity in the last two decades has multidimensional economic and social consequences
and is reflected in the modern scholarly research.
Several theoretical frameworks are usually applied to the analysis of sanctions.
Generally, theoretical models dealing with economic sanctions display (1) the reac-
tion of the target economy, (2) importance of the sanctioned goods, (3) the role and
response of various interest groups (Caruso, 2003) and (4) the welfare deprivation as
a result of sanctions.
According to Rudolf, 2007 there are two basic kinds of models, macro- and micro-
models, which explain the relation of sanctions and their political influence.
The classical macro-models are based on a cost-benefit function and suggest that
a high maintenance in eliminations of the sanctions effects like supply shortages,
increased unemployment etc., which is necessary for securing the power, will make
a rational government give in when the costs of domestic support exceed the benefit
of not conceding to the demands.
According to the Solow model (Solow, 1957), the scarcity of capital increases the
rate of return, which in turn leads to a higher growth in the short run. However, an
assumption of the capital availability for investment, necessary for the growth deter-
mination, is usually violated under the condition of sanctions. Sanctions in a target
country lower the level of both foreign and domestic investment. It happens either
directly or through worsening a general investment climate and making foreign and
domestic investment also less attractive. An own empirical analysis (Chapter 3) with
respect to the FDI also supports this conclusion concerning the negative impact of
sanctions with respect to the foreign investment. In other words, imposed export re-
strictions may bring about a lower growth rate for the target economy through inef-
ficiencies in employing labour and capital, worsening domestic expectations, drops
in savings, investment, employment and a devaluation of the local currency. This
would lead in turn to an inward shift of the target’s production possibilities frontier
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(Carbaugh and Wassink, 1988).
A group of theoretical models refer to welfare losses born by the target coun-
try, which is straightforward taking into account the formal definition of sanctions.
Without proper welfare deprivation, according to the sanctions idea, a successful
cohesion of the target state is impossible. In line with this expectation, neo-classical
general equilibrium models (see e.g. Porter, 1979 or Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2007)
show that a targeted state ends up with worse terms of trades as a result of trade
sanctions compared to the sender state. A higher level of elasticity of offer curves of
both sender and target, the greater is the bilateral dependence on the mutual trade
among all involved parties.
The micro-models are based on a plurality of interests of different groups and
actors, which are variously affected by sanctions. According to this view, sanctions
should target political elite and its closest supporters individually. These models
comply with a concept of so called smart sanctions which was developed in the after-
math of devastating humanitarian consequences of the comprehensive sanctions im-
posed on Iraq (Lopez and Cortright, 1997; Cortright, Lopez, and Gerber, 2002; Beladi
and Oladi, 2015). Smart sanctions are especially associated with a game-theoretical
approach (Eaton and Engers, 1992; Drezner, 2003 etc.).
The empirical sanctions literature deals primarily with two questions: whether
the sanctions work and how to improve their effectiveness. Most researches, how-
ever, agree on the ineffectiveness of the sanctions, judging upon the compliance of
the target (Drury, 1998; Galtung, 1967; Pape, 1997; Wallensteen, 1968).
A prominent strand of the sanctions literature is dealing with the regime type.
Democracies are likely prone to comply with the sender demands rather than au-
thoritarian regimes (Allen, 2008; Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000; Nooruddin, 2002). In
non-democracies, the economic burden is shifted on the governed broad masses,
like in case of Iraq which lost 48% of its Gross National Product (GNP) (Bolks and
Al-Sowayel, 2000; Pape, 1997). A political and/or economic instability of the tar-
get also strengthens success (Hufbauer et al., 2010; Jing, Kaempfer, and Lowenberg,
2003; Lam, 1990). An anti-government behaviour within the target state is generally
positively correlated with the event of sanctions, although it is more likely to occur
in more democratic target states (Allen, 2008). Sanctions can thus increase a popular
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support of the ruling regime, contribute to a rise of a new (industrial) elite benefiting
from a country’s international isolation (Galtung, 1967; Kirshner, 1997).
A country regime of the sender also plays a role in the effectiveness: more demo-
cratic senders achieve higher success levels (Lektzian and Souva, 2007). They are
also more frequent sanctions imposers compared to other regime types (Cox and
Drury, 2006; Lektzian and Souva, 2003). It can be explained through a broader group
of interests to be satisfied. Democracies are also more likely to impose sanctions
against non-democracies due to the goals which are more often applicable to other
regime types (Cox and Drury, 2006; Lektzian and Souva, 2003).
Empirical evidence on export restrictions is quite controversial and did not find
much confirmation (Bonetti, 1998; Lam, 1990), unless a pre-sanctioned target de-
pended heavily on the trade with the sender (Hufbauer et al., 2010). Financial sanc-
tions tend to be more successful (Allen, 2008; Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff,
1997; Drury, 1998), although this fact is not always proved empirically (Hufbauer
et al., 2010).
The duration of sanctions is also found to be controversial: whereas some schol-
ars observe increasing welfare costs of sanctions with time (Brady, 1987), others ar-
gue the opposite (e.g. Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000; Miyagawa, 1992). It might be
due to a so-called selection bias (Drezner, 1999; Nooruddin, 2002). The main argu-
ment of these studies is that the potential target changes its policies before the event
of sanctions imposition and then alters its behaviour. In this case, coercion never
materializes and the event of sanctions doesn’t exist, which creates a problem for
the (previous) studies which look at the imposed sanctions.
A discussion about the effectiveness of sanctions is not possible without an anal-
ysis of their impact in terms of welfare deprivation (Dorussen and Mo, 2001). Costs,
both to the sender and the target, are carefully considered in the sanctions’ analysis
(Baldwin, 2000). The logic behind this argument is that higher costs of compliance
for the target go along with a higher probability of the government altering its be-
haviour. The target country is stripped of trade gains and loses its welfare (Caruso,
2003). Harshness of the costs to the target is proved to be crucial for the success of
sanctions (Bonetti, 1998; Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff, 1997; Drury, 1998; Jing,
Kaempfer, and Lowenberg, 2003; Lam, 1990; Lektzian and Souva, 2007). Dependent
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on the degree of mutual integration and a resulting damage of the interactions, a
sender can also be affected heavily. Despite some existing empirical evidence on the
negative relationship between the costs of sanctions to the sender (Drezner, 1999),
costs to the sender still often remain disregarded in the dominant sanctions research
(Caruso, 2003; Dorussen and Mo, 2001). Economic costs of the sanctions are some-
times expressed by a significant drop in a bilateral trade (Hufbauer et al., 2010),
especially multilateral and/or comprehensive sanctions are likely to disrupt trade
(Caruso, 2003). The pre-sanctions trade acts as a measure for pre-sanctions linkage
between the countries and influences a potential welfare loss (Bonetti, 1998; Miya-
gawa, 1992). When disentangled, international sanctions depress trade to a higher
degree rather than war, not only between the belligerent parties, but also with third
countries (Lamotte, 2012).
Determining the costs of sanctions for the sender is also the primary object of the
current empirical analysis.
2.2.2 Literature review on the Ukraine conflict
Since the beginning of the conflict, an increasing number of publications dealing
with the conflict appeared. They predominantly concentrate on the effects of the
conflict on the Russian economy (e.g. Gurvich and Prilepskiy, 2015; Vercueil, 2014
etc.). This is natural since the economic impact on Russia is generally considered
as rather heavy compared to the Western countries and the political behaviour of
Russia is of higher interest (Deutsche Bank Research, 2014). Existing empirical anal-
yses apply various tools: (macro)econometric growth forecasting (e.g. see Rautava,
2014; Vercueil, 2014), computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling (Barry, 2014;
Kutlina-Dimitrova, 2017), and input-output modelling (Christen et al., 2016; Oja,
2015).
Macroeconomic analyses focus primarily on growth forecasts, curtailing initial
growth forecasts of Russia to a different degree (Christen et al., 2016). In case of
a further conflict escalation and a low variant of oil prices a Russian economy was
supposed to contract by 3% in 2015 (Vercueil, 2014)4. Economic sanctions’ costs up to
4Besides a drop in GDP in 2015, increased inflation and worsening of other macroeconomic indi-
cators, the poverty level in Russia has increased steadily since the introduction of sanctions in 2013:
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10% of GDP (Shirov, A.A., Yantovskiy, V.V., Potapenko, V.V., 2015; Folkerts-Landau,
2014) and a resumed growth of 1.5% in the medium perspective were initially pre-
dicted for Russia, whereas sanction-specific drop in real GDP would amount to 1-
1.5% as well as a cumulative impact of 9 percent of GDP in the mid-term (IMF, 2015).
Tuzova and Qayum, 2016 anticipated a contraction of GDP by 19% and a rate of infla-
tion of almost 20% in the next two years, after the start of the conflict. It is becoming
clear now, that such gloomy prospects for Russia, as well as its potential failure to
preserve the macroeconomic equilibrium longer than until 2016, in case the Central
Bank of Russia (CBR) keeps trying to maintain the standard of living, squandering
its reserves, did not hold (World Bank, 2017).
However, enduring sanctions continue to weaken the Russian economy by re-
ducing both domestic and foreign direct investment as well as Russian stock returns,
and significantly continue to increase a volatility in the sectoral indices. However, it
ought to be said that the direct effects of sanctions on the Russian economy are not
as detrimental as is the deteriorating price of oil (Dreger et al., 2016; Hoffmann and
Neuenkirch, 2017). However, it is simultaneously not possible to explain the drop in
GDP only through the decline of oil prices. A part of Russian GDP decline is neces-
sarily sanctions-driven. Even when being estimated 3.3. times lower than the impact
of the oil price shock (Gurvich and Prilepskiy, 2015), it should not be neglected due
to its sustainable impact on the Russian economy.
Because of highly strong trade ties with senders, Russia’s trade loss in just two
years, 2014 and 2015, amounted to $US 62.94 billion (Hinz, 2017). The trade ban also
led to a depreciation of the real exchange rates (Kholodilin and Netšunajev, 2019),
although the depreciation was primarily caused by the decline of oil prices (Dreger
et al., 2016). Aganin and Peresetsky, 2018 show that imposed sanctions increased
the volatility of the ruble exchange rate and its dependence on oil price volatility.
Although, as the authors claim, the impact of sanctions evaporates with time, as the
Russian economy becomes more and more adjusted. One of the possible reasons for
this notable adjustment process was a switching to a floating exchange rate regime,
undertaken by the CBR in November 2014.
according to the World Bank, 2017, the poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of popula-
tion) increased from 10.8% in 2013 to 11.2% in 2014 and by over 2% the following year, reaching 13.4%
in 2015
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Investigations on a micro-level, exploiting a “smart” nature of the sanctions, find
that sanctions negatively impact financial health of the targeted firms and increase
a firm exit probability. An average directly sanctioned or affiliated company lost
around 25% of its operating revenue and 30% of employees during the period from
March 2014 until December 2016, compared to non-sanctioned counterparts (Ahn
and Ludema, 2017). A study, evaluating risks perception, associated with sanctions,
by Russian manufacturing companies, concludes that sanctions can be catastrophic
not only for directly targeted firms, but also for top-performing, globally integrated
firms with firm ties to the EU and/or Ukraine (Golikova and Kuznetsov, 2017). It
makes the recent sanctions shock different from a usual cyclical crisis which would
eliminate the least efficient firms, having a creative destruction effect. The sanctions
in place also resulted in a significant fall in Russian stock prices and an increase in
volatility and heavy-tailless of stock returns in the aftermath of sanctions (Naiden-
ova and Novikova, 2018; Ankudinov, Ibragimov, and Lebedev, 2017).
However, one should not ignore some increase of economic activities related to
the demand pull from investments into Crimea’s assets and infrastructure. This
shock, introduced to a system which rests in equilibrium, might result in an increase
of Russia’s GDP by 1.42%, an increase of production in all sectors by 19.3 bln Dollar,
an increase in a trade balance by 699.2 mn Dollar, a decrease of market prices by
0.6%, and finally a decrease of price of all production factors (Barry, 2014).
Several studies, dealing with the welfare losses on both conflict sides, agree on
more serious consequences for Russia than for the Western economies and predict
only minor losses in GDPs of the EU (Deutsche Bank Research, 2014). For instance,
Kholodilin and Netšunajev, 2019 do not find a strong evidence of an adverse effect
of sanctions on the growth rate of Euro area’s GDP. However, considering a modest
growth of the EU economies, a danger of the growth reversal, which can be easily
turned into stagnation, exists. Moreover, it is expected that Baltic countries, espe-
cially Lithuania, Finland and Poland face the largest losses, although Germany re-
mains one of the biggest exporters to Russia (Boulanger et al., 2016; Giumelli, 2017;
Oja, 2015).
An Austrian study on the macroeconomic effects of the current trade conflict re-
ports a fall in value-added of EU-27 by 0,2-0,9% (depending on the scenario) and the
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negative employment effects of 0,2-1,1% (depending on a scenario). The negative ef-
fects for Germany can add up to somewhat 1.2% of GDP and up to 500 thousand un-
employed in the worst-case scenario. The realized impact of the conflict in terms of
value-added amounts to 6.65 billion Euro (Christen et al., 2014). A successor study,
released by the same researcher group, predicts even gloomier consequences for the
German economy (Christen et al., 2016).
It is known from the literature, that the main areas of EU exposure to the Rus-
sian sanctions are the food industry, the textile industry, the pharmaceutical indus-
try, the electronics industry, the machine tool industry and the industry of trans-
port means (Havlik, 2014). The industries listed above are in peril, mostly, in the
long term, although financial institutions may conceivably sustain large short-term
damage (Shirov, A.A., Yantovskiy, V.V., Potapenko, V.V., 2015). A ban on agri-food
products is supposed to cause the EU-28 a welfare loss of 126 million Euro, which
is remarkably below an expected welfare loss in Russia that amounts to about 3.4
billion Euro (Boulanger et al., 2016). Agriculture, engineering and energy sectors
are the most vulnerable sectors of the EU in terms of a long-term negative sanctions
impact, whereas financial restrictions are even more destructive in the short term:
European financial institutions can lose up to 10 billion US Dollars annually, caused
by a reduction in interest payments (Shirov, A.A., Yantovskiy, V.V., Potapenko, V.V.,
2015).
There have been warnings for Europe concerning any premature decision-taking
resulting into observed ineffectiveness of the sanctions (Vries, A.W.d., Portela, C.,
Guijarro-Usobiaga, B., 2014). The literature indicates the institutional weaknesses of
EU foreign policies undermined by the current crisis (Sjursen and Rosén, 2017).
2.3 Empirical approach and data
The empirical approach comprises of two parts. In the first part, a simulation for the
period from July 2014 until December 2016 is carried out. For this purpose, a Vec-
tor Autoregression (VAR) model for each sector, with a substantial export history of
every EU-economy is estimated5. This way, we get a “what-would-have-happened”
5For several countries it was only possible to forecast a total of exports, since a sectoral disaggrega-
tion contained a lot of gaps due to a weak trade relation with Russia in particular sectors. The group of
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scenario for each group of goods, taking into consideration such factors as the weak-
ening rouble, the stagnating growth in Russia, and the collapse of oil prices, but ex-
cluding the event of sanctions itself. Therefore, by subtracting the forecasted values
from the statistically observed ones we can determine a so called “due to sanctions
effect”, i.e. direct losses caused by sanctions.
However, a profound economic analysis is not complete without considering
inter-sectoral ties within each sender economy since a decrease in the output of
one sector consequently affects all other sectors of the economy through the sys-
tem of production links, or the backward linkages (Shirov, A.A., Yantovskiy, V.V.,
Potapenko, V.V., 2015). The spreading of the impulses (both positive and negative)
in an economy is triggered through a chain mechanism. To imagine how such sys-
tem works, a simplified example can be considered: if a demand for Volkswagen in
Russia sinks by 100 cars, an automobile industry “A” in Germany has to decrease
its production of cars accordingly6, but it will also demand less intermediate in-
puts in form of, for example, rubber from a sector “B” producing rubber and plastic
products for its 100 steering wheels, and a sector “C”, producing textiles and textile
products for its 100 seat covers. It means that “B” and “C” also must decrease their
outputs although no primary negative impulse was imposed on them. To estimate
such total effects, or welfare losses, on an economy of changes in elements that are
defined exogenously to that model, an input-output model is employed (Miller and
Blair, 2009).
A negative demand shock imposed on any EU-economy because of the bilateral
sanctions represents an exogenous demand change. Obviously, as explained above,
not only directly sanctioned companies (and sectors) are affected, but also their sup-
pliers, and suppliers of the suppliers etc. In the current study both direct and indirect
(supply chain) production effects at sectoral level as well as total macroeconomic ef-
fects shall be calculated.
Moreover, it is crucial to consider the intensive economic ties within the EU.
Supposedly, some countries are less affected through the sanctions, but are tightly
these countries includes: Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. For
these countries a following assumption was made: forecasted values of total exports were laid over
the sectoral export structure of the pre-crisis year, 2013. It was not possible to make any forecasts for
Cyprus and Malta. For the latter two only spillover effects were calculated.
6We do not consider a substitution of export markets here.
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connected to the countries with a serious damage. It leads to negative spillover
effects within Europe as well.
The concrete research questions can be formulated as follows: (1) What are over-
all production effects of the EU sanctions on EU-27? (2) How strong are spillover
effects within EU-27 within the magnitude of the crisis? (3) What does a ranking of
European loss bearers look like?
2.3.1 Econometric approach and data
Considering the nature of the study, a chosen econometric approach seems to be
intuitive. We are seeking to forecast export values within a scenario, as if sanctions
had never happened. For this purpose, we use a VAR model iterative forecasting
based on the past values of exports, domestic demand in Russia and an exchange
rate, as well as present values of exogenous factors, oil prices and a proxy for the
world economic development. The model of the following setup is applied:
yt = v+ A1yt−1 + ... + Apyt−p + B0xt + B1Bt−1 + ... + Bsxt−s + ut (2.1)
where yt = (yt1, ...yKt)′ is a vector comprising of endogenous variables; the Ai’s are
(K × K) coefficient matrices; xt = (xt1, ...xMt)′ is a vector of exogenous variables;
the Bi’s are (K × M) coefficient matrices; v is a (K × 1) constant term; the ut’s are
K-dimensional serially uncorrelated vector of residuals with mean zero and non-
singular covariance matrix ∑ u.
The data used in the study are per month and run from January 2000 through
December 2016. The following endogenous variables are included:
EXPORTt stands for sectoral exports to Russia. The model is estimated for each
sector in each country which has real exports reflected in the Eurostat statistics. The
sectoral data are drawn at the most detailed five-digit level of SITC classification
and are converted into the ISIC classification of the necessary level in accordance
with the WIOD table for the second part of empirical analysis.
INPRODt is the index of the industrial production in Russia. The data are ob-
tained from OECD.
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EXRATEt is a real exchange rate EUR/RUB7 obtained from the European Cen-
tral bank.
Following exogenous variables are included in each model as well:
BRENTt stands for Crude Oil Prices: Brent - Europe, measured in US dollars
per Barrel. The data are retrieved from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
This variable accounts for the oil price slump which would have affected the Russian
economy regardless of the sanctions.
BADIt is the Baltic Dry Index, a proxy for the world economic development.
This variable helps to account for a financial crisis in 2008/2009.
For the purpose of a seasonal adjustment, a set of seasonal dummies is included
in each estimated model in its exogenous part. A constant term is also treated as
exogenous.
To make sure all variables are stationary, they are expressed in the first-difference
form of their logs. An important step in working with VAR models is the selection of
the VAR lag order. Recalling that Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is considered
the strongest, when applied to monthly data, it is chosen to establish an optimal
number of lags (Ivanov and Kilian, 2005). Throughout the estimated models the
optimal number of lags varies between 1 and 128, depending on the country and
the respective sector. Some countries show a clear tendency towards one lag order
throughout all sectors.
After estimating the individual sectoral model for each country over the sample
period between February 2001 and June 2014 and obtaining the corresponding im-
pulse response functions, we proceed to the goal of the VAR-modelling within this
study: dynamic forecasting. It is conducted for the period from July 2014 to De-
cember 2016. The forecasted sectoral exports are summed up to total exports. The
discussion of concrete numbers is offered in the results section.
The quality of each model is tested in several ways: first, each estimated model
is tested for stationarity. All the eigenvalues of each companion matrix lie inside
the unit circle, which means that each VAR model satisfies a stability condition. An
7For the countries which remain outside of the Euro-zone throughout the whole period of analysis
exchange rates were calculated using EUR/RUB exchange rates. The list of these countries include
Great Britain, Romania, Sweden, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Denmark.
8A summary of a number of lags for each country for each sector as well as the values of the AIC
can be found in Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3 of the appendix.
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individually implemented Lagrange-multiplier test for a residual autocorrelation in-
dicates that a lag order was chosen properly. Moreover, a formal ex post test of the
significance of the lags in each equation is carried out. As a rule, in the export’s
equations all lags are significant, even when the VAR is considered as a whole.
2.3.2 Input-output analysis
The second step of the analysis is an application of the input-output analysis. The
core of the input-output analysis is the input-output table (IOT). IOT is a part of
national accounts. The table comprises four quadrants. The columns of the matrix
in the first quadrant represent the economic activities in form of many industries,
assigned respectively to primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, whose interroga-
tions are displayed in the production matrix. The interconnectedness of sectors is
captured in the input coefficients (Miller and Blair, 2009). Quadrant II presents a
final demand, which comprises consumption, investment and exports. Through ex-
ogenous changes in final demand = direct effect (primary impulse through loss of
exports = demand shock) a chain reaction is triggered: not only companies which en-
gage in an export activity with Russia (and sectors) are negatively affected, but also
their suppliers, and suppliers of the suppliers etc. This impact is captured through
an indirect effect. Quadrant III is a matrix of the primary inputs (labour, capital,
land) and contains various components of value added (wages and salaries, oper-
ating surplus etc.) and imports. Quadrant IV sometimes may contain, for instance,
imports by household for private consumption, but mostly, it is published without
any data.
Mathematically, an input-output system comprises of a set of linear equations
which contains n unknowns (Miller and Blair, 2009). The solution of this system is
obtained by means of the inverse coefficients derived from the basic I-O equation
x = (I− A)−1y (2.2)
where (I − A)−1 inverse Input coefficients, (I − A) – Leontief-Matrix, y – de-
mand, x – output.
Chapter 2. EU and Russian sanctions: how big is the economic impact within the
European Union?
58
To estimate the effect of the exogenous demand shock on outputs of the sectors of
each economy, a standard input-output methodology is applied: the vector of a sec-
toral output x is calculated by multiplying an inverse Leontief matrix IO of the do-
mestic and import inputs with the vector y, comprising sectoral export losses in each
of the conflict year, derived from the VAR forecasting from the previous method-
ological step. The latter vector represents an exogenous demand shock imposed on
the system.
Total macroeconomic output effects can be decomposed into the direct effects
(firms/sectors-exporters of the sanctioned products to Russia) as well as the indi-
rect effects (firms/sectors linked to the affected firms/sectors as suppliers). In other
words, the sum of both direct and indirect effects measures a total impact on the
economy resulting from a loss of final demand in one of its sectors. Spillover effects
due to the European trade interconnectedness are derived for each country.
To measure the macroeconomic and sectoral impact of the Ukraine crisis on the
EU, a World IOT for the year 2011 out of Release 2013 of the World Input Output
Database (WIOD) is used for calculations. It is appropriate for an ex-ante estimation
because a structure of a developed economy does not change a lot in such a short
term. Input coefficients for domestic production and imports are used.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Macroeconomic results
Figure 2.2 shows a development of the real and forecasted sum of total exports of
the EU-27 to Russia. At the first sight it is possible to recognize that the oil price
dynamics are the main, but not the only one, determinant of the export curves.
In the first year of implementing the sanctions, total production losses in the EU-
27 amounted to 29 billion Euro; in the second year, over 22 billion euro; and, already
in 2016, signs of recovering at the whole EU-level were clear. If taking into account
the interconnectedness of the countries within the EU, the EU-27 experienced ad-
ditional 12.5 billion Euro losses within the first two years since the imposition of
sanctions. Therefore, by the end of the second year with the sanctions in force, the
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FIGURE 2.2: EU-27 real and forecasted export, exchange rate and oil
price, monthly dynamics
Source: Eurostat, World Bank, own calculations
cost of sanctions amounted to nearly 64 billion Euro production losses for the EU-27.
Table 2.1 provides a short overview over the suffered yearly losses.
TABLE 2.1: EU-27 losses due to sanctions, in million Euro
Immediate losses Total losses
(direct + indirect) (direct + indirect + spillover)
2014 -28.767,81 -36.199,07
2015 -22.577,45 -27.650,44
2016 2.032,72 1.980,71
2 years -51.345,26 -63.849,51
3 years -49.312,54 -61.868,79
Source: Own calculations
The impact of sanctions is distributed differently across the countries over the
years. Overviews of the yearly losses in 2014 and 2016 which took place in each
country individually, are presented in Figure 2.3. It contains the intra-EU spillover
effects and enables us to obtain a full picture of analysis. An overview over the
year 2015 is provided in Figure B.4 of the appendix. An overview for 2014 and 2016
excluding intra-EU spillover effects can be found in Figure B.5 of the appendix. Table
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2014 loss, in million Euro
up to 500 (12)
500 to 1000 (6)
1000 to 2500 (4)
2500 to 5000 (4)
more than 5000 (1)
2016 loss, in million Euro
more than 1500 (4)
500 to 1500 (4)
0 to 500 (6)
trade gain between 0 and 500 (8)
trade gain between 500 and 1000 (4)
trade gain of more than 5000 (1)
FIGURE 2.3: Export losses due to sanctions in 2014 (left) and 2016 (right), including spillover effects
Note: EU-27 export losses due to intra-EU trade connectedness. The number of countries in each category is shown in parenthesis in the legend. The scale on the right is
reverted and shows the biggest losses on the top, countries recovered from losses to a different extent by 2016 are depicted in blue.
Source: own calculations
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B of the appendix presents a summary for all years by country.
In 2014, all economies of the EU were hit through sanctions, although to a dif-
ferent degree. In the ranking of the European loss bearers Germany comes top with
over 5.6 billion country losses and additional 1.9 billion Euro due to the trade con-
nectedness with other EU-countries and is coloured the darkest in Figure 2.3. The
fact that over 33% of total losses in Germany are due to the trade relations within
Europe indicates a strong embeddedness of Germany into the European trade struc-
ture. Italy ranks the second with a total of nearly 4.8 billion Euro of output losses,
followed by France and Poland with around 3.7 and 3.6 billion Euro respectively.
Obviously, smaller EU-economies are affected less in absolute terms but taking
into account their higher dependence on the trade relations with Russia, a relative
impact is very high. So, the share of Lithuanian exports to Russia out of total world
exports amounted to 21% in 2014 and decreased up to 14% in 2015 and 2016, still
underlining a substantial meaning of the Russian market. Latvia follows with 15%
of Russian exports in total exports in 2014, whereas this share decreases up to 11%
in 2015 and 2015. Estonia, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Slovenia, Slovak and Czech
Republic are following next in descending order. Therefore, it seems intuitive to
expect the impact on these countries to be the highest, when comparing the losses
suffered as a share of exports to Russia in the pre-crisis year, 2013. So, Estonia’s and
Lithuania’s exports to Russia were deprived by around 73% and 54% respectively in
2014 compared to the 2013 numbers. Whereas Germany lost “only” around 22% of
the 2013 Russian exports in 2014.
A gap between the countries which start recovering after the sanctions shock in
2014 and those which suffer even more devastating losses the longer the sanctions
endure, appears already in 2015. Looking again at the absolute loss bearers, a slight
change of the picture can be observed: although Italy still ranks as the second, ex-
hibiting a total loss of nearly 5 billion Euro, the first position is taken by Lithuania
with nearly 5.7 billion Euro of output losses. Only a small fraction, around 1%, of
this amount is due to the European embeddedness which reconciles with the im-
portance of the Russian market on one hand and, as a consequence, a weaker trade
connection towards Europe on the other. On the contrary, Germany’s solid integra-
tion and a very strong position within the European trade network is indicated by
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the fact that the output losses caused by the intra EU-trade connectedness are nearly
5 times higher than the direct and indirect losses which took place within the country
immediately.
Moreover, in 2015 a losses pattern towards Eastern European and Baltic countries
becomes clear. Poland ranks as the third biggest loss bearer with nearly 3 billion
Euro, followed by Czech Republic with almost 1.9 billion Euro losses. Hungary
ranks high as well with 1.4 billion Euro losses. Great Britain is an interesting case.
The economy does not suffer any country losses which would indicate a recovery
from the sanctions shock, but alone due to a close trade intertwining with other
European economies, an output loss of over 370 million is imposed on the country,
which places it along the other countries onto the loss bearer list. The situation
might look different if Brexit is executed before the sanctions conflict with Russia is
resolved.
As it can be seen from Figure 2.3 a clear division of Europe in two groups can
be observed by 2016. Group 1, so called ‘less dependent countries’, comprises pre-
dominantly of Western European economies, which managed to recover from the
sanctions shock by the end of 2016. This group includes the following countries:
Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia. It should be noted that Bel-
gium, Great Britain9, Greece, Portugal and Slovenia were not affected any more by
the sanctions crisis after 2015. Group 2 covers essentially Eastern European and
Baltic countries, which include: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ire-
land, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and Austria. Cyprus
and Malta belong into this group as well, however, only losses resulted out of the
trade embeddedness into the EU-27 could be considered10.
9Great Britain still suffered some loss, if taking the intra-EU trade connectedness into consideration.
10Forecasts for selected countries as values in levels as well as real export development can be found
in a graphical form in Figure B.3 of the appendix. The list of both groups can be is provided in Table
B.5 of the appendix.
Chapter 2. EU and Russian sanctions: how big is the economic impact within the
European Union?
63
2.4.2 Sectoral results
Export decline to Russia is reflected across different sectors across European economies
to various degrees. An execution of the sectoral analysis provides an important in-
sight into the structural weaknesses at the individual country level. The sectors with
the strongest backward linkages within each country are affected the most, but si-
multaneously recover sooner when the adjustment process is ongoing.
Overall, it can be concluded that the aggregated sector Food, Beverages and To-
bacco (15t16) is the most frequently impacted (43 times out of 375). This could indi-
cate that Russian counter-sanctions were successful in terms of absolute production
losses across the European countries. This sector appears to be among the top 5 loss
bearing sectors in each year in the following countries: Finland, Great Britain, Italy,
Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia and Sweden. It should be noted that in most countries this
sector does not appear in the ranking of 2016 even if the losses in the first and the
second year of sanctions are significant in this sector.
Chemicals and Chemical Products (sector No. 24) is mentioned 40 times in the
ranking and, therefore, is the second most affected sector across Europe. Bulgaria,
Spain, Finland and Romania indicate heavy losses within this sector for each year.
Chemicals and Chemical Products sector is followed by Machinery (sector No. 29 –
38 references), Electrical and Optical Equipment (sector No. 30t33 – 32 references)
and Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing (sector No. AtB – 30 references).
Czech Republic, Romania, Slovak Republic and Sweden, contain Machinery among
the top 5 loss bearing sectors in each year. In a similar manner, Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Lithuania and Slovak Republic contain Electrical and Optical Equipment; and,
Hungary, Lithuania and Poland contain Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing.
There seems to be a pattern in group 2, the “dependent countries,” where the same
sectors tend to be affected more heavily in each year of the sanctions, whereas within
group 1, a higher diversification is observable. It could indicate a better adjustment
to the crisis conditions and a reorientation of the economy within the group 1.
Overall, the service sectors seem to be affected only moderately or not at all. Two
service sectors with the highest frequency citation (both 14 references) are Wholesale
Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles (sector No.
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51) and Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities (sector No. 71t74).
2.5 Discussion and conclusion
Followed by Russia’s political destabilization of Eastern Ukraine and the annexation
of Crimea in the beginning of 2014, European Union and several other Western coun-
tries applied various sanctions to Russia. Russia responded with different sectoral
restrictions towards the imposers. The sanctions introduced by both conflict parties
affect not only products concerned but have large-scale effects on many European
economies as well as noticeable macroeconomic effects on Russia itself. However,
considering Russia’s strong dependency on natural resource exports, declining oil
prices since summer 2014 would have led to a currency devaluation anyway (Dreger
et al., 2016), which in turn would have influenced a domestic demand for European
imports in Russia.
This paper aims to solve an uneasy task of disentangling between a pure sanc-
tions effect and all the other factors when estimating imposed economic losses on
individual European economies. Using high frequency data on disaggregated Euro-
pean exports, domestic production in Russia, exchange rates, oil prices and a world
economic development, a two-step methodology, comprising of a VAR modelling
and an input-output analysis, was employed. A clear advantage of using an input-
output method is a possibility to consider indirect effects along the value-added
chain which are greater than the directly imposed effects.
The results indicate a development of a clear pattern concerning sustainable loss
bearers in Europe throughout the Ukraine conflict: as the most Western European
economies managed to recover from the sanctions shock, the Eastern European and
Baltic countries seem to suffer ever greater consequences of the conflict as the sanc-
tions remain in force and the Russian economy starts to recover. Spillover effects
within Europe indicate a different integration of individual countries in the Euro-
pean trade structure, which could explain differences in recovery process. At the
same time this fact raises the question of a desired convergence within Europe,
which could remote ever further because of the uniform sanctioning politics in the
EU-28.
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Chapter 3
Impact of political risk on FDI exit
decisions: the case of Russia
Autors: Ksenia Gonchar, Maria Kristalova and Philipp Marek1
Abstract
In this paper we study exit decisions by multinationals in the host country that
is characterized by weak institutions and high political risks. Using multinational
plant-level data for Russia in the period 2000-2016, and applying the Cox hazard
proportional model, we find significant effects of political risk on exits. Multina-
tional companies (MNCs) are particularly sensitive to problems associated with low
democratic accountability, military in politics, conflict and corruption. Institutional
similarity between the host and home country makes MNCs more vulnerable to po-
litical risk. Sanctions significantly catalyse the effects of political risk on exits and are
particularly threatening for subsidiaries from sender states with weak institutions.
Large size of the subsidiary, organization as a greenfield or joint-venture with a lo-
cal partner, as well as the existence of an intergovernmental investment treaty help
subsidiaries to build resistance against host political risks. These findings provide
empirical evidence, which can help to reach conclusions in the debate about FDI
volatility in countries with high levels of risk.
JEL classification: E02, E61, F21, F23, L10, P26
Key words: multinational company (MNC); foreign subsidiary; political risk;
exit; Russia; transition economy
1For detailed information about the contributions of the authors see Appendix C.
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3.1 Introduction
There has been a decrease of accumulated FDI stock in Russia since the global fi-
nancial crisis of 2008 and FDI inflows have been fragile compared to the 2000s. A
number of high-profile and large-scale divestments have been reported. For exam-
ple, ConocoPhillips, sold its oil and gas assets and quit Russia (Financial Times,
2015). General Motors closed its St. Petersburg assembly plant and took a $600 mil-
lion write-off soon after U.S. sanctions were imposed on Russia (Fortune, 2015). Shell
was harassed by the Russian government into reducing its 55% stake in the Sakhalin-
2 project to 25% in favor of the local energy group, Gazprom (The Guardian, 2006).
On the other hand, the period also saw a number of landmark FDI entries, no-
tably those which followed the partial privatization of diamond miner Alrosa and
of oil company Rosneft. Multinationals, which recently increased their operations
in Russia, include BP, ExxonMobil, Glencore, Daimler and Schlumberger. Schlum-
berger made its entry by purchasing 51% of Eurasia Drilling Company (EDC). How-
ever, the Russian government has said that operational and ownership control of
EDC by the multinational could be reversed if the U.S. sanctions regime intensifies
(Kommersant, 2018).
The main scope of our study is to analyse the influence of political risk on exit
decisions by multinationals. These effects remain relatively understudied in the lit-
erature, which has tended to focus on choice of entry location as a function of po-
litical risk. The present paper helps to fill this research gap by analysing the factors
that increase or decrease the length of stay of an MNC in a politically troubled mar-
ket. Several new aspects are introduced into the exit analysis: we study the effects
of risks on exit during various time periods and distinguish the exit strategies of
genuine and round-tripping MNCs; we analyse how national and sub-national risks
interact in a large transition country with heterogeneous regional institutions; and
we incorporate relations between the home and host countries into the analysis, in-
cluding the imposition of sanctions and the impact of political risks in the home
country.
Divestment in general is one of the principal stresses faced by multinationals and
host economies (Rodrik, 1997), while plant closure is one of the few unambiguous
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observed signals of plant performance and thus of inherent interest at a micro level
(Bernard and Jensen, 2007). All multinationals face political risks, especially when
firms from countries with weak and strong institutions interact in the process of
globalization. Some multinationals are more sensitive to political tension than oth-
ers and choose to divest. However, the decision to divest involves substantial risk
and costs in itself. If policy makers want to retain foreign direct investments, it is
important for them to gain a better understanding of behaviour by multinationals
in order to design measures to prevent exits, and to protect the jobs, business activ-
ity and technology learning that are associated with FDI. From the point of view of
businesses, it is important to spot the divestment activators, which sometimes make
exit unavoidable.
We understand exit – the main outcome that we seek to explain in this paper –
as a decision to liquidate or sell a subsidiary in a host market. Thus, like Dunne,
Klimek, and Roberts 2003, we are not studying the mortality of plants, but rather
decisions to stop producing output in the Russian geographical market. Our chief
explanatory factor is political risk, which we understand as the assessment of the
business environment in the host or home country, deriving from political change
and governance, which may affect firm operations and profit. We deal with political
risks and constraints arising from politics in the host and home country or in third
countries.
Five main research questions are studied: (1) How does political risk in host
and home country affect the decision to exit and does it have different effects across
time and industries? (2) Does the effect of political risk on exit depend on political
differences between the home and host locations? (3) What mechanisms can protect
multinational firms from political distress in the host country and make them less
likely to exit? (4) How do national and sub-national risks interact in determining
exit strategy? (5) Have sanctions catalysed the effect of political risks?
Our theoretical approach is to explain exit by political risk, which is in line with
the industrial organization literature, real options concept and the theory of power
bargaining. Based on this literature, we hypothesize that factors associated with po-
litical risks contribute to the decision by a multinational to exit. We expect that multi-
nationals, which do not experience high political risks in their home countries, will
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we more risk-averse than their counterparts that originate from a more distressed
political environment. Finally, we expect that a larger subsidiary, local partnership
or bilateral investment treaty and a favourable location in a sub-national region in-
creases the bargaining power of the MNC and protects it from political intervention
of the host government or pressure from the home country.
Russia is an appropriate empirical setting for studying the effects of political
risks on multinational exit behaviour. Russia is a country with high levels of insta-
bility but is endowed with natural resources and a large domestic market. Financial
difficulties and limited freedom of action due to conditions imposed by sanction-
ing countries constrain the institutional authorities of the host government in their
relations with MNCs. Divestments of various kinds have taken place in practically
all industries, and there were instances of direct expropriations of foreign firms in
2014, immediately after the annexation of Crimea, when more than two hundred
Ukrainian firms were expropriated on the pretext of “unfair prior privatization”
(RIA News, 2015). So, Russia is an appropriate case for the analysis of divestment
behaviour by MNCs in response to political risks.
In our empirical analysis, we find that foreign multinationals are highly vulner-
able to overall political risks, which motivate market withdrawals. MNCs are par-
ticularly sensitive to problems associated with low democratic accountability, cor-
ruption, military involvement in politics and conflict. Political similarity does not
tend to make multinationals from developing countries "weather the storm" better
in Russia: on the contrary, the greater the contrast between the home and host loca-
tion (i.e. the better the political environment in the home country), the less likely it
is that a multinational will exit.
Contrary to expectations, tolerable sub-national risks do not reduce the impact
of national political risk, except in the city of Moscow.
Sanctions make exit more likely and add to the contribution of home risks to
exit decisions. Various structural factors may shield foreign subsidiaries from polit-
ical problems: large size of the subsidiary, greenfields and joint-ventures with local
partners give greater resistance to exit.
In the next section (Section 2) of this paper we outline the literature which in-
spired our study and relate it to the hypotheses of our research. Section 3 describes
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the data. Section 4 provides the empirical strategy and discusses the construction of
dependent and explanatory variables. Section 4 reports the results of a Cox-Hazard
proportional model of plant exit, and section 5 summarizes results.
3.2 Literature overview
The industrial organization literature shows that the exit process reflects underly-
ing productivity shocks that generate uncertainty (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson,
1988; Caves, 1998; Li, 1995). Several regularities described by this literature are im-
portant for our research: traditional structural entry barriers affect the decision to
exit; major economic and political disturbances affect the firm turnover process; and
the likelihood of exit declines with greater size of the subsidiary.
Increased political risk may cause defensive divestment driven by the higher
costs and reduced profit of FDI operation in a weak institutional setting (North,
2017). So political risk affects FDI decisions (Busse and Hefeker, 2007), though it is
rarely the principal factor, and in most cases it interacts with other specific features
of firms and markets (Wei, Andreosso-O’Callaghan, and Wuntsch, 2007).
This brings us to our first hypothesis:
H1. Political risk determines exit by multinationals.
Multinationals do not immediately decide to exit when risks increase. Real op-
tions theory (Dixit, 1995; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) explains that most divestment
decisions are taken with a delay or not taken at all because of the existence of sunk
costs that cannot be recouped if the firms changes its mind later on. If the firm can-
not divest without costs or may regret having exited, a period of delay enables it
to learn more about the uncertainties ahead. This model predicts that postponing
a final decision is the optimal strategy in conditions of uncertainty and leads us to
suggest dependence of the exit decision on internal and external resistance to exits.
Large size of the plant, for example, may entail that sunk costs of exit are particu-
larly high, increasing probability that the decision to exit will not be made (Dial and
Murphy, 1995).
Next, we were guided by the family of theories of power bargaining, developed
by international business research, which can be applied to specific risks generated
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by a host government. This theory establishes that all multinationals face the risk
of post-entry costs that the host government may impose on foreign subsidiaries
(Vernon, 1971; Teece, 1986b; Moon and Lado, 2000). So multinationals are exposed to
changes in the political landscape of the host and to changes in the balance of power
between the MNC and the host government. In this context exit can be understood
as an issue, over which the MNC and host country engage in bargaining, and, if
exit actually occurs, that represents a failure of the attempt to keep the business
going. Although the motives of the sides involved in bargaining cannot be observed
directly, the exit outcome is in most cases undesirable for both the MNC and the host
government.
The power bargaining literature explains that the impact of political risk on exit
decisions is not a simple function of the degree of political instability in the host
country. The impact also depends on how the host risks relate to the institutional
situation in the home country. Changes in international markets and political or
economic disturbances at home can affect the power of MNCs in certain situations.
Several mechanisms are at work: the coercive power of the home government; dif-
ferences between political risk levels that are considered tolerable; and barriers to
communication and knowledge transfer. Stress and confusion among foreign em-
ployees may entail the payment of additional premiums and higher turnover of per-
sonnel (Berry, Guillén, and Zhou, 2010; Alcacer and Ingram, 2013; Kogut and Singh,
1988).
Although the host government is the main source of political risks, there are
other institutional instruments that may facilitate a risk-exit link. The bargaining
theory envisages that political risk may be influenced by the home country of the
multinational, if that country uses coercive power exogenous to the transaction (Ko-
brin, 1987; Tallman, 1988). In particular, trade restrictions and sanctions could be
viewed as a coercive tool used by the home government in order to influence the out-
come. Although such threats do not relate directly to disputes between MNCs and
the Russian government and do not include a direct ban on investments in Russia,
they may have an effect on these disputes. Vadlamannati, Janz, and Berntsen, 2018,
for example, discuss how UN "shaming resolutions" against human rights violations
affect FDI behaviour through damaged bilateral relations, less favourable trade and
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investment agreements, and possible reputation losses for MNCs that may be held
accountable for ignoring human rights abuse in host countries. The same line of
thought can be applied to investments from countries that have sanctions in place
against the host country.
Another mechanism behind the political distance argument is discussed in De-
seatnicov and Akiba, 2016: MNCs have their vision of the optimal level of political
risk that they can tolerate; MNCs from the North are less likely to tolerate politi-
cal risk in developing countries, though they may tolerate these risks in developed
countries if the overall level of stability there is sufficient for their needs. Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc, 2008, in turn, report that institutional similarity may be an ad-
vantage for MNCs from developing-countries, especially in host countries with even
worse regulation and a higher level of corruption than at home.
Our second and third hypotheses, based on real options and policy bargaining
theories, are that:
H2. A multinational will be more likely to divest when the differences in political
institutions and governance between home and host countries are greater.
H3. Sanctions against a host country encourage departure of MNCs that orig-
inate from the country imposing the sanctions (the "sending country"). Sanctions
catalyse the effect of political risk on exits.
Finally, the resource-based literature suggests that multinational firms may differ
in their response to political pressure. Moon and Lado, 2000, explain that bargain-
ing power relative to the host government enables MNCs to generate economic rents
and achieve superior performance in a particular host country. Such MNCs are less
likely to be affected by government interventions. This bargaining power or addi-
tional rent may stem from various sources, which might be generally described as
the social and economic relations between MNCs and local actors, including busi-
ness partners and government, within the concept of embeddedness (Granovetter,
1985). So joint-ventures (JVs) may show greater resilience to political pressure, since
exit is politically costlier for the host government if a local firm is affected (Henisz,
2000). In general, this literature establishes that a joint-venture is a better solution for
an environment characterized by high uncertainty and governance problems (Kogut
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and Singh, 1988), and that multinationals will minimize political risks through part-
nerships with resident firms.
An MNC may also enjoy better protection from overall political risks thanks to
location of its subsidiary in an institutionally strong sub-national territory, especially
in a large and diverse country such as Russia, where weak country-level institutions
are compensated by better-than-average governance in some of the country’s re-
gions (Bessonova and Gonchar, 2015).
The power bargaining theory finds the role of investment size to be indefinite.
It may be a source of power for the multinational, especially if the host country is
constrained in its financial and technological capabilities and needs the employment
provided by the MNC subsidiary. On the other hand, large size of the subsidiary
may have "hostage value", increasing the bargaining power of the host country when
sunk costs cause relative immobility of a large investment (Kobrin, 1987; Moran,
1975).
These points lead us to test the following interaction hypothesis:
H4. MNCs facing an unfavourable political environment do not abandon their
subsidiaries, when they are protected from political risk by large size of the sub-
sidiary, local networks and more favourable location at the sub-national level.
Previous empirical work offers conflicting answers to our research questions.
Many studies are sceptical about political environment as a powerful explanatory
factor for international business flows. On this view, political institutions are some-
times statistically related to decisions by MNCs, but that relationship does not hold
much power to predict real-world outcomes (Arel-Bundock, 2017; Li and Vashchilko,
2010; Oetzel and Oh, 2014; Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2007). Nil effects are reported by
Globerman and Shapiro, 2003, for U.S. FDI flows to 43 countries in the 1990s: polit-
ical instability does not prevent entry but reduces the inflow. Counter findings are
provided by Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Jensen, 2003; Vu, Yamada, and Otsuki, 2017.
Several studies have particular relevance for our work on issues of exit in re-
sponse to political risks. Lankes and Venables, 1996, show that political risk in-
creases the likelihood of FDI project termination in transition economies. Using data
on Japanese multinationals, Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2009, show that increased politi-
cal openness increases the longevity of international joint-ventures and reduces exits
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from greenfield investments. Components of political risk may interact: good gov-
ernance in a host country reduces the likelihood of MNC divestment in response to
terrorist attacks (Oh and Oetzel, 2011). Cuypers and Martin, 2010 report that divest-
ment may be caused by changes in exchange rates, demand and institutions. Smaller
cultural distance reduces the likelihood of exit decisions (Sousa and Tan, 2015).
Two studies of MNC exits use Russian data. Johns and Wellhausen, 2016 use data
on U.S. multinationals in Russia to model the effects of economic links and value of
the subsidiary on the level of expropriation risk to which the multinational is ex-
posed in the host country. They find evidence that a greater proportion of domes-
tic suppliers reduces probability that the host government will breach its contract.
Gurkov and Saidov, 2017, in a case study of exits in Russia, report that the exit rate
of multinationals has been lower than might be expected in view of the severity of
recent political and economic upsets. They explain this by MNC-host government
negotiations and low asset liquidity.
3.3 Dataset
The data consist of observations of plants with no less than 10% foreign ownership,
collected from the Ruslana-Amadeus data source between 2000 and 2016, including
information on financial accounts, ownership structure, and date of incorporation
of all registered FDI plants. We can also identify the location of the plant within a
particular Russian sub-national region and the home country of the foreign investor.
At the time of writing financial data are available for sixteen years, which is a rea-
sonably long period of time for observing multinational subsidiaries. Exit is said to
have occurred when a subsidiary is not operational in year t as compared to year
t-1, and has either permanently departed, is in the process of liquidation, or was ac-
quired by another firm. We identify entry, exit and continuous operations based on
the firm’s ID number: entry is represented by a new ID in the registry, exit is when
the ID has been removed from the registry and/or changed its status from active to
non-active, and a continuing subsidiary is when the ID stays unchanged.
The exact date of exit is defined as the year when an inactive plant, which has
changed its legal status (i.e., most commonly, has been dissolved as a legal entity)
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ceased to report financial data. Financial reporting usually ceases 2-3 years prior to
the year of legal dissolution. The time gap between the change of the legal status and
the cessation of financial reporting reduces the endogeneity risk, since the decision
to exit itself may add to the political problems in the host location. A comparable
strategy was applied by Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1988 (although, unlike
Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1988, we can observe subsidiaries which entered
and exited between the start and end years of the dataset).
We organize the data as the full sample and several sub-samples. The full data
set includes foreign subsidiaries, i.e., plants in which no less than 10% belongs to the
foreign investor, including continuing subsidiaries and plants which entered and
exited between 2000 and 2016. A total of 48,494 observations are incorporated in
this data set. Next, we split the full sample into two sub-samples of genuine in-
vestors and plants established by investors of Russian origin through tax havens
and financial hubs (round-tripping investments), which may have lower sensitivity
to political problems than plants set up by authentic investors. At the end of 2014
the Russian government passed an anti-offshore law, which led to a decline of the
FDI stock held by countries that are centres for round-tripping FDI, most notably
Cyprus.
We identify round-tripping investments based on a list issued by the Russian fi-
nance ministry. About 23,900 subsidiaries are genuine investments and about 24,600
are round-trippers. We use the sub-sample of round-trippers in some specifications,
where it is interesting to study the different reaction of genuine foreign investors
and round-trippers to political constraints. Between 2000 and 2016 more than 13,000
foreign subsidiaries exited the Russian market, including 6,556 genuine multination-
als. The mean survival period is 8.42 years and is a little longer for genuine investors
compared to round-trippers.
In some specifications we split the sample into investments in various sectors and
test whether political constraints are particularly important for FDI in services (Kol-
stad and Villanger, 2008). Other sub-samples account for the group of home coun-
tries that imposed sanctions on Russia and the group of countries that concluded an
investment treaty with Russia: probability of exit would be expected to increase in
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the first group and decrease in the second. Additionally, we suggest that the rela-
tionship between behaviour by multinationals and political risk is unstable across
years (Méon and Sekkat, 2012), and run our regressions on two time sub-samples
(2008-2011 and 2012-2016), supposing that in the first time period multinationals
may have been most sensitive to home political risk due to the world financial crisis,
while in the later period Russian political risk would have been the chief factor.
Statistics on multinational exit rates (Table 3.1) show that the worst affected sec-
tor was construction, which lost half of all foreign subsidiaries and where the num-
ber of exits was more than three times higher than entries. The financial and insur-
ance sectors lost one third of foreign subsidiaries, and the number of exits relative to
entries is almost six times higher. The exit rate is lower in manufacturing (27%), but
the sector experienced a very low number of new entries.
Exit numbers rocketed in the period after 2012, when the average exit rate was
38.5%, though the worst ratio between exits and entries was observed between 2008
and 2011.
With respect to source country groups, we observe a clear difference in exit rates
between countries, which imposed and did not impose sanctions (59.5% and 23.2%
respectively). Variations between means for other subgroups are modest. The map
below (Figure 3.1) shows the geographical distribution of exit intensity (exit share in
entries) across home countries.
3.4 The variables and econometric strategy
In this paper we test an empirical model of exit that allows political risks in host and
home country, plant characteristics, and industry and sub-national characteristics to
affect the decision by a multinational to divest. We suggest that post-entry behaviour
of multinationals remains risk-averse and profit-maximizing, though entry and post-
entry attitudes towards political risks are not necessarily equivalent, because, for a
subsidiary already in place, the risk of politically induced losses has to be balanced
by the MNC against the risks and losses arising from the divestment decision.
Chapter 3. Impact of political risk on FDI exit decisions: the case of Russia 76
TABLE 3.1: Exits of multinationals by sector, time period and home
country group, 2000-2016, full sample
Exits Entries Exit rate, % Exits as Total
N obs. N obs. % of entries N obs.
Sector
Agriculture 250 102 45.0 198.4 556
Mining 160 126 21.8 127.0 733
Manufacturing 1489 470 26.9 316.8 5543
Electricity 72 39 25.4 184.6 284
Water supply 64 20 42.4 320.0 151
Construction 1029 292 51.4 352.4 2002
Trade 4832 1662 34.6 290.7 13956
Transportation 591 197 26.2 300.0 2253
Accomodation 147 66 20.2 222.7 727
ICT 609 192 28.5 317.2 2140
Finances. insurance 962 165 31.6 583.0 3042
Real estate 1268 400 20.8 317.0 6107
Professional, R&D 1251 365 26.3 342.7 4764
Administration 427 121 32.3 352.9 1320
Public administration, defense 3 1 30.0 300.0 10
Education 16 8 45.7 200.0 35
Healthcare 41 30 30. 136.7 133
Arts, recreation 94 26 51.4 361.5 183
Other services 50 9 40.3 555.6 124
Others 408 3873 9.2 10.5 4431
Time period
2000-2007 328 877 11.7 37.4 2815
2008-2011 7332 1864 24.6 393.3 29810
2012-2016 6103 5423 38.5 112.5 15869
Home country group
Investment treaty 4597 3084 26.4 149.1 17407
No investment treaty 9166 5080 29.5 180.4 31087
Sanctions 4147 2316 59.5 179.1 6968
No sanctions 9616 5848 23.2 164.4 41526
Lower political risk 9530 5316 27,0% 179.3 35318
Higher political risk 4233 2848 32,1% 148.6 13176
Genuine investors 6443 4135 27.0 155.8 23885
Round-trippers 7320 4029 29.7 181.7 24609
Source: Our dataset
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FIGURE 3.1: Exit intensity by home country
Note: Geographical distribution is calculated as the share of total exits in the total entries by the FDI source country during the whole time period 2000-2016. The number of
countries in each category is shown in parenthesis in the legend. Round-tripping investments are excluded.
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We use several specifications. First, we analyse the data as a panel over a reason-
ably long time period from 2000 to 2016, which lets us combine differences at the mi-
crolevel with the cross-home-country, cross-sector and cross-regional specificity. All
models are proportional Cox-Hazard regressions, which are most commonly used
in event history analysis and relate the survival time of the foreign subsidiary to
changes in political risk in the host or home country. The model produces estimates
of the hazard rate, i.e., the instantaneous rate of failure at which a subsidiary i will
exit at time t on the condition that it survived at t− 1.
In order to obtain the hazard rate of subsidiary i at time t, hi(t), the non-parametric
baseline hazard function h0(t), is multiplied by a parametric part capturing the im-
pact of the vector of covariates Xik(t) by means of parameter estimates bk.
hi(t) = h0(t)exp{
n
∑
j=1
bjPij(t) +
m
∑
k=3
bkXik(t)} (1)
The vector of main predictors P, comprising home and host political risks, is
used in the equation 1 together with the vector of covariates X referring to several
levels of analysis: country (existence of a bilateral investment treaty, participation
in sanctions, and exchange rate of the local currency relative to the home currency);
sub-national region (size of the subnational market, proximity and investment risk,
number of foreign investors in the region); industry (sector dynamics); and charac-
teristics of the subsidiary (size, age, liquidity, organization).
3.4.1 Political risk and political distance
We measure our main explanatory variable of interest in three different ways, all
based on the political country risk index published by PRS group: the level of 12
separate political risks, the composite indicator of all risks and the gap between po-
litical risk in the host and home locations (political distance) in absolute terms. We
choose PRS instead of other available sources because it provides a combination of
indicators, which are most typical in the Russian political and socio-economic con-
text, has the widest country coverage for the years under review and takes account
of risk generated inside and outside the host destination.
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The index includes 12 weighted variables covering both political and social at-
tributes and reflects the subjective perceptions of experts as to the political stability
of countries analysed by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) on a com-
parable basis (Howell, 2014). In the original index the lower the number of points
assigned to a predefined group of political risk components, the higher the risk.
However, for ease of reading and interpretation, we have reversed this rule and
made lower risk equal to lower total points. Not all components of the PRS in-
dex are purely political in nature. The components are: government stability, socio-
economic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corrup-
tion, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, demo-
cratic accountability and quality of the bureaucracy. In one specification of our
model we treat the sub-divisions of political risk as stand-alone variables and in-
clude them stepwise in the regression.
Additionally, the composite indicator of political risk was calculated by summing-
up scores of separate risks, because the original political risk index was based on 100
points. The same composite methodology is widely accepted in the FDI literature
(see e.g., Neumayer and Spess, 2005). In our dataset cumulative political risk in the
host country has mean value of 39.85 and is scored between 31.67 and 47.67 over the
whole time period, with higher score indicating a higher political risk (Table 3.2).
Next, we replace the political risk indicator by a measurement, which is calcu-
lated as the gap between political risk in the host and home locations (political dis-
tance) in absolute terms. By doing so, we test the possibility that firms from emerg-
ing countries and in general countries with a comparable political environment,
would be more likely to tolerate risky markets than their global peers (Aleksynska
and Havrylchyk, 2013; Satyanand, 2011). Additionally, by estimating the effects of
political distance on exits, we take account of recent changes in the political and eco-
nomic environment in home countries. We cannot exclude that some exit decisions
by multinationals in Russia since 2008 have been determined not only by political
risks in Russia, but were also driven by conditions at home, measured in our data as
home political risk and political similarity.
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TABLE 3.2: Definition of variables and descriptive statistics, for genuine investors in 2016
Variable name Definition Source Mean Std Min Max
Exit MNC decision to liquidate or sell subsidiary
in the host market
Ruslana-Amadeus 0.184 0.388 0 1
Host political risk Country risk measure, incorporating 12 polit-
ical and social attributes of the business en-
vironment in Russia. Higher score indicates
higher risk
PRS group data 43.50 0 43.50 43.50
Home political risk Country risk measure, incorporating 12 polit-
ical and social attributes of the business envi-
ronment in the home country. Higher score
indicates higher risk
PRS group data 24.97 11.74 11.83 58.33
Political distance Absolute difference between the political risk
index in Russia and the home country
PRS group data 24.26 8.115 9.375 35.75
Countries with polit-
ical risk assessment
worse than Russia
Dummy for the difference between the polit-
ical risk index in Russia and the home coun-
try, =1 when negative (the same or worse than
Russia) and =0 otherwise (better than Russia)
PRS group data 0.202 0.402 0 1
Continued on the next page
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Table 3.2 Definition of variables and descriptive statistics, for genuine investors in 2016 (continued)
Variable name Definition Source Mean Std Min Max
Countries with polit-
ical risk assessment
better than Russia
Dummy for the difference between the politi-
cal risk index in Russia and the home country,
=1 when positive (better than Russia) and =0
otherwise
PRS group data 0.798 0.402 0 1
Characteristics of the subsidiary
Size Categorical variable for small (=3), medium
(=2) and large (=1) subsidiaries, based on
Ruslana estimation of plant size by combina-
tion of employment and output with control
for the sector
Ruslana 2.247 0.746 1 3
Age Number of years in the market Ruslana 8.374 6.979 0 98
Liquidity Dummy for reported loss, =1 if loss in the
year prior to exit
Ruslana 0.185 0.389 0 1
Greenfield Wholly owned foreign subsidiary Ruslana 0.336 0.473 0 1
JV local Joint-venture with at least one local partner Ruslana 0.254 0.435 0 1
JV foreign Joint-venture with foreign partners only Ruslana 0.409 0.492 0 1
Continued on the next page
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Table 3.2 Definition of variables and descriptive statistics, for genuine investors in 2016 (continued)
Variable name Definition Source Mean Std Min Max
Home country characteristics
Investment treaty Dummy = 1 if the home country has con-
cluded an investment treaty with Russia and
=0 otherwise
WTO 0.776 0.417 0 1
Sanctions Dummy = 1 if the home country imposed
sanctions against Russia after 2014 and =0
otherwise
TASS, information
agency, tass.ru
0.704 0.456 0 1
Host country characteristics
Exchange rate volatil-
ity
Exchange rate of the host currency relative to
the home currency
FXTop currency con-
verter, fxtop.com
47.06 34.29 2.20e-05 178.1
Geographical proxim-
ity
Proximity between the capital of the host re-
gion and the home country
Own calculation using
GPS coordinates, gps-
coordinates.org
2828 2319 272.8 16557
Sector dynamics Share of entries by new firms in the total num-
ber of firms in the sector at 4-digit level
Own estimation from
Ruslana total popula-
tion of plants
0.00177 0.00726 0 0.333
Continued on the next page
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Table 3.2 Definition of variables and descriptive statistics, for genuine investors in 2016 (continued)
Variable name Definition Source Mean Std Min Max
Subnational characteristics
Regional investment
risk
Score measure of regional investment risk, as-
sociated with the quality of governance, fi-
nancial and economic situation, criminal sit-
uation and environment. Higher score indi-
cates higher risk
Expert rating agency,
expert.ru
1.692 1.040 0 7.694
MNCs in the region Logged number of MNC subsidiaries in the
subnational region
Ruslana 6.378 1.829 0 8.355
Market size Logged population of the subnational region Rosstat 15.31 1.032 11.89 16.33
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3.4.2 Factors that affect the impact of political risk on exit decisions
In the next set of regressions, we test the extent to which reactions of foreign sub-
sidiaries to the same levels of political risk differ. Some plants are long-lived in
spite of problems. We hypothesize possible non-linear reaction of multinationals to
changes in political risk and test several shifters, which may cause differing impact
of risk on exits (eq.2). In technical terms, we interact the indicator of political risk or
political distance with the covariates that measure the factors, which complement or
reduce political risk.
hi(t) = h0(t)exp{
n
∑
j=1
bjPij(t) +
m
∑
k=3
bkXik(t) +∑∑ bl PijXik} (2)
The first set of factors that may compound the effect of risk on exits is sanctions
imposed on Russia in 2014 and bilateral investment treaties between Russia and
other countries. Although the sanctions imposed on Russia do not go as far as a ban
on foreign investments, we may assume a connection between sanctions and the
relationship between home and host governments, which could affect divestment
decisions (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2007; Vadlamannati, Janz, and Berntsen, 2018).
The expectation is that, for subsidiaries that originate from sanctioning countries,
the effects of home political risks will be catalysed by sanctions. Non-sanctioning
countries, by contrast, may profit from sanctions if their subsidiaries act as sanction-
busters (Barry and Kleinberg, 2015), so the effects of political risk on subsidiaries
from such countries would be reduced. Descriptive statistics are inconclusive in this
respect. For example, U.S. subsidiaries have topped the list of exiting firms since
2008 (six years prior to sanctions), accounting for 8-13% of departures by genuine
investors in various years. UK subsidiaries account for 9-11% of departures in the
same period.
As microeconomic shifters, we test the structure and organization of the sub-
sidiary, comparing joint-ventures between multinational and local firms with wholly
foreign-owned greenfields and joint-ventures that have exclusively foreign owners.
A local partner may help to mitigate political threats if the harm experienced by
the foreign owner will spill over and hurt local business (Johns and Wellhausen,
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2016). Theoretically, a joint-venture with a local partner should be negatively asso-
ciated with exits and reduce political risk effects, while the effects of organization as
a greenfield may be both positive and negative (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007).
As regards scale, we suppose that larger subsidiaries may be more embedded in
the host economy and have higher costs and risks associated with exit. Larger firms
have more bargaining power in negotiations with government and local competi-
tors. On the other hand, large and profitable firms are more likely to be the target
for government harassment than less important smaller firms (Kobrin, 1987).
Thirdly, we suppose that macro-level political variables may not be sufficient to
predict the effects of risks on exit in a large country with highly heterogeneous politi-
cal institutions at the sub-national level. Country-level political risk may be reduced
if a subsidiary is located in a sub-national region, where political risks at national
level are mitigated by more favourable institutional and economic conditions com-
pared with less advanced regions. In technical terms, we use the same proportional
Cox-Hazard model and add interactions of predictors, which are responsible for
size, joint-venture status, and regional investment risk, with the indicator of politi-
cal risk. We estimate these models only on the sample of genuine investors.
Below we report the results of graphical analysis of our data and use the Kaplan-
Meier estimator. Figure 3.2 shows that genuine investors survive longer than round-
trippers. Home location matters: there is a significant difference between the failure
rate of subsidiaries that originate from countries, which imposed sanctions on Rus-
sia, and from countries, which did not impose sanctions. Affiliates representing the
sender states (countries imposing sanctions) were less likely to exit at the begin-
ning of the observation period and more likely to exit after 2012. A bilateral invest-
ment treaty makes exit less likely. Political distance also counts, though the effect
is the opposite of what was predicted: subsidiaries from the country group with
negative political distance (better than Russia) are less likely to exit compared to
home countries with political risk assessment that is the same or worse than Russia.
There is a higher likelihood of exit for smaller subsidiaries in comparison with larger
plants, and for plants organized as joint-ventures between several foreign investors
as against joint-ventures with a local partner and greenfields. The city of Moscow is
the most vulnerable sub-national location as regards exit probability. These results
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depict patterns of exit by multinationals from Russia and need to be tested by our
econometric analysis.
3.4.3 Controls
The patterns of multinational exit decisions indicate that plant- and sector-specific
shocks are likely to play an important role in addition to political risk. We therefore
also use controls that are frequently applied in the FDI literature. Surviving plants
tend to be bigger, older and more productive than exiting subsidiaries, so we control
the model for size and age. Our data do not allow us to measure factor productivity
directly, so we rely on the findings reported by Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004,
and Yeaple, 2009, which establish that productivity affects multinational entry and
exit behaviour, and is strongly correlated with size. We also take account of liquidity
to allow the possibility that making losses is what causes the MNC to divest.
External insecurity may arise from major changes in exchange rates and levels of
demand (Cuypers and Martin, 2010). We capture the demand conditions by indus-
trial dynamics using measures of the entry rate across 4-digit industrial sectors. This
approach takes account of entry and exit occurring during the same period in each
sector, and reflects the industrial shocks better than sales data, which are subject to
biases because available price indexes are excessively aggregated in conditions of
high inflation. The entry rate was calculated by the authors from the total popu-
lation of firms in Ruslana. We expect hazard of exit to be reduced by higher entry
rates.
We control the model for exchange rate volatility of the Russian currency relative
to the currency of the home country and expect that appreciation of the home coun-
try’s currency reduces probability of exit (see Blonigen, 1997, for the link between
exchange rate and FDI flows).
Some characteristics of sub-national host markets are considered. Size of the
sub-national market is proxied by logged population, which we assume is a power
resource (source of bargaining power) for the host government. Proximity is mea-
sured by the Euclidian distance between the capital of the host sub-national region
and the capital of the home country. When we study the interaction of national and
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FIGURE 3.2: Kaplan-Meier survival across various groups of subsidiaries by affiliate size, age, organization, home country and charac-
teristics of the host region
Note: We use the sub-sample of genuine investors only, except for the first graph, where the survival estimates of genuine and round-tripping investors is shown. The horizontal
axis shows the number of years, the vertical axis displays the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates. Failure is defined as exit of the subsidiary from the Russian market
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sub-national risks, we replace control for market size by the number of foreign sub-
sidiaries in the region.
In some specifications we split the sample across industrial sectors. The expec-
tation is that when sunk capital shifts bargaining power to the host government, a
subsidiary working in services and other mobile industries will be in a worse posi-
tion than a subsidiary working in traditional extractive industries and manufactur-
ing (Kobrin, 1987).
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Do political risks drive FDI exits?
Table 3.3 summarizes estimates of the determinants of hazard of exiting the Russian
market. Column one refers to all years of observation and all foreign investors. The
hazard ratios (exponentiated coefficients) are the expected ratios of failed firms per
surviving firm, so that hazards greater than one indicate an increasing hazard rate
and are thus associated with reduction of subsidiary survival time. Hazard ratios
less than one imply that MNCs postpone or do not consider exit. Columns 2-3 split
the sample between the two sub-samples of round-tripping and genuine investors to
test whether round-trippers, being more familiar with the Russian political context,
will be less likely to exit in response to growing political risk in Russia than genuine
investors. Next, we investigate whether the influence of host and home political risk
on exit differs between the period of the world financial crisis (2008-2011) and the
later time period mainly characterized by growing political risks in Russia (2012-
2016). The threshold can be seen in Figure 3.2, where survival curves change in
2011-2012. We then examine whether the impact of political risk varies across sectors
(columns 6-9).
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TABLE 3.3: Political risk as a determinant of MNC exit decision, baseline results
All Round- Genuine
subsidiaries trippers investors
All years All years All years 2008-2011 2012-2016 Mining Manufacturing Construction Services
Host political risk 1.014** 0.805*** 1.040*** 1.077** 1.023* 0.993 1.004 1.088** 1.048***
(2.71) (-3.52) (7.51) (2.89) (1.73) (-0.12) (0.33) (2.54) (7.97)
Home political risk 1.001 0.957 1.005*** 0.998 1.008*** 0.983 1.003 1.001 1.007***
(0.92) (-1.26) (3.92) (-0.93) (5.43) (-0.85) (0.86) (0.25) (4.63)
Medium size 1.208*** 1.139 1.227*** 1.029 1.273*** 2.477** 1.519*** 0.772 1.135*
(3.82) (1.10) (3.75) (0.30) (3.71) (2.01) (3.61) (-1.08) (1.90)
Small size 3.183*** 2.100*** 3.321*** 2.393*** 3.219*** 4.415*** 4.149*** 2.327*** 3.080***
(26.48) (6.80) (24.81) (10.31) (20.66) (3.61) (13.75) (4.32) (18.89)
Greenfield 0.298*** 0.352*** 0.304*** 1.887*** 0.103*** 0.206*** 0.268*** 1.137 0.295***
(-33.78) (-6.41) (-26.30) (9.49) (-30.65) (-3.53) (-10.51) (0.56) (-23.73)
JV with the local partner 0.675*** 0.428** 0.685*** 1.354*** 0.575*** 0.514** 0.703*** 0.911 0.676***
(-13.57) (-2.39) (-12.77) (4.78) (-16.15) (-2.32) (-5.03) (-0.79) (-11.15)
Continued on the next page
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Table 3.3 Political risk as a determinant of MNC exit decision, baseline results (continued)
All Round- Genuine
subsidiaries trippers investors
All years All years All years 2008-2011 2012-2016 Mining Manufacturing Construction Services
Liquidity 3.356*** 6.842*** 3.304*** 25.397*** 2.223*** 3.429** 4.674*** 3.504*** 2.897***
(32.76) (12.87) (31.11) (44.66) (18.47) (3.22) (16.83) (8.43) (22.85)
Age 1.002 1.013** 1.000 0.999 0.999 1.013 1.005** 0.999 0.996
(1.09) (2.74) (0.22) (-0.32) (-0.40) (0.40) (2.06) (-0.11) (-1.28)
Sector dynamics 0.023*** 0.051** 0.033*** 1.646 0.008*** 0.005 0.016*** 0.012 0.021***
(-11.90) (-2.27) (-10.64) (0.67) (-12.60) (-1.22) (-3.77) (-1.33) (-10.79)
Market size 1.124*** 1.060 1.124*** 0.982 1.131*** 1.137 1.079** 1.226*** 1.122***
(9.20) (1.10) (8.76) (-0.66) (8.09) (1.01) (2.41) (3.60) (6.87)
Proximity 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000** 1.000* 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(-1.24) (-1.37) (0.31) (-2.16) (1.79) (-0.34) (-0.55) (0.24) (0.56)
Exchange rate volatility 1.001** 1.013 1.003*** 1.002* 1.004*** 1.010 1.006*** 1.003 1.002**
(2.72) (1.14) (4.95) (1.87) (6.28) (1.28) (3.79) (1.52) (2.90)
Continued on the next page
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Table 3.3 Political risk as a determinant of MNC exit decision, baseline results (continued)
All Round- Genuine
subsidiaries trippers investors
All years All years All years 2008-2011 2012-2016 Mining Manufacturing Construction Services
No. of obs 119951 21105 98846 40293 56100 1337 17395 4801 72719
No. of subjects 27973 6995 21600 15045 18394 260 3566 841 16477
No. of failures 6324 568 5756 1432 4324 54 872 411 4263
BIC 113336.405*** 8656.452*** 100674.346*** 23199.929*** 70831.259*** 537.691*** 12095.519*** 5032.379*** 71943.100***
Log pseudolikelihood -56598.034*** -4268.482*** -50268.165*** -11536.341*** -35350.020*** -225.656*** -5989.176*** -2465.330*** -35904.384***
Wald chi2(10) 5377.138*** 537.698*** 4657.381*** 3696.257*** 3462.347*** 90.230*** 931.376*** 199.834*** 3279.050***
Notes: All estimations use the Cox proportional hazard model. Regression coefficients are the hazard ratio (exponentiated coefficients). Z statistics are reported in parentheses beneath
the coefficients. Robust standard errors are used. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% 5% and 10% (the reference value is 1, meaning ‘no effect’). The Wald test checks the
null hypothesis that all (non-exponentiated) coefficients equal zero. The reference category of the size dummy is large and very large subsidiaries; the reference category for type of
organization is joint-ventures with several foreign owners.
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Host political risk has strong explanatory power in all specifications of the model:
in the full sample increase of host political risk by one unit makes exit 1.4% more
likely. Genuine investors react to both host and home political risk: the first increases
hazard by 4% and the second by 0.5%. Round-trippers are immune to home political
risk, and their specific institutional knowledge and capabilities apparently even en-
able them to extract advantage from political risks in Russia: if the host political risks
increase by one unit, round-trippers are 19.5% less likely to exit. Home political risks
do not affect the divestment behavior of round-trippers. In our further analysis we
exclude firms created by round-trippers from the sample and keep only subsidiaries
founded by genuine investors, since change in the regulation of offshore business af-
ter 2014 changed the nature of political harassment against round-trippers in Russia.
This change is not captured by our measurement of host political risks.
When we split the sample into two time periods, we find that the nature of polit-
ical hazards, typical for the two periods of observation, does not change the strong
and positive hazard ratio associated with host political risks: in both periods the
host risk effects are hazardous and significant. However, the results with the control
variable show that liquidity had a big effect on exit decisions in the years imme-
diately after the financial crisis: subsidiaries that reported losses were more than
25 times more likely to exit than profitable firms in that period, while loss-making
plants were only about twice more likely to exit between 2012 and 2016.
The findings also imply that construction and services are more exposed to polit-
ical risks than industry: the likelihood of an exit grows by 4.8% in trade and services
and by 8.8% in construction when political risks intensify. This confirms the finding
of Kolstad and Villanger, 2008, of higher vulnerability of more mobile sectors. How-
ever, service sectors with a positive industry trend are less likely to fail: if the share
of entries in the total population of firms in the services sector doubles, the hazard
of exit in the services subsample is reduced by nearly 98%.
As regards the control variables, plant features, size and liquidity are correlated
with the exit decision in the expected way: smaller and loss-making plants are more
likely to exit. Age does not vary significantly from one in most specifications. Green-
fields and joint-ventures with local partners have much lower exit hazard (70% and
32.5% lower, respectively, for the full sample) compared to joint-ventures set up by
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several foreign investors. Exchange rate volatility relative to the home currency is an
exit determinant mainly for genuine investors. Larger subnational markets are more
likely to be associated with divestment, thus confirming the expectation that larger
markets provide additional bargaining power to the host government rather than to
the MNC. This finding is in line with the theoretical considerations mentioned above
(Dial and Murphy, 1995; Kobrin, 1987). Geographical proximity, which the literature
finds to have a strong impact on entry decisions, does not seem to have a significant
impact on exits.
Important findings emerge when we study the effects of the separate compo-
nents of political risk (Table 3.4, column 1). Various components of political risk have
varying impact and not all of them are exit determinants. Problems with democratic
accountability and military in politics seem to drive the hazard ratio most strongly:
the reported hazards are 90% higher for the former component and 85% for the lat-
ter. Our result confirms prior findings that investor confidence is higher when host
regimes are democratic (Jensen, 2008). Corruption in the political system – mostly
understood in the data source as excessive patronage, favors for favors and close ties
between politics and business, rather than as pressure to pay bribes – troubles multi-
nationals and significantly determines exits (68.7%). Our finding confirms empirical
evidence advanced by Wei, 2000, on the negative link between corruption in a host
country and inward FDI as well as recent findings for Russia by Zakharov, 2018.
The hazard ratios for home political risks are the highest for law and order
(10.5%), bureaucracy (7.9%) and socio-economic conditions (Table 3.4, column 2).
The only components of home political risk, which significantly reduce the failure
rate, are problems with democratic accountability of the home government and re-
ligious tensions in the home country. With respect to democratic accountability,
it is worth considering work by Li and Resnick, 2003, who claim that democracy
may discourage FDI due to costs associated with labour protection, antitrust laws
and public pressure for the fair distribution of capital. Another point to consider
is that weak democracy at home may provoke risk-diversification behaviour, mak-
ing multinationals from such countries immune to low democratic accountability in
Russia (Aguiar et al., 2012).
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TABLE 3.4: The effects of political risk components and political sim-
ilarity on exits (genuine investors only)
Host politi-
cal risk
Home po-
litical risk
Political
distance
Government stability 1.068*** 1.040*** 0.986
(4.69) (3.64) (-1.07)
Socioeconomic conditions 0.739*** 1.054*** 0.941***
(-6.42) (7.46) (-5.65)
Investment profile 1.069*** 1.006 0.973**
(3.36) (0.90) (-2.40)
Internal conflict 1.426*** 1.025** 0.985
(4.84) (2.37) (-1.30)
External conflict 1.124*** 1.050*** 0.987
(7.52) (5.28) (-1.29)
Corruption 1.687*** 1.040*** 0.969**
(7.54) (3.73) (-2.98)
Military in politics 1.849*** 1.047*** 0.864***
(8.57) (4.65) (-7.04)
Religious tensions 0.000 0.959** 0.950**
(.) (-2.63) (-2.38)
Law and order 1.322*** 1.105*** 0.970**
(7.88) (6.70) (-2.00)
Ethnic tensions 0.000 1.006 1.056**
(.) (0.49) (3.16)
Democratic accountability 1.900*** 0.983** 1.024**
(10.33) (-2.15) (2.02)
Quality of the bureaucracy 1.000 1.079*** 0.923***
(.) (6.30) (-6.42)
All controls included Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 102676 98846 98846
No. of subjects 22326 21600 21600
No. of failures 6032 5756 5756
Notes: All estimations use the Cox proportional hazard model. Regression coeffi-
cients are the hazard ratio (exponentiated coefficients). Z statistics are reported in
parentheses beneath the coefficients. Robust standard errors are used. ***, ** and *
denote statistical significance at 1% 5% and 10% (the reference value is 1, meaning ‘no
effect’). The Wald test checks the null hypothesis that all (non-exponentiated) coeffi-
cients equal zero. The reference category of the size dummy is large and very large
subsidiaries; the reference category for type of organization is joint-ventures with sev-
eral foreign owners.
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3.5.2 Does political difference have impact on an MNE’s exit decision?
Next, we turn to the impact of institutional similarity with respect to political risks
between source and destination countries and analyze the effect of political distance
in absolute terms on the exit decision of an MNC (Table 3.5). The hypothesis is that
ability to cope with high political risks in the home country might benefit MNCs op-
erating in a similarly challenging institutional environment abroad, so they will feel
less pressure to exit. MNCs from developing countries might feel more "at home" on
the Russian market.
The results show that political similarity is indeed relevant in determining exit
decisions, but the direction of the effect is the opposite of what was expected. The
estimates show that institutional similarity does not bring advantages to foreign
subsidiaries: if the political distance increases by one unit, the probability of exit
decreases by 0.4% (Table 3.5, column 1). The result persists when we use the alterna-
tive measurement of political distance (splitting the sample between home countries
that are better and those that are worse than Russia in terms of country political risk).
Multinationals from countries with better political conditions are less likely to suffer
divestment hazard than multinationals from countries with comparable or higher
political risks than exist in Russia: for the former the hazard rate of host political
risk is 3.6%, while for the second it is 10%. Home political risk is only a problem for
multinationals from countries with better political risk scores than Russia. In the real
world, this means that the likelihood of exit for German multinationals, which have
one of the largest political distances to Russia, is much lower than for their Turkish
counterparts, even though Turkey is very similar to Russia as regards political risk.
Finally, we study how an investment treaty with Russia changes the relationship
between risks and exit. An investment treaty may offer additional protection to a
subsidiary and reduce the hazard of exit under pressure from political risks. To test
this, we run the same regressions on subsamples of subsidiaries originating from
countries with and without an investment treaty with Russia. The findings show
that subsidiaries from countries that have an investment treaty with Russia are 0.9%
less likely to fail in response to increasing political risk (Table 3.5, column 4). This
result is in line with the empirical literature, which provides evidence that bilateral
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TABLE 3.5: Impact of institutional similarity on MNC exit decisions
(genuine investors only)
Political dis-
tance
Subsample
of countries
with lower
political risk
than Russia
Subsample
of countries
with higher
political risk
than Russia
Subsample:
investment
treaty with
Russia
Subsample:
no invest-
ment treaty
with Russia
Political distance 0.996** 0.991*** 1.001
(-2.22) (-3.80) (0.19)
Host political risk 1.036*** 1.100***
(6.26) (4.86)
Home political risk 1.004** 0.986
(2.31) (-1.02)
Investment treaty 0.855*** 0.814*** 1.159
(-5.23) (-6.31) (1.35)
All controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 98846 88944 9902 75052 23794
No. of subjects 21600 20473 3517 16581 5755
No. of failures 5756 5117 639 4181 1575
BIC 100702.830*** 88299.212*** 8423.315*** 70714.947*** 23263.721***
Log pseudolikeli-
hood
-50282.407*** -44075.534*** -4151.854*** -35295.731*** -11576.436***
Wald chi2(10) 4638.692*** 4429.086*** 357.253*** 3501.515*** 1121.847***
Notes: All estimations use the Cox proportional hazard model. Regression coefficients are the hazard ratio (ex-
ponentiated coefficients). Z statistics are reported in parentheses beneath the coefficients. Robust standard errors
are used. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% 5% and 10% (the reference value is 1, meaning ‘no ef-
fect’). The Wald test checks the null hypothesis that all (non-exponentiated) coefficients equal zero. The reference
category of the size dummy is large and very large subsidiaries; the reference category for type of organization is
joint-ventures with several foreign owners.
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investment treaties protect FDI in developing countries with poor domestic institu-
tional quality (Neumayer and Spess, 2005). In the subsample of countries without
an investment treaty the effect is not significantly different from one.
The pattern when larger distance leads to lower probability of exit is confirmed
for separate measurements of gaps in political risk (Table 3.4, column three). How-
ever, two important exceptions are observed: the theoretically predicted effect (larger
distance, higher probability of exit) remains valid for ethnic tension and democratic
accountability. An increase of absolute distance between the home location and Rus-
sia as regards ethnic tension and democracy induces a 5.6% and 2.4% higher hazard
of a subsidiary’s exit from the Russian market.
Overall, however, it is clear that familiarity with a high-risk political environ-
ment does not compensate MNCs from developing markets for disadvantages in
terms of technology, management and political bargaining power relative to MNCs
from more developed markets.
3.5.3 The importance of sanctions
Next, we focus on how multinationals react to political relations between home and
host countries and, specifically, whether MNCs are responsive to their home coun-
try’s imposition of sanctions against Russia after 2014. In Table 3.6 we report the
results for our measure of how sanctions affect the hazard of exit (columns 1 and 3)
and the results of interaction of both our indicators of political risks with the dummy
for belonging to the group of sender states (columns 2 and 4).
The indicator of host political risks is excluded from the study of interaction be-
tween sanctions and political risk due to high endogeneity of host risks and sanc-
tions. The imposition of sanctions has itself been a major contributor to Russia’s
political risk scores since 2014. The individual components of host political risk are
also highly correlated with sanctions.
As seen in column one of Table 3.6, the impact of sanctions on an MNC’s deci-
sion to exit is positive and significantly different from one at the 1% level. The eco-
nomic significance of the effect suggests that subsidiaries established by firms from
sender states experience 9.9% growth of the likelihood of exit. So the community of
subsidiaries from non-sender countries would be expected to be more permanent.
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TABLE 3.6: The impact of sanctions on exit decisions (genuine in-
vestors only)
Home Interaction Political Interaction
political risk of risks distance of distance
and sanctions and sanctions
Home political risk 1.007*** 1.003**
(5.08) (2.28)
Interaction of home 1.017***
political risk with
sanctions
(6.23)
Political distance 0.990*** 1.000
(-4.88) (-0.11)
Interaction of political 0.972***
distance with sanc-
tions
(-7.06)
Sanctions in force 1.099** 0.730*** 1.126*** 2.153***
(2.82) (-4.06) (3.38) (8.26)
All controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 98846 98846 98846 98846
No. of subjects 21600 21600 21600 21600
No. of failures 5756 5756 5756 5756
BIC 100713.297*** 100696.007*** 100714.164*** 100685.162***
Log pseudolikelihood -50287.641*** -50273.245*** -50288.074*** -50267.822***
Wald chi2(10) 4612.036*** 4665.262*** 4609.698*** 4705.893***
Notes: All estimations use the Cox proportional hazard model. Regression coefficients are the hazard ratio
(exponentiated coefficients). Z statistics are reported in parentheses beneath the coefficients. Robust stan-
dard errors are used. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% 5% and 10% (the reference value is 1,
meaning ‘no effect’). The Wald test checks the null hypothesis that all (non-exponentiated) coefficients equal
zero. The reference category of the size dummy is large and very large subsidiaries; the reference category
for type of organization is joint-ventures with several foreign owners.
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These results support our third hypothesis, according to which sanctions are posi-
tively connected with exits.
As regards political similarity and sanctions (Table 3.6, columns 3 and 4), the re-
sults confirm the previous finding that political similarity is not an advantage for
subsidiaries that represent countries with weak institutions. Participation in sanc-
tions makes the situation even worse for them. Subsidiaries from sender states that
are similar to Russia in the measurement of political risks are more likely to exit than
MNCs from non-sender states, which have a level of home political risk compara-
ble to that in Russia. The economic significance of sanctions grows to 12.6% in this
specification.
Next, we examine whether the positive effect of political risk on exit is condi-
tional on the home country’s association with sanction sender states. Interaction
terms between political risk measurement and sanctions are reported in column 2
of Table 3.6. The interaction term is positive and significant at 1%, suggesting that
the positive effect of risk on exit decisions is more severe when the home country
joins sanctions against Russia. When we turn to the alternative measure of political
risk, calculated as political similarity between home and host location, and exam-
ine whether the effect of political similarity is conditional on sanctions (Table 3.6,
column 4), the interaction term is negative, below one and significant at 1%. This
suggests that the tendency of increasing political distance to reduce exit probability
becomes less pronounced when the home country is a sender.
We quantify the economic result of the risk/sanctions interaction terms in Fig-
ures 3.3 and 3.4. The marginal plots in the figures allow much more intuitive inter-
pretation of the regression results in the Cox hazard model, especially if they include
interaction terms. They allow us to observe how differences across various groups
(sanctioning vs. non-sanctioning states in this case) change when any other variable
of interest increases (Williams, 2012). Thus, Figure 3.3 demonstrates the adjusted
prediction of the failure ratio at various levels of home political risk for the groups
of subsidiaries aligned and not aligned with sender states. We see that sanctions
increase the impact of political risks on exit: subsidiaries originating from sender
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FIGURE 3.3: Adjusted predictions of interaction between home polit-
ical risks and sanctions
Note: Figure 3.3 presents the regression results of equation 2 (Table 3.6, column 2) for the sanc-
tions/risk interaction. 95% confidence intervals are marked by vertical lines. Relative hazards are
estimated separately for each of two groups (sanctioning vs. non-sanctioning states) at hypothetical
fixed values of home political risk between 5 and 55, using the actual observed values for all other
variables.
countries with the highest political risk at home have almost three times higher haz-
ard ratios than other countries with highest home risk, which do not impose sanc-
tions. In the real world this result means that Bulgarian subsidiaries with a 35.5 score
for home political risk in 2016 are approximately 1.76 times more likely to exit than
Brazilian subsidiaries, which have the same home political risk score.
Figure 3.4 shows that if the home country’s political distance to Russia is approx-
imately 13 points and the country joins sanctions against Russia (this is the exact sit-
uation of Moldova), its subsidiary is about twice more likely to exit than a subsidiary
from Algeria, which has the same political distance but is not a sender state. How-
ever, sanctions make no difference to the impact of risks on exits for sender states
with high political distance to Russia.
Overall, our analysis provides evidence that the imposition of sanctions adds to
pressure on sender-state subsidiaries to exit the Russian market and adds to exist-
ing home political risks. Our results offer confirmation from detailed micro-data of
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FIGURE 3.4: Adjusted predictions of interaction between political dis-
tance and sanctions
Note: Figure 3.4 presents the regression results of equation 2 (Table 3.6, column 4) for the sanc-
tions/political distance interaction. 95% confidence intervals are marked by vertical lines. Relative
hazards are estimated separately for each of two groups (sanctioning vs. non-sanctioning states) at
hypothetical fixed distance levels between 10 and 40, using the actual observed values for all other
variables.
the earlier findings of Mirkina, 2018, who shows that aggregated FDI flows from
sender states fell much more sharply in the short-run than FDI from non-sender
states. The chilling effect of sanctions on the business interests of home and host
countries is confirmed. Whether or not the departure of MNCs means that sanctions
have been successful and whether these effects promote the foreign policy interests
of the sender state is another issue. More work is needed to establish the link be-
tween the economic costs of sanctions and their contribution to the sender’s foreign
policy goals.
3.5.4 Structural factors that may reduce the impact of political risk on exit
Our fourth hypothesis is that MNCs exposed to an unfavourable political environ-
ment are less likely to exit if they are protected by large size of the subsidiary, local
networks and a more favourable location at the sub-national level. In this section we
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examine whether the effects of political risk on exits are conditional on sub-national
investment risk and on the size and type of organization of the subsidiary.
How do national and sub-national risks interact?
We have already shown the direct effect of some sub-national characteristics on exit
decisions, following the FDI literature, which reports how market size and prox-
imity affect the decision. Our results suggest that larger markets lose more MNC
subsidiaries, while the results for proximity are inconclusive (Table 3.3). We now
examine whether the effects of national political risks on exit are conditional on the
level of sub-national investment risk and hypothesize that the effect of national polit-
ical risk may be mitigated if the subsidiary is located in an institutionally favourable
territory (H4). We introduce interaction terms between country and regional risks
following equation 2 (Table 3.7, columns 3, 5 and 7).
The estimation results for the conditional effects of national and sub-national
risks are not conclusive when the regression is run on the total sample of genuine
investors (Table 3.7, column 1), national political risks remain positive and are eco-
nomically and statistically significant, while sub-national risks are negative and in-
significant.
What if this result is driven by the city of Moscow, which is one of the best re-
gions regarding investment risks (though not in all years of observation) and hosts
more than half of all foreign subsidiaries? As the Kaplan-Meier estimator in Figure
3.2 demonstrates, at the beginning of the observation period, there is hardly any dif-
ference in propensity to exit between subsidiaries located in Moscow and elsewhere.
However, since around 2012 subsidiaries located in Moscow have been more likely
to exit than subsidiaries elsewhere. We rerun the same regression on the sub-samples
of subsidiaries located in the city of Moscow and in the regional groups of institu-
tionally strong and weak locations. Institutionally strong regions are defined as the
10% of regions with the lowest investment risks (Moscow excluded) on a yearly ba-
sis. This strong group consists of about 7 regions which host approximately one
third of the sampled subsidiaries.
The results prove that subsidiaries in Moscow are significantly affected by both
national and sub-national risks, but the impact of regional risk is much higher there
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TABLE 3.7: Conditional effects of regional and country risks on exit decisions
All regions Moscow sub-
sample
Interaction of re-
gional investment
risk and country
political risk for
Moscow
Subsample of
institution-
ally strong
regions
Interaction of re-
gional investment
risk and country
political risk for
strong regions
Subsample
of institu-
tionally weak
regions
Interaction of re-
gional investment
risk and country
political risk for
weak regions
Regional risk 0.910*** 1.389*** 0.149** 1.002 623.985*** 0.944** 1.427
(-6.10) (4.78) (-2.53) (0.01) (4.51) (-2.54) (1.35)
Political risk 1.042*** 1.091*** 1.027 1.018 1.084*** 1.037*** 1.058***
(8.16) (10.40) (1.24) (1.55) (4.61) (4.05) (3.64)
No. of MNCs 1.022** 0.822*** 0.855*** 0.964 0.968 0.944** 0.936**
(3.28) (-6.55) (-4.56) (-1.57) (-1.38) (-2.68) (-2.96)
Pol. risk 1.057** 0.854*** 0.990
x regional risk (3.01) (-4.52) (-1.58)
All controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 102372 46807 46807 18512 18512 37053 37053
No. of subjects 22259 10803 10803 5875 5875 9350 9350
No. of failures 6000 3080 3080 1040 1040 1880 1880
BIC 105309.192*** 49748.741*** 49751.497*** 14741.071*** 14736.218*** 28943.692*** 28952.177***
Log pseudolikelihood -52585.378*** -24809.848*** -24805.849*** -7311.578*** -7304.239*** -14408.725*** -14407.708***
Wald chi2(10) 4710.926*** 2036.423*** 2058.724*** 1106.110*** 1144.370*** 1595.229*** 1594.011***
Notes: All estimations use the Cox proportional hazard model. Regression coefficients are the hazard ratio (exponentiated coefficients). Z statistics are reported in parentheses beneath
the coefficients. Robust standard errors are used. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% 5% and 10% (the reference value is 1, meaning ‘no effect’). The Wald test checks the
null hypothesis that all (non-exponentiated) coefficients equal zero. The reference category of the size dummy is large and very large subsidiaries; the reference category for type of
organization is joint-ventures with several foreign owners.
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than the impact of national political risk: Moscow-based subsidiaries are 38.9% more
likely to exit if the regional investment risk increases by one unit.
In the sub-sample of subsidiaries located in institutionally strong regions (Moscow
excluded) both national and sub-national political risk have slightly positive, but in-
significant impact. In institutionally weak regions national risk is highly significant
and has the expected sign. However, regional risks in the weak regions show results,
which conflict with H4: higher regional risks are associated with lower probability
of failure.
Interaction of national and regional risks (Table 3.7, columns 3, 5 and 7) show
that only Moscow experiences significant and positive impact from both national
and sub-national risks: lower sub-national risks in the capital may mitigate hazards
associated with growth of national political risk. This does not apply to the rest
of the sample: interaction terms for the institutionally strong regions are negative
and significant, and for the group of institutionally weak regions they are negative
and insignificant. Overall, we find that institutional heterogeneity of sub-national
regions in Russia offers only partial confirmation of H4. Local risks affect exits in
the expected way in the city of Moscow (mitigating national political risks), but not
elsewhere in Russia.
Does the subsidiary’s size, type of organization and sector affiliation shift the ef-
fects of political risk on exits?
The size of the subsidiary has the anticipated effect in all of the specifications, which
we have dealt with so far. A medium-size subsidiary increases the probability of exit
by 22.7% compared to a large subsidiary, and the hazard rate for small subsidiaries
is 3.3 times higher than for large ones (Table 3.3, column 3, for genuine investors).
Sensitivity to scale is mostly typical for the mining and manufacturing industries,
where small MNC plants exit over 4 times more often than large plants (Table 3.3,
columns 6-7).
Is the effect of host political risks smaller for bigger plants? To answer this ques-
tion we interact the host political risk indicator with the size group dummies and
present the graphical result of our regression analysis in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. The
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FIGURE 3.5: Adjusted predictions of interaction between host politi-
cal risk and subsidiary size
Note: Figure 3.5 presents the regression results of equation 2 (and corresponds to column 1 in Table
3.8) for the size/risk interaction. 95% confidence intervals are marked by vertical lines. Relative haz-
ards are estimated separately for each of three size groups (large, medium and small subsidiaries) at
hypothetical fixed values of host political risk between 35 and 45, using actual observed values for all
other variables.
corresponding regression results with interaction of size dummies and host political
risks are presented in Table 3.8.
We see in Figure 3.5 that the gap between medium and large subsidiaries does
not change, regardless of the level of political risks in Russia. This visually con-
firms the regression result that indicates an insignificant interaction term between
medium size of a plant and host political risk. However, large subsidiaries remain
most resistant to market exit at all risk levels. This finding is consistent with Dial
and Murphy, 1995, who find that large sunk costs associated with bigger size of the
plant discourage exit. This is exemplified by the fact that, when political risk in Rus-
sia reached its highest observed score of 44.25 in 2015, small subsidiaries had almost
six times higher hazard ratios than large subsidiaries.
As political risks increase, greenfields and joint-ventures with local partner have
obvious advantages over joint-ventures consisting of foreign investors only (Figure
3.6) (greenfields reduce the effect of political risk on exit decisions to the greatest
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FIGURE 3.6: Adjusted predictions of the interaction between host po-
litical risk and mode of entry
Note: Figure 3.6 presents the regression results of equation 2 (and corresponds to Table 3.8, column 2)
for the mode of entry/risk interaction. 95% confidence intervals are marked by vertical lines. Relative
hazards are estimated separately for each of two groups (Greenfields; joint-ventures comprised of
several foreign owners; and joint-venture between foreign and local owners) at hypothetical fixed
values of host political risk between 35 and 45, using the actual observed values for all other variables.
This finding confirms results in the literature, which establish the advantages
of a joint-venture with the local partner for managing political hazards (Demirbag,
McGuinness, and Altay, 2010; Henisz, 2000). However, Figure 3.6 shows that the
most resistant type of organization, for reducing exits due to political risk, is a
wholly-owned subsidiary. This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction
by Nocke and Yeaple, 2007. The economic significance of this effect is quite high:
exits from greenfield investments have been low in the period of growing Russian
political risk since 2008. For example, in 2011 greenfields were about 50% less likely
to fail compared with joint-ventures comprised of foreign investors only and in 2015
they were more than 20 times less likely to fail.
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TABLE 3.8: Results of Cox proportional hazard model analysis for
genuine investors. Interaction effects of political risk with firm size
and mode of entry
Interaction of
political risk
with size
Interaction of
political risk
with entry
mode
Political risks 0.960** 1.160***
(-3.14) (21.18)
Greenfield 0.301*** 9.33e+06***
(-26.57) (31.83)
At least one Russian shareholder 0.657*** 180.622***
(-14.25) (14.31)
Medium size 0.720 1.220***
(-0.55) (3.61)
Small size 0.034*** 3.254***
(-6.29) (24.44)
Interaction of pol. risk 0.653***
with greenfield (-33.09)
Interaction of pol. risk 0.874***
with at least one Russian share-
holder
(-15.48)
Interaction of pol. risk 1.013
with medium size (0.89)
Interaction of pol. risk 1.118***
with small size (8.50)
All controls included Yes Yes
No. of obs. 98850 98850
No. of subjects 21600 21600
No. of failures 5756 5756
BIC 100634.466*** 99597.472***
Log pseudolikelihood -50242.474*** -49723.977***
Wald chi2(10) 4962.885*** 5557.267***
Notes: All estimations use the Cox proportional hazard model. Regression coeffi-
cients are the hazard ratio (exponentiated coefficients). Z statistics are reported in
parentheses beneath the coefficients. Robust standard errors are used. ***, ** and *
denote statistical significance at 1% 5% and 10% (the reference value is 1, meaning ‘no
effect’). The Wald test checks the null hypothesis that all (non-exponentiated) coeffi-
cients equal zero. The reference category of the size dummy is large and very large
subsidiaries; the reference category for type of organization is joint-ventures with sev-
eral foreign owners.
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3.6 Conclusions
This paper presents empirical results regarding exit decisions by multinationals in
response to the growth of political risks in Russia and political factors in their home
countries Our findings strongly support what has already been suggested by the
literature on industrial organization and institutions by showing that political risk
is an influential factor in decisions by MNCs to quit the Russian market. Such risk
interacts not only with the firm’s size, structure and market specifics, but also with
relations between the home and host countries. This paper compares the effects of
political risk on exit during various periods of economic and geopolitical instability,
and reports that the effects are economically and statistically significant in all the
years of observation, although liquidity issues determined exits to a much greater
extent in years immediately following the global financial crisis than in later years.
We find striking differences in the combination and statistical significance of pol-
icy risk indicators between genuine and round-tripping investors. Round-trippers,
which have special institutional knowledge and strong embeddedness in the local
economy, are not sensitive to political risk factors.
Our findings do not fully support the idea that decisions by entrants to exit mir-
ror traditional structural entry barriers. In particular, tolerable sub-national risks,
which have been reported to stimulate entries, do not bring advantages with respect
to exits. On the contrary, institutionally strong sub-national regions lose foreign
subsidiaries and business activities even more rapidly than institutionally weak ter-
ritories in face of increasing political risk at national level. The city of Moscow is the
only exception in this trend.
Our results confirm the theoretical prediction that, in making an exit decision, an
MNC faces a trade-off between the economic benefits of remaining longer against
the costs associated with uncertainties and risks in the difficult political environ-
ment. The findings suggest that multinational companies may in fact increase the
duration of their stay in a troubled market if their subsidiaries there are large-scale
or are greenfields or are working in the capital-intensive resource sector with deep
roots in the host economy, enabling them to build resistance to political pressure
from host and home governments. Economic ties in destination areas through joint
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venturing with local partners also reduce the probability of failure.
The study finds that patterns of multinational behaviour in response to political
risks differ, depending on the institutional gap between the home and the host loca-
tion. We had expected that MNCs from countries with high levels of political risk
would be more tolerant to the political situation in the host country. However, we
find, on the contrary, that closer institutional match makes foreign subsidiaries more
likely to exit and more vulnerable to political risk. This may be explained by weaker
bargaining power and smaller financial and technological resources of subsidiaries
from home countries with comparable and higher political risks.
Our paper contributes to the sanctions debate, not by answering the question of
whether sanctions ultimately work, but as regards the economic cost of sanctions in
terms of losses of functioning businesses and damage to economic relations. This ar-
ticle gives attention to a specific aspect of political pressure that has been overlooked
in previous literatures, namely the connectivity between sanctions and home polit-
ical risk. We find that political pressure from sender states has strong influence on
multinational exit decisions. Alignment with the group of countries that imposed
sanctions makes subsidiaries more likely to exit, and sanctions penalizing Russia’s
record of political behaviour complement political risks, associated with home pol-
icy and governance. There is no evidence that subsidiaries of third countries fill
the vacuum left by sender-state firms, expanding their business in Russia. Overall,
when sender states impose economic sanctions, the risk for multinationals in the tar-
geted country strongly increases and they respond to the risk by divesting. MNCs
from weaker sender states are most vulnerable to the pressure of sanctions.
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performance
Autors: Ksenia Gonchar and Maria Kristalova1
Abstract2
This paper studies how innovation strategies of Russian manufacturing firms af-
fect various features of firm performance. A multi stage model is used, which relates
the firm’s decision to undertake R&D to its innovation output, technical efficiency,
labour productivity, and growth. We also include imports into the knowledge pro-
duction function, because catching up economies may adopt technologies embodied
in imported hardware. Additionally, we link productivity and innovation output to
survival. We find that both types of knowledge input – R&D and imports – strongly
determine innovation. Innovations yield the strongest performance return in the
case of catching up to technological frontier. Product innovation is more beneficial
than process innovation in all performance features except for labour productivity.
However, higher efficiency does not improve the growth rates or survival time of
manufacturing firms. Taken together, these results show that innovation is not uni-
formly rewarded across all features of firm performance.
JEL classification: C30, D24, O30
Key words: innovation; productivity, growth, survival, Russia
1For detailed information about the contributions of the authors see Appendix C.
2The authors wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance with the preparation of the data by Olga
Uvarova and insightful comments by Professor Jutta Guenther, Professor Torben Klarl, and partici-
pants of the ierp seminar at the University of Bremen
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4.1 Introduction
Despite sound theoretical claims that technological changes determine growth and
productivity differences across firms, these expectations are not always supported
by empirical data in emerging countries. Firms in Russia could raise output and
productivity on the basis of little investment or innovation by drawing on under-
employed stocks of capital and labour and increased private consumption (Ahrend,
2004). The ability of firms to receive a return from innovations is reduced by a low
degree of competition and a weak market selection mechanism, which allows ineffi-
cient firms to remain in the market and even grow. For example, Bogetic´ and Olusi,
2013 establish that Russian manufacturing firms’ survival is weakly correlated to
productivity (TFP). They conclude that managerial incentives in incumbent firms
may not strongly favour the productivity-innovation link when competition is weak.
In general, factors which affect the technological advance and connection between
firm innovation and the performance in transition countries are still poorly under-
stood. The empirical literature frequently identifies financial constraints as the main
barrier restraining the ability of firms to catch up to the technological frontier (Hall
and Lerner, 2009; Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2013). The innovation-performance
link in latecomer countries, as compared to frontier economies, may be reduced by
a low market value of the novel products and resulting smaller profits from innova-
tion (Hu, Kang, and Wu, 2017). Additionally, the more incremental and less radical
nature of innovation renders a conventional measurement methodology inappro-
priately designed to quantify the innovation effort and its performance effect in this
group of countries (Cirera and Muzi, 2016).
This paper attempts to contribute to the understanding of the relation between
innovation and firm performance in transition economies by analysing the inno-
vation strategies of Russian manufacturing firms. The main research question is
which performance characteristic -productivity gains, output growth, or survival -
is rewarded by innovation in the presence of relatively low competition, high un-
certainties, and a weak market selection mechanism? To what extent is performance
influenced by various forms of innovation? How does the effect differ across dif-
ferent sources of knowledge inputs? How do size, location, and market selection
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intervene in the innovation-performance relation?
The Russian manufacturing industry is a motivating empirical setting for the
analysis of the performance-innovation link in transition economies. It is large and
structurally sophisticated: the manufacturing value added accounted for 12% of
GDP in 2016, which is comparable to Brazil (10.3%) and Poland (18.1%), and half
the level of the Czech Republic (24.4%) and China (28.8%) (World Development In-
dicators, 2018). The industry went through several boom and bust cycles in recent
years in response to transition and cyclical dynamics. It contracted severely in 2009
during the world economic crisis and again in 2015, when the geopolitical situation,
the fall of commodity prices, sanctions, and a national currency devaluation caused
a major downturn. In total, the Russian manufacturing industry lost more than two
million jobs between 2002 and 2015 (Rosstat, 2018).
This paper builds on the previous literature treating the innovation-performance
link and is mostly inspired by the Schumpeterian and evolutionary school of thought
and contributes to this literature by introducing four important novelties. Firstly,
by using a unique dataset comprised of matched survey and registry data to com-
pare the innovation impact on three performance indicators – productivity, growth,
and survival. The modified Crépon, Duguet, and Mairesse (Crépon, Duguet, and
Mairesse, 1998) — henceforth CDM — model is estimated for the cross-section and
panel data. Post-innovation performance is analyzed for the next three years after
the survey was conducted. Studies of innovation effects on various performance
characteristics rarely overlap. Therefore, this paper provides new insights into the
innovation-performance literature. Secondly, innovation input is not limited to R&D
expenditures but is complemented by knowledge input generated by imports of
machines and equipment – the most typical source of technologies for the firms in
emerging economies. Thirdly, we distinguish effects of innovation on labor produc-
tivity and on technical efficiency (TE) in terms of their distance to the production
frontier, thus emphasizing nuances of technological and cost competitiveness. Fi-
nally, by using the Cox proportional hazard model, we investigate how innovation,
growth, and productivity advantages translate into a longer survival time and thus
expand the CDM concept into the most critical performance characteristic of the
firm.
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The findings show the complexity of the innovation-performance link: in gen-
eral, innovations are rewarded, but not across all components of overall performance
and not across all types of innovation. The highest return is found for catching
up to the technological frontier: product innovation is a strong contributor to the
shortening of the distance to the most efficient firm in 4-digit sector and is further-
more beneficial for growth and survival. Process innovation contributes mostly to
labour productivity and growth. In turn, achieved technical efficiency results in
greater innovation output, whereupon technological superiority decides further in-
novation. Innovation improves the growth rate and increases the achieved survival
time, though both growth and survival are mostly dependent on the overall evo-
lution of the industry. Contrary to expectation, more efficient firms do not survive
longer and, as a consequence, the efficiency of resource allocation and market selec-
tion mechanisms may be questioned.
The implication of these results is that in spite of the specificity of the Russian
market structure and institutional setting, our findings are consistent with the pre-
dictions of the evolutionary literature concerning the innovation-performance re-
lationship. The departure from the theory relates to the low correlation between
productivity advantages and survival and growth.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant
literature. Section 3 describes the data and key variables used in analysis. Section 4
presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 describes the findings, Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Theory and findings of the empirical literature
We build our research on the conceptual framework of the Schumpeterian and evo-
lutionary approach to innovation activity as a main engine of change. It establishes
that technological advances develop as an evolutionary process in which innova-
tions shape all of the three dimensions of a firm’s performance we seek to study in
this paper: productivity, growth rates and survival behavior (Dosi, 1988; Klepper
and Thompson, 2006; Nelson and Winter, 1982b; Pavitt, 1999). This framework is
particularly relevant for the emerging economies that often adopt productive tech-
nologies employed before in high-income countries.
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Firms are viewed as complex dynamic organizations that explore the technolog-
ical frontier as they learn from new technologies. Technical change within firms is
related to technological opportunities in the industry and to the environment with a
selection mechanism, applying when innovation benefits are dependent on product
demand and factor supply conditions, as well as on the behaviour of other firms in
the sector. According to this perspective, if productivity depends on technological
opportunities within sectors, then R&D and innovations in some sectors are more
productive than in others. Additionally, differences in the selection environment
lead to various speeds of diffusion of technologies and new products.
The firm learns not only as a result of R&D. It often seeks to complement or
balance inventions with an application of existing knowledge from external sources
(Dosi, 1988). Imports of machines and equipment may therefore be viewed as a
carrier of specific productive knowledge, provided that importing firms can learn
from the R&D investments made earlier by their trade partners (Coe and Helpman,
1995).
This leads us to the first hypothesis:
H1. Productivity evolution is determined by the firms’ innovation decisions,
which in turn depend on knowledge input provided by R&D and imports.
The next important prediction of evolutionary economics refers to the role of
achieved productivity and profit as mechanisms stimulating the search for novel
products and the departure from existing routines (Hall and Jones, 1999; Winter,
1975; Witt, 1996). This sequence of evolutionary knowledge creation, learning, and
a further application of knowledge determines the intensity and efficiency of inno-
vation. Thus, we hypothesize the bidirectional causality between innovation and
productivity:
H2. Not only does innovation stimulate productivity, but innovation may also
be driven by economic returns from previous innovation. Therefore, former advan-
tages in technical efficiency strengthen further innovation.
Within the same theoretical framework of evolutionary economics, gaps in pro-
ductivity across firms as an outcome of the search and learning process consequently
result in differences in growth rates among firms (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Nelson
and Winter, 1982a). Innovation should result in economic growth due to the greater
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variety of products, their superior quality, the unique nature of new technologies
and products, and cost advantages. However, the outcome is not guaranteed and is
conditioned by various factors (Griliches, 1998; Hall and Jones, 1999). The positive
effects may be curtailed by liquidity problems, inefficient allocation, and other diffi-
culties the firm faces. Innovating firms may fail to obtain an economic return from
innovation, leading them to shrink and die even though they are innovation leaders.
They may, for example, not have sufficient capacities and complementary assets, or
a new product might not meet sufficient demand (Teece, 1986a). The recent model
by (Hommes and Zeppini, 2014) shows the role of demand in technological change:
when the demand is elastic, technological progress leads to an ever-increasing frac-
tion of innovators. With inelastic demand, technological progress is characterised
by fewer and fewer innovators instead.
The extended Nelson and Winter model (Winter, 1984) introduces entry dynam-
ics as a pattern of the broader evolution of the industry, outlining a situation in which
the incumbents are challenged by the new firms which enter with the new technolo-
gies, thus forcing the mature firms to innovate or to contract. This expectation is
complemented by the notion of the industry life cycle (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005)
with the various backgrounds of the entrants in different industries.
Hence, our hypothesis for an innovation-growth link may be formulated as fol-
lows:
H3. Innovation and related productivity gains are associated with growth con-
ditional on firm’s survival and positive industry dynamics.
In turn, the survival perspectives of the firms depend on how they transform ad-
vantages in productivity, profitability, and scale economies into the better survival
chances (Aghion, Howitt, and García-Peñalosa, 1998; Audretsch, 1995; Griliches,
1979). Several factors may cause a variation in the probability of survival, depending
on innovations. First, the market selection mechanism matters: a turnover of firms
occurs when competitive pressure induces the exit of inefficient firms (Hopenhayn,
1992), therefore if the selection mechanism is inefficient, the productivity-survival
link may be disrupted. Second, the survival-innovation link in mature industries
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has certain specificities. As Agarwal and Gort, 2002 write, a mature market is char-
acterized by fewer technological opportunities, a shift of innovation to minor prod-
uct refreshments and cost reduction, and from pure innovation to imitation. All this
leads to more intense competition and lower rates of survival. Moreover, techno-
logically intense industries may be associated with higher hazard rates because of
the speedy obsolescence of the initial endowment in such industries. Firm age and
economies of scale are other important factors: Jensen, Webster, and Buddelmeyer,
2008 study the innovation-survival link for young and mature firms and report that
young firms are more prone to an early death in general, but they more likely suc-
ceed in risky and innovative industries than do mature firms.
From this follows the fourth hypothesis:
H4. Innovations and higher productivity lead to a higher chance of survival,
especially for small firms, which are usually more likely to die.
The empirical literature reports various outcomes of innovation efforts regarding
the various performance characteristics, types of innovation, and level of develop-
ment of the host economy. With respect to the innovation-productivity link, the
existing literature generally documents large and persistent productivity differences
among producers and traces these differences to innovation efforts (Syverson, 2011).
A survey of the productivity-innovation literature (Hall, 2011) shows that most re-
search at the microlevel finds positive effects of product innovation on productiv-
ity, though the elasticities for developed countries are considerably higher than for
less developed countries. The effects in the manufacturing industry are found to
be higher than in services, and in the low technology sectors they are lower than
in mid- and high technology. Concerning imports as a source of knowledge for in-
novation, the literature is quite conclusive: imports contribute to innovation and
performance (see (Wagner, 2012) for a literature review). The mechanisms behind
import spillovers include the improvement of technologies, the quality of products
(Damijan, Konings, and Polanec, 2014), and the development of new routines which
are adopted through imitation and reverse engineering (Goldberg et al., 2010).
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The estimation results for process innovation and productivity are less consis-
tent, the effects found being negative, zero, and rarely positive. This may be ex-
plained by the different mechanisms behind the effects of product and process inno-
vations on productivity and by the difficulties of measuring new production tech-
nology in an appropriate manner (Mohnen and Hall, 2013; Crespi and Pianta, 2008).
In general, product innovations increase productivity by increasing output, entering
the new markets, and increasing demand, while process innovations reduce costs
and lead to higher capital intensity, which contributes to cost advantages. Both ways
to accumulate dynamic capabilities entail significant costs and risks, which can be
disruptive in a weak economy. Therefore, the expected benefits of innovation on
performance in weaker economies are lower compared to more developed countries
Regarding the innovation-growth perspective, there remains a degree of ambi-
guity in the empirical literature. Some studies conclude that innovation matters for
firm output growth, some however do not find a strong link between innovation and
sales growth (for the extensive literature survey see Coad, 2009). The ambiguous
effects are explained by the large time lags between the time of invention and intro-
duction of the new product, as well as by the combination of cost and risk involved
(Coad and Rao, 2008). Uncertainties also force firms to delay risky investment de-
cision needed to bring innovative products to the market (Bloom and van Reenen,
2002). Additionally, markets often fail to serve as effective selectors for delivering
the rewards of economic growth according to a firm’s productivity advantage (Au-
dretsch, Segarra, and Teruel, 2014). A low persistence of growth rates over time
may also present difficulties for finding the effects of innovation on firm growth
(Audretsch, Coad, and Segarra, 2014).
Recent empirical studies claim that innovation interacts with third factors when
it determines the growth effects. Therefore, the link is positive only for some firm
groups and in general there appear to be limits to this positive relationship. (Coad
and Rao, 2008), for example, report that R&D and patents increase the growth rates
of fast-growing firms, while for others the effect may be zero or negative. (Grillitsch,
Schubert, and Srholec, 2019) show that only broader sources of knowledge and their
combinations, as opposed to just R&D, drive innovation and firm growth. They
also find evidence of a non-linear link between knowledge and growth according to
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which, beyond certain thresholds, an increase of the knowledge base results in de-
creasing firm growth. Conditions for a positive innovation-growth link may include
types of innovation activities under which product innovation rather than process
contributes to growth (Santi and Santoleri, 2017). Furthermore, the continuity of the
innovation process may also matter (Triguero, Córcoles, and Cuerva, 2014; Deschry-
vere, 2014). A favorable location and geographical knowledge spillovers may con-
dition pertaining positive effects (Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005). In turn, (Demirel
and Mazzucato, 2012) report that restrictions of an effective innovation-growth link
are incurred due to insufficient economies of scale and a lack of persistence in patent-
ing.
A weak selection mechanism conditioned by weak competition is often quoted
as a serious barrier to firm turnover based on efficiency advantages. For example,
(Tybout, 2000) suggests a higher patience of markets toward inefficient firms in de-
veloping economies, where large incumbents may be protected from death irrespec-
tive of their innovation and productivity. (Ugur, Trushin, and Solomon, 2016) report
on UK data that R&D active firms survive longer in more concentrated industries.
However, despite the ambiguity of protection policy in emerging economies, large
protected incumbents often carry out significant innovation efforts.
Upon the whole, empirical studies on data relating to transition economies do
not indicate that the innovation-survival link follows a special pattern in this group
of countries. For example, in China, where the government largely protects state-
owned firms, the studies show a positive relationship between survival and pro-
ductivity (Audretsch et al., 2016; Yu et al., 2015). Some studies suggest an inverted
U-shaped relationship (see Zhang and Mohnen, 2013 for the link between R&D in-
tensity and survival). A comparable relationship is demonstrated for Chile (Fernan-
des and Paunov, 2015), where product innovation is shown to be beneficial for the
survival of plants, though the effect is confirmed only for multi-product plants and
relatively low levels of risks.
Previous research on the Russian data generally finds some positive performance
effects of innovation. Regarding the innovation-productivity link, (Roud, 2018) uses
the CDM modelling on the data of the national innovation survey. He reports that in-
novation output, measured as innovation sales per employee, positively influences
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labor productivity. Imports as an input into innovation decisions are studied on sur-
vey manufacturing data by (Gonchar and Kuznetsov, 2018): the paper reports ben-
eficial effects of importing on firm innovation between 2005 and 2009 and a higher
impact of imports on product innovation rather than on process innovation. Con-
cerning growth effects, (Chadee and Roxas, 2013), using the World Bank survey data
for 2009 within the structural equation modelling, report a positive influence of inno-
vation on sales growth, conditional on the quality of the institutional environment.
Golikova et al., 2017 describe how Russian manufacturing firms which invested in
tangible assets prior to the 2008-2009 crisis have been more likely to demonstrate
higher growth rates during the recovery and the immediate post-crisis period. Fi-
nally, González, Iacovone, and Subhash, 2013, using the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) dataset, study the productivity-survival link
and conclude that in general more productive manufacturing firms are less likely to
exit than less productive ones, though this finding does not hold for sectors where
competition is less intense and unproductive firms are less likely to exit. Further-
more, improved productivity improves companies’ survival chances mostly during
economic surges rather than during slumps. To the best of our knowledge we are
not aware of studies that use TE measures to analyse the relationship between in-
novation and productivity in Russia and compare various performance outcomes of
innovation efforts.
4.3 Data and descriptives
4.3.1 Data sources
The data we use for estimation come from a manufacturing firms’ survey of about
2,000 manufacturing plants of all sizes, carried out by the National Research Uni-
versity Higher School of Economics in 2014 in the framework of face-to-face inter-
views3. The resulting main sample includes firms randomly stratified by manufac-
turing sectors and size groups of enterprises, but not by sub-national regions. The
sample is somewhat skewed towards larger firms; therefore, where possible, we
3The dataset, questionnaire and methodology of sampling and data collection may be found under
https://iims.hse.ru/rusfirms
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weight data to bring our sample close to the structure of the general population of
manufacturing firms. For the weights we use the inverse of the observations’ sam-
pling probabilities across 2-digit sectors and size groups of firms.
We merge survey-related establishment level indicators to later performance data
from the Ruslana dataset collected by Bureau van Dijk. Additionally, we use sector-
specific data, calculated by the authors using the manufacturing industry population
data as reported by Ruslana. This allows us to take into consideration that, when the
innovation decision is made, this may affect revenue subject to a time lag and there-
fore avoids the problem of simultaneity of firm decisions concerning innovation,
investments, and organization, thus reducing the endogeneity risk. All performance
data is deflated with the use of a 4-digit sectoral price index.
While the survey is conducted at the plant level, we do not distinguish between
plants and firms in this study. To capture the specificity of the ownership pattern in
the Russian manufacturing industry we control all estimations for the measurement
that distinguishes between independent and dependent plants (Holding dummy).
The strength of this study lies in the combination of two independent data sources.
This allows us to measure innovation directly, based on the self-perception of com-
pany managers, while accounting data for the post- and pre-survey period enable
us to assess the impact of lagged measurements of firm organization and behaviour
on later performance. In addition, combining survey and accounting data reduces
common method bias, which is a usual occurrence for survey statistics.
4.3.2 Dependent variables
This paper seeks to explain three performance measurements that are expected to be
impacted by innovation decisions. They are the productivity, the growth rate, and
firm survival.
Productivity, generally understood as efficiency in production, is measured in
two ways – either as total factor productivity (technical efficiency, TE) computed
by means of stochastic frontier analysis, or as labour productivity (real operational
turnover per worker). TE takes account of the firm’s efficiency and shifts in the
sectoral technological frontier. Because we lose a lot of observations with TE, addi-
tionally we use simple labour productivity as a measure of efficiency: this indicator
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is easy to understand and to measure, though it does not reflect the intensity of use
of factors other than labour input factors. Our data shows a large within sector’s gap
in TE estimates among manufacturing plants in the year when the survey was con-
ducted: the average firm in the 90th percentile of TE distribution is 1.6 times closer
to the technological frontier than the average firm in the 10th percentile.
The second dependent variable is the growth rate measured as annual real growth
of operational revenue, deflated with the use of 4-digit sectoral prices indexes (2010
being the base year).
As it relates to survival, our dependent variable is the number of years between
1991 (the year when the market reforms started) and the failure event by 2018. A
plant is defined as exiting when it is not operational in year t as compared to the
year t-1 and has either permanently closed, remains in the process of liquidation,
or was acquired by another firm. In our data, the share of exits falls monotonically
with the firm size: in the group of companies with 10-19 employees 42.7% of firms
exited the market whereas the percentage stood at only 2.3% for plants with more
than 500 workers. Companies face different operational risks depending on sector
affiliation: the highest mortality rate is observed in the timber and food-processing
sector (21.7% and 20.2% of firms exited respectively), the lowest being found among
firms which belong to the transportation equipment industry (about 2%).
4.3.3 Independent variables
We do not observe the full history of surveyed firms before and after the survey
was conducted and rely on several self-reported indicators of R&D, innovation, firm
organization, and ownership. R&D as innovation input is measured by two indica-
tors. First, by the dummy constructed by asking if the firm performed R&D three
years prior to the survey. Second, R&D intensity is calculated from the answers to
the question about the mean share of R&D expenditures in sales within the three
years prior to the survey and is defined as the logged value of R&D expenditures
per employee. The indicator of R&D intensity is used to explain innovation out-
put in a knowledge production framework and to additionally test for H.4 when
R&D - survival effects are studied. In our data, the mean value of R&D of a typi-
cal manufacturing firm accounts for about RuR 19 thousand per employee in 2014 –
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TABLE 4.1: Group statistics of performance (2014-2016) of innovators and R&D spenders
Product innovation within
3 years prior to the survey
Process innovators within
3 years prior to the survey
R&D within 3 years prior
to the survey
yes no yes no yes no
Mean No.
obs
Mean No.
obs
Mean No.
obs
Mean No.
obs
Mean No.
obs
Mean No.
obs
Employment, people 143.5 752 79.42 724 186.8 606 75.97 956 185.4 495 80.57 1,450
TE 0.703 563 0.680 450 0.695 480 0.691 593 0.688 387 0.685 922
Labour productivity,
output in thousand
RUB/person
1635 728 1111 678 2132 590 1080 899 1881 482 1175 1,372
Sales growth rate, % -14.4 722 -20.5 654 -17.7 585 -19.2 875 -16.7 484 -18.0 1,327
Exit rate, % 7.6 159 9.4 197 4.7 98 12 251 2.3 50 19 398
Source: Survey data for innovations and Ruslana data derived from Bureau van Dijk for productivity, output growth, and exit.
The monetary indicators are deflated at 2010 prices. Deflators were calculated with the use of annual 4-digit sectoral prices
indexes, as reported by Rosstat.
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FIGURE 4.1: Kaplan-Meier survival by type of innovation
Note: The horizontal axis shows the number of survival years, starting from 1991 and the vertical axis displays the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates. Failure is defined as exit
of the plant from the market. All of the data are weighted. Product innovations, process innovations, and R&D spenders in this figure are defined by the dummies.
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approximately an average monthly wage in manufacturing.
Additionally, our econometric strategy takes into account the specificity of inno-
vation processes in transition economies, seeing as relying on the R&D input into the
knowledge function may underestimate the innovation effort especially in smaller
firms in traditional sectors. We assume that the plant receives knowledge either
through R&D or by learning from technologies embodied in imported machines
and equipment. Import participation is measured as a logged value of imports per
worker and is constructed from the questions about the share of imports of machin-
ery and equipment in fixed assets.
In our data, some differences in R&D and import participation are observed:
16.9% of plants report R&D expenditures and 23.9% import hardware. Overall 32.5%
of the sampled plants engage in at least one of the learning activities, which we
expect to serve as an input into innovation.
We measure innovations following the procedure applied in most innovation
surveys by asking if the plant introduced a new or significantly improved product
or production technology during the past three years prior to the survey (that is
between 2011 and 2014). Thus, we get the dummy for product innovators (48.2% of
observations) and a dummy for process innovators (33.3% of observations).
This measurement is extensively used in survey-based empirical literature, al-
beit for some important drawbacks – for instance, its inability to fix the exact timing
of innovation and to correct for size, seeing as larger firms obviously have more
product lines and are thus more likely to be counted as product innovators (see the
survey by Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010). Therefore, to measure product innovations,
we use the responses to the question about the mean share of the plant’s sales due
to new products within the three years prior to the survey. From these responses
we construct our measurement of innovation output for product innovations – the
real sales of novel products per worker. This indicator is often regarded as a rela-
tively accurate measure because it highlights the persistence of successful product
innovations, thus profiting from the fact that most firms track their sales by type of
product.
We use a comparable approach to capture process innovations because of the
above-mentioned fuzziness of innovation dummies. In the survey, we have the
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question about the age structure of machines and equipment. We assume that the
share of machines and equipment installed no later than 5 years ago quantifies the
technological structure of the hardware stock and reflects recent investments into
process innovations. To take account of other than equipment-related production
technologies, we condition the measurement of the technological structure of equip-
ment by the positive answer to the question about the introduction of new or signif-
icantly modernized technologies.
Table 4.1 shows how our main performance indicators of interest differ across in-
novating and non-innovating firms between 2014 and 2016. Additionally, Figure 4.1
presents a more detailed graphical analysis of our data for exits using the Kaplan-
Meyer survival estimator across various groups of plants depending on their inno-
vation status and R&D spending.
R&D spenders exhibit the most consistent advantages in all performance indica-
tors: they beat non-spenders in technological efficiency, labour productivity, growth
rate, and survival. The Kaplan-Meyer estimator (Figure 4.1) shows the same ten-
dencies: starting from the central point in the survival time, the product innova-
tors, process innovators, and R&D spenders are more likely to survive than are non-
innovators.
The return to process innovation is the highest in labour productivity and sur-
vival, while the technical efficiency is only slightly higher for process innovators.
And at last, all types of innovators have much larger plants than non-innovators,
the gap being the highest for process innovators where firms which introduce new
technologies employ nearly 2.5 times more people than inactive firms. These re-
sults illustrate patterns of performance by innovators in the Russian manufacturing
industry and need to be tested by our further econometric analysis.
4.3.4 Controls
The literature recognizes various determinants of R&D and innovation which we
include in the knowledge production function as controls and divide them into three
groups: firm-level knowledge stock, ownership and organization, and the industry’s
technological and demand conditions.
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With regard to knowledge stock, we include a variable which measures invest-
ments into human capital as a dummy for firms which invest into personnel train-
ing (24.7% of observations). Age may capture the accumulated knowledge through
learning and lead to improvements in innovation, productivity, and growth (Coad,
Segarra, and Teruel, 2013), though the under-performance of younger firms may be
associated with their riskier R&D strategies when compared to mature firms rather
than being derived from their low knowledge stock (Coad, Segarra, and Teruel,
2016). Our sample is dominated by mature firms: the mean age of the firm in the
sample amounts to almost 18 years.
ICT capabilities measured as a dummy for firms which report ICT management
system (14.6% of observations) may contribute to innovation decisions due to addi-
tional IT-based capabilities, lower operation time, and a higher efficacy of managers.
The international quality management certificate (ISO) has an impact on product
and process innovations through its incentives to update technologies and improve
quality (Marette and Crespi, 2003).
We control for the size of the plant measured in terms of employment as a contin-
uous and categorical variable or as logged operational turnover in the equation for
growth effects. The firm’s market power is measured as a share of firms’ turnover
in the total industry’s turnover at the 4-digit sectoral level. As a rule, the empirical
literature confirms the Schumpeter hypotheses of size and monopoly power and re-
ports that large plants are more likely to innovate and to receive higher return from
innovation to productivity, but their innovation output does not increase propor-
tionally to their size (Griffith et al., 2006; Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010). The mean
plant in the sample employs 99 people in the time covered by the survey (2014)4;
between 2011 and 2016, the mean employment declined from 141 to 100 workers.
Several features, controlling for firm organization, are captured by the owner-
ship structure. We expect that the foreign subsidiary has advantages in terms of
productivity (Melitz, 2003), but is not necessarily a superior innovator if R&D and
innovation decisions are taken at the level of the home multinational (Crespi, Tacsir,
and Vargas, 2016). Government ownership has an inconclusive impact on innova-
tion decisions. On the one hand, the management of a publicly owned organization
4According to the Ruslana data.
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has weak incentives to take decisions that lead to cost reduction or innovation (Hart,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997). On the other hand, the state sector is still an important
actor in technological development, seeing as state-owned firms can more easily ob-
tain financing support, innovation subsidies, and preferential access to the new mar-
kets than can private firms. Literature on emerging economies’ data mostly shows
that firms innovate less if the government keeps a stake (Cui, Jiao, and Jiao, 2016).
In addition to providing us with an ownership dummy, our data allows to measure
access to public support. Subsidies may stimulate innovation by yielding additional
resources to the firm (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010) or by creating rents and reducing
the firm’s incentive to improve efficiency (Cette, Lopez, and Mairesse, 2017). In our
data, about 3.6% of firms receive subsidies, larger firms being much more effective
at getting subsidies (59% subsidized firms in the group of large firms).
The dummy for the holding answers for the external economies of scale, which
is usually an attribute of an integrated company and simultaneously measures the
level of independence of firm behavior because the holding may delegate the R&D
and innovation decisions to a specialized facility. The share of the main product in
sales (specialization) takes account of the finding by (Bernard, Redding, and Schott,
2010) that a firm’s productivity is positively linked to the variety of products it pro-
duces.
We control the estimations for financial constraints experienced by the firm (lagged
negative profit dummy), taking into account the argument of Schumpeterian litera-
ture that profits play a role in innovation decisions of the entrepreneur as part of the
“virtuous circle” when profit is the result of successful innovation and the source of
financing of the innovation effort (Guarascio and Pianta, 2017). Financial frictions
prevent firms from developing and adopting better technologies (Gorodnichenko
and Schnitzer, 2013), though access to external financing (measured in our data as a
dummy for firms which use external funds) may increase investing capabilities.
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TABLE 4.2: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables.
Variable Definition and source of data Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
TE – technical effi-
ciency
A ratio of observed TFP to the maximum TFP in the 4-
digit sector. The higher the value, the closer the plant
is to the production frontier. Own calculation through
stochastic frontier analysis, Ruslana data for the full pop-
ulation of manufacturing firms
0.688 0.127 0.227 0.992
Labour productivity Log of deflated output per worker. Own calculation on
Ruslana data
6.703 1.139 -1.310 13.36
Output growth Annual output growth. Own calculation on Ruslana data -0.106 0.613 -6.779 3.238
Failure to survive Dummy for firms which de-registered between the time
of the survey 2014 and the last reporting date (2018), Rus-
lana
0.0729 0.260 0 1
Product innovation Log of real new products’ sales per worker. Calculated
from the question about the mean share of new products’
sales in total turnover during three years prior to the sur-
vey. Own calculation based on the survey data
0.366 4.340 -9.640 11.11
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables (continued).
Variable Definition and source of data Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Process innovation Share of recently installed machinery and equipment (<
5 years) if the firm positively responded to the ques-
tion about the introduction of new production processes.
Own calculation based on the survey data
0.116 0.248 0 1
R&D decision Dummy for firms which performed R&D between 2011
and 2013, survey
0.171 0.377 0 1
R&D intensity Log of real annual value of R&D expenditures per
worker. Own calculation from the survey data
0.466 1.391 -0.728 8.968
ICT Dummy for firms which have ICT management system,
survey
0.161 0.367 0 1
Human capital Dummy for firms, which trained personnel, survey 0.292 0.455 0 1
ISO Dummy for firms which introduced ISO and other inter-
national quality certificates, survey
0.413 0.493 0 1
Exporting Dummy for exporting activities, survey 0.154 0.361 0 1
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables (continued).
Variable Definition and source of data Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Imports Log of yearly real value of imports of machinery and
equipment per worker. Own calculation based on the
survey data
-2.352 3.047 -3.729 9.876
Age Number of years on the market, survey 17.98 19.13 1 303
Specialization % of main product line in sales, survey 79.74 21.68 3 100
Subsidized Dummy for firms which received any kind of financial
support from the government, survey
0.0367 0.188 0 1
Holding Belongs to holding, dummy, survey 0.0897 0.286 0 1
Foreign FDI among owners (any stock), dummy, survey 0.0234 0.151 0 1
State Government among owners, any stock, dummy, survey 0.0254 0.158 0 1
Liquidity Dummy on negative profit in the previous year, Ruslana 0.198 0.399 0 1
Market share % of firms’ sales in total sales of 4-digit sector. Own cal-
culation on Ruslana data
0.0253 0.135 0 1
External financing Dummy for firms which raised any external financing in
2011-2013, survey
0.375 0.484 0 1
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables (continued).
Variable Definition and source of data Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Size group Categorical variable for small (=3), medium (=2), and
large (=1) subsidiaries, Ruslana
1.565 0.679 1 3
Size (alternative) Log of employees, Ruslana 3.251 1.447 0 9.727
Foreign competition Dummy for firms which experience any type of compet-
itive pressure from foreign subsidiaries or imports, sur-
vey
0.395 0.489 0 1
Entry rate Share of firms which entered the 4-digit sector in the total
number of firms. Own calculation on Ruslana data
0.0731 0.0344 0 0.222
Industry growth Yearly real output growth rate in 4-digit sector. Own cal-
culation on Ruslana data
0.00695 0.174 -1.271 1.004
Size of the city Categorical variable for cities with population less 250
thousand people (=3), 250 - 999 thousand people (=2),
and above 1 million people (=1), survey
1.918 0.836 1 3
Note: Data are weighted and for 2014
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Sector dummies are used to control for unobserved sectoral heterogeneity and
to take account of various technological opportunities within sectors. The variety
of technological opportunities, as evolutionary theory shows, may stem from the
population ecology approach, obtaining when shared resource pools affect firms be-
longing to one niche, i.e. industry, in the same way (Geroski et al., 2003; Hannan
and Freeman, 1977). In some specifications, we replace sector dummies by specific
sectoral characteristics like the entry rate (the share of entries in the total number of
active firms in 4-digit sector) or the deflated sector output growth rate. This allows
us to control for external forces possibly acting on innovation decisions of the firm
and the efficacy of these decisions, especially for demand-oriented innovation. The
entry rate captures industry evolution when the incumbents may be challenged by
start-ups which enter with new technologies and therefore the higher entry rate may
be associated with an additional motivation for mature firms to innovate. The av-
erage output growth at the sectoral level helps to capture the stage of the business
cycle and demand conditions in the sector.
The role of competition in innovation decisions is complex, being mostly pos-
itive for technologically advanced firms near the frontier and nil or negative for
laggards (Aghion et al., 2006). We expect positive impulses from competition, for
which we use a self-reported categorical variable showing the pressure of competi-
tion from foreign subsidiaries and imports on the markets where the firm is active.
Exporting firms are more likely to innovate and report R&D expenditures due to
the pressure of higher competition in international markets and the learning effects
(Gorodnichenko, Svejnar, and Terrell, 2010).
The access to external knowledge is proxied by the strength of agglomeration
forces, depending on the size of the host city. The city size may determine innova-
tion and productivity because proximity contributes to a more effective generation
and diffusion of knowledge (see Feldman, 1999 for literature survey). Table 4.2 sum-
marizes definitions of dependent variables, main predictors of interest, and a set of
controls at the firm and sector level.
Chapter 4. How innovation affects performance 133
4.4 Empirical model
4.4.1 Research design and identification strategy
We begin by constructing the measure of firm productivity with maximum-likelihood
estimates of the stochastic frontier production function for panel data, as suggested
in (Battese and Coelli, 1995). The advantage of this measurement is that it takes
account both of technical progress and inefficiency of the plant relative to the best
performing plant in the sector. Given that the registry data which we link to the
survey data is extracted from the Ruslana database, we also followed the advice of
the OECD, 2017 on how to approximate indicators not observed directly in this data
base, but which are needed for a production function analysis. Thus, we proxy out-
put, capital, material, and labour cost by turnover, fixed assets, cost of goods sold
and the average wages at the sector/region level, because the plant level labour cost
data is too scarce. Then we exclude the missing observations and trim the 1% worst
and best plants at the TFP level to exclude the outliers. The final full unbalanced
population panel includes 471,740 firms across 231 4-digit manufacturing sectors.
For each of the surveyed plants we construct the indicator of the TFP distance to the
technological frontier as a share of plant TFP relative to the best performing plant in
the 4-digit sector.
In all further specifications except for the survival equation we use an extension
of the three-stage structural model developed by Crépon, Duguet, and Mairesse,
1998 (CDM) and later modified by Lööf and Heshmati, 2006. We depart from this
classical model with two important novelties: we add imports as an input into the
knowledge production function and continue the CDM logic into the growth equa-
tion when growth is influenced by productivity gains achieved due to innovation.
Figure 4.2 shows the research model we apply in this study when the system of four
equations is estimated for several sequencing stages of the innovation cycle: the de-
cision to undertake R&D, to introduce product or process innovation, the resulting
outcome for productivity, growth, and survival.
The main starting point of CDM analysis comes from the assumption that R&D
data systematically underestimate the amount of R&D efforts and innovation, espe-
cially within smaller firms, which often innovate on a more informal basis outside of
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FIGURE 4.2: The research model applied in the study
the R&D lab (Dosi, 1988). If so, using predicted rather than observed values of R&D
and innovation efforts helps to take account of formal and informal activities.
Additionally, several econometric problems, typical for the innovation-productivity
analysis, are addressed by CDM approach. First, it deals with the selection bias oc-
curring when R&D spenders and innovators are not randomly selected from the
manufacturing firms’ population and the decision to undertake R&D and R&D in-
tensity are not fully independent. When modelling the selection of innovation input,
we solve this issue by additionally considering a selection equation and therefore al-
lowing for a possible dependence between the first two stages of the system of four
equations.
Second, the studies of innovation-performance link on the survey data face diffi-
culties in the interpretation of correlation and in defining the direction of causation
because one cannot ignore that more productive firms are more likely to engage in
R&D and be successful in the area of innovation output. Therefore, the real causation
may go from productivity to R&D and innovation. When factors underlying selec-
tion into R&D spenders are accounted for, explaining R&D intensity on a reduced
sample of firms which report R&D reduces concerns about endogeneity.
Thirdly, the strength of this study lies in the possibility of a chronological se-
quence of the analysis. Usually, innovation papers suffer from the simultaneity bias
because of the cross-sectional nature of the survey data. Thus, innovation input in
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t is often used as an explanatory variable for the innovation output in t, and the in-
novation output, in turn, as a determinant of the productivity, also in t. However,
previous productivity in t-1 probably determines innovation in t as well. In order to
break this econometrically vicious circle, we combine cross sectional data for selec-
tion and outcome equations, and panel data from various sources for the innovation
output-performance link. Lagged levels of TE among controls additionally lessen
endogeneity issues and help to study how previous productivity supports further
innovation.
To sum up, our research explains the decision to undertake R&D, the innovation
output, and the resulting performance indicators: productivity, growth and survival.
Each stage of the three-stage CDM model is explained in detail below.
4.4.2 R&D decision and R&D intensity
First, following Griffith et al., 2006 and Morris, 2018, we estimate the decision to
undertake R&D and the R&D intensity within the two-step Heckman selection pro-
cedure for the cross-sectional data structure. Our aim is to obtain the latent measure-
ment of R&D input into the knowledge production function, based on the assump-
tion of the existing recording and/or reporting problems associated with the formal
R&D expenditures in firms’ books. The sample selection model can be specified as
follows:
Let g∗i be a latent (unobserved) firm’s decision relating to whether or not to un-
dertake an innovation effort and let r∗i be its latent (unobserved) level of innovation
investment, with gi and ri being their observable counterparts. Then,
gi =

1 if g∗i = β0x0i + µ0i > 0
0 if g∗i ≤ 0
(4.1)
and
E[ri|gi = 1, x1i] = E[ri|r∗i > 0, x1i] = β1x1i + E[µ1i|r∗i > 0, x1i] (4.2)
where x0i and x1i are vectors of determinants. β0 and β1 are parameter vectors
which measure the impact of various factors on the probability of undertaking an
R&D investment in the first place and its level respectively. We assume that µ0i and
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µ1i are normally distributed random error terms with mean of zero, that they have
constant variances, and that they are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables
and correlated with each other. Their joint distribution is bivariate normal.
In the first stage, a binary variable g determines whether or not r is observed.
We estimate x0 using Probit. In the second stage, we estimate β1 of the second stage
using OLS, but conditional on gi = 1, i.e. ri > 0. For observed values gi = 1, we
have an observed realization of the other latent variable r∗.
Both x0 and x1 include sector dummies, a training dummy as a proxy for human
capital, an internationally recognized certificate (ISO), and the ownership structure
as predictors of R&D decision and R&D intensity. If a firm undertakes R&D, the
intensity of R&D expenditures is measured as a logarithm of R&D expenses in sales
per worker (averaged for 2011-2013).
For a more robust specification, we impose exclusion restrictions, meaning that
the selection equation includes exogenous variables that are excluded from the out-
come equation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). In the absence of the exclusion restric-
tion, a multicollinearity issue might potentially arise due to the almost linear form of
the inverse Mill’s ratio over the considerable portion of its range: in case of collinear-
ity existing between the correction term and the included regressors, standard errors
are heavily overestimated. The size of the plant is a state-of-the-art exclusion re-
striction in the selection equation and is measured as logged average employment
between 2011 and 2013. It is not included in equation 4.1 because R&D intensity has
already been explicitly scaled (Morris, 2018). The possible explanation is that smaller
firms possess fewer financial resources and a stronger risk aversion towards inno-
vation activities as compared to large firms (van de Vrande et al., 2009). Two other
parameter shifters, exporting and foreign competition, are relevant for decision on
R&D spending, but are excluded from the R&D intensity equation.
Thus, we predict the value of R&D expenditure per employee, save the predicted
values of the R&D intensity and the inverse Mills ratio, and use it as an instrument
in the next step when estimating the knowledge production function.
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4.4.3 The knowledge production function
The third equation within the CDM framework is the knowledge production func-
tion that links innovation output to productivity. It can be formalized as follows:
Kit = γrR̂it + β2Yit−1 + β3X2it + β4MR + µ3t (4.3)
where K is the innovation output, R is the latent innovation input, Y is the previous
productivity, X is a vector of controls, MR is the inverse Mill’s ratio from equations
4.1-4.2, and µ is the random error term with a zero mean and constant variance.
We include the inverse Mill’s ratio to control for the selection bias. We also ac-
count for firms which might have attempted some innovations but don’t report it
explicitly in the survey by including the predicted values of R&D intensity.
To estimate an alternative specification of the knowledge production function,
we also make use of importing intensity as a proxy for knowledge input. We as-
sume that import is not a latent variable, therefore, we just employ observed values
of import intensity and do not correct for the selection bias and therefore omit the
inverse Mill’s ratio
Kit = γr I + β2Yit−1 + β3X2it + µ3t (4.4)
where K is the innovation output, I is the observed innovation input, Y is the pre-
vious productivity, X is a vector of controls, and µ is the random error term with a
zero mean and constant variance.
4.4.4 Performance equations
At the last stage of the CDM model we assess the impact of the innovation input on
the performance:
Yit = γkK̂it−1 + β5X3it + µ4t (4.5)
where Y is a firm’s performance indicator, γ is the performance’ effect5 with respect
to product or process innovation, K is the predicted innovation from the previous
5Only in case of labour productivity and product innovation can we speak of elasticity, whereas it
is not possible to talk about elasticities when measuring a firm’s performance by TE or the impact of
process innovation on TE or labour productivity (see Table 4.2 for a construction of the variables).
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step, X is a vector of controls, and µ is the random error with zero mean and constant
variance.
In equation 4.5 three alternative measures indicating firm’s performance are used:
technical efficiency, labor productivity and output growth. To account for a plausi-
ble chronological sequence of the innovation process, allowing for a feedback effect
between productivity and innovation, the dependent variable is modelled as a func-
tion of the lagged predicted innovation output (product and process innovation). We
control equation 4.4 and 4.5 for a number of factors such as: size, age, ownership,
specialization, liquidity, market share, location, and sectoral dummies.
In case of output growth, we use the sectoral growth rate on the NACE 4-digit
level instead of sectoral dummies. In line with Gibrat’s law (Gibrat, 1931), we proxy
size by previous output. Further on, we exclude market share and limit the sample
to surviving firms only.
Following (Lööf and Heshmati, 2006), we allow for a partial correlation of the
error terms within the CDM model by assuming that the main predictor’s (innova-
tion output) error terms are correlated with the independent endogenous variable
(TE, labor productivity, and output growth). Therefore, equations 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5
are modelled as a simultaneous system using instrumental variables two-stage least
squares (IV 2SLS) in the panel data setting for the post-innovation period of 2014-
2016. To sum up, we assume that productivity in 2014 was influenced by innovation
output from 2013 and this output in turn was affected by the productivity level in
2012. Thus, we account for the endogeneity of innovation output and a firm’s pro-
ductivity.
4.4.5 Survival function
As a further performance indicator, we estimate a firm’s survival as depending on
productivity and growth advantages. For this purpose, we estimate proportional
semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard regressions, which relates the survival
time of the firm to other performance and innovation indicators: technical efficiency,
labor productivity, product, process innovation, and R&D intensity. The model pro-
duces estimates of the hazard rate, i.e. the instantaneous rate of failure at which a
subsidiary i will exit at time t on the condition that it survived at t− 1.
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In order to obtain the hazard rate of firm i at time t, hi(t), the non-parametric
baseline hazard function, h0(t), is multiplied by a parametric part capturing the im-
pact of the vector of covariates Xik(t) by means of parameter estimates bk.
hi(t) = h0(t)exp{
n
∑
j=1
bjPij(t) +
m
∑
k=2
bkXik(t)} (4.6)
The vector of main predictors P, individually comprising innovation and perfor-
mance indicators, is used in the equation together with the vector of covariates X:
size, age, liquidity, specialization, market share, and organization on the firm-level
and some further controls (size of the city and entry share in the 4-digit sector). In
one specification, we interact innovation with the size dummy to study if innovation
may help most vulnerable small firms to decrease their mortality rate.
4.5 Results and Discussion
4.5.1 Knowledge production function
Our first step is to estimate R&D knowledge input by means of the Heckman pro-
cedure. Table 4.3 presents results on the likelihood of the decision to undertake
R&D (column 2) and the value of R&D expenditures per worker (column 1). As ex-
plained in our methodological section, the two-stage procedure to define the input
into innovation output is essential because we imply selection and expect that some
manufacturing firms underreport R&D expenditures. Our results confirm the selec-
tion bias: the coefficient on lambda (inverse Mill’s ratio) is significant at the 5% level,
which implies that error terms are correlated. Therefore, traditional methods with
OLS estimation would be misleading in this research.
The propensity to undertake R&D increases with the size of the plant and is
more typical for industries with the higher value added, firms in food-processing
and timber industries being significantly less likely to take an R&D decision relative
to chemicals (our reference category). In line with the Schumpeterian prediction
concerning the role of firm size in concentrated markets, in our data a growth of the
number of employees by 1% is associated with a 3.1% increase of the likelihood of
an R&D decision. Thus, our finding confirms that the production of knowledge is a
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subject of scale economy. We therefore use size to explicitly control for selection bias
and furthermore assume the linearity of the investment function with respect to size.
Therefore, it is omitted from the second stage equation explaining R&D intensity.
A greater knowledge stock is associated with a higher likelihood of perform-
ing R&D: if the firm reports personnel training, the likelihood of an R&D decision
increases by 13.5%. International quality certificate and the power of foreign com-
petition strongly determine an R&D decision. Our result on exports compellingly
confirms a positive relation between R&D and exports, where being an exporter cor-
relates with a 12% higher probability to invest in R&D. This result stays in line with
the CDM-based literature, which reports a higher probability of investing in inno-
vation for exporting firms. Thus, (Crespi and Zuniga, 2012) report an 11% marginal
effect of exports on R&D decision for Chile and 15% for Argentina. The economic
significance of this effect for developed countries is somewhat higher: 65% for UK
(Hall and Sena, 2017) and 64% for Belgium (Czarnitzki and Delanote, 2017).
The ownership structure and organization are weakly related to R&D. Compara-
ble results on size, competition, and ISO as drivers of R&D decision in the Heckman
equation can be found in (Morris, 2018) for a big group of transition and developing
economies.
Next, we estimate the knowledge production function (equation 4.3) and use the
predicted value of R&D expenditures per worker and observed imports per worker
as indicators of knowledge input into innovation output. We consider two differ-
ent outputs: product and process innovations. Additionally, we control the model
for previous technical efficiency (columns 1-4 in Table 4.4) and previous labour pro-
ductivity (columns 5-8) as drivers of innovation to test our hypothesis concerning
incentives to innovate generated by economic return from previous innovation. As
results from Table 4.4 indicate, our choice of two-stage models is fully justified: the
significant Mill’s ratio suggests selectivity across all specifications in equation 4.1.
The economic significance of the knowledge input is the highest for product in-
novation. When R&D expenditures per worker grow by 1%, new products’ sales
per worker increase by 1.95-1.11% (columns 1 and 5). The contribution of imports
is somewhat lower when compared to R&D, though it remains positive and signifi-
cant: if lagged imports, measured as the value of imported machines and equipment
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TABLE 4.3: R&D decision and R&D intensity (average marginal ef-
fects)
R&D per worker R&D decision
Holding 0.623*** -0.004
(2.81) (-0.15)
Human capital 0.283 0.135***
(0.97) (6.20)
ISO 0.585*** 0.060***
(2.93) (2.91)
FDI 0.119 -0.066
(0.33) (-1.46)
State -0.523 0.004
(-1.15) (0.07)
Specialization -0.004 -0.000
(-0.77) (-0.90)
Electro -0.036 0.132*
(-0.10) (1.74)
Engineering -0.085 -0.010
(-0.27) (-0.19)
Food -0.137 -0.193***
(-0.29) (-4.39)
Other non-metallic -0.664* -0.061
(-1.77) (-1.04)
Steel -0.480 -0.051
(-1.46) (-0.94)
Textile and garment -0.960 -0.163***
(-1.49) (-3.17)
Timber -0.091 -0.185***
(-0.15) (-3.88)
Transport 0.019 -0.071
(0.05) (-1.16)
Log of employees 0.031***
(4.94)
Exports 0.120***
(5.09)
Competition (FDI or import) 0.064***
(3.12)
Lambda 0.638**
(2.02)
Number of observations 1111
Number of selected observation 217
Rho 0.454***
Sigma 1.404***
p-value for comparison test 0.013***
Notes: The results of the two-step Heckman procedure on cross-section average data for 2011-2013. The coeffi-
cients in the second column are for the likelihood of a firm to invest in R&D, in the first column those for the
expected value of R&D intensity if the firm has reported R&D spending; Rho tests for the significance of the corre-
lation term between the residuals of the selection and outcome equations; t statistics in parentheses. Significance
levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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per worker, increase by 1%, sales of novel products per worker grow by 0.5%.
In the same way both R&D and imports translate into process innovations, though
its effect is smaller when compared to product innovation and we do not observe a
meaningful difference between the two knowledge inputs. The share of new equip-
ment in the hardware stock conditional on a positive answer to the question about
the introduction of new technologies (our definition of process innovation) increases
by 0.8-0.6 percentage points with a 10% increase of R&D intensity and by 1-0.8 per-
centage points with a 10% increase of imports. The lower elasticity of process inno-
vations to knowledge inputs may be caused by a low sensitivity of revenue-based
indicators to efficiency improvements, associated with the modernization of hard-
ware and production technologies (Hall, 2011).
It is also the case that innovation output is higher for the most productive firms,
both for TE and labour productivity specifications. The shortening of the distance
to the technological frontier by 1 percentage point, or 0.01 unit, (the TE ranges from
0 to 1, where the 1, or 100%, is the frontier), leads to a 2-35-3.65% growth of prod-
uct innovations. Less powerful is the impact of achieved labour productivity on
product innovations, where a 1% gain in labour productivity results in a 0.19-0.27%
growth of product innovations. Effects of previous levels of productivity on process
innovations are less consistent and somewhat “noisy”. Summing up, the results con-
firm our H2 for product innovations and demonstrate the sequence of evolutionary
knowledge creation, whereby efficient innovation, proxied by technological superi-
ority and higher labour productivity, reinforce further innovation.
Some controls are also important determinants of innovation output outside their
effect on R&D. Thus, smaller firms are not only less likely to perform R&D, but they
are also less efficient in translating R&D into successful product or process innova-
tions. Firms under foreign ownership, being neutral for R&D decisions, are signifi-
cantly less innovative in the case of product innovations. This result could capture
the specificity of the markets the foreign subsidiaries are targeting and the distribu-
tion of labour in the international value chain they belong to because subsidiaries
may rely on the innovations carried out by the headquarters (Crespi, Tacsir, and
Vargas, 2016). Market share (not included in R&D equation), as a rule, significantly
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increases innovation output in line with the Schumpeterian hypothesis on the ad-
vantages of dominating firms in innovation efforts.
A location in a large city significantly increases innovation output for product in-
novation irrespective of the source of the knowledge input and is not significant for
process innovations. Thus, we confirm the power of agglomeration forces and the
importance of the local market size for more demand-driven product innovations.
The firms which belong to the sectors characterized by higher entry rates do not
innovate more intensively, contrary to our expectation based on evolutionary theory.
Thus, we could not confirm that new entrants threaten the technological leadership
of mature incumbents and thus incentivize their innovation behaviour.
Weak innovation efforts of entrants may be inferred from the results on how
age determines innovation: younger firms in all specifications are significantly less
innovative. This may partly explain our result on the neutrality of the industrial
dynamism as measured by the entry rate as a determinant of innovation.
4.5.2 The effects of innovation on TE and labor productivity
Next, we study whether innovation leads to technological progress of the firm and
productivity gains as described in equation 4.5. In this way we test our main hypoth-
esis concerning the innovation-productivity link (H1). We take into account that the
knowledge stock, a firm’s organization, ownership, and other covariates included in
the analysis affect both innovation and its efficacy in terms of productivity growth
and estimate productivity equations as a system of two stage 2SLS, where all regres-
sions are IV regressions. Table 4.5 reports the second stage results for two outcomes:
TE and labour productivity6. As in previous specifications, we distinguish between
two sources of knowledge input: predicted R&D intensity and imports, and two
types of innovation.
The results show that product innovation has a strong effect on TE: if innovative
sales per worker increase by 10%, the distance to the technological frontier shortens
by 1-2 percentage points. Process innovations are somewhat less beneficial for TE
and contribute to technological advances only when we measure knowledge input
by imports.
6The first stage IV results are available from the authors upon request
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TABLE 4.4: The determinants of innovation output: by type of innovation and source of knowledge
Controlled for lagged TE Controlled for lagged labor productivity
Product innovation Process innovation Product innovation Process innovation
R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as
an input an input an input an input an input an input an input an input
Lagged TE 3.651*** 2.348** 0.055 0.067**
(3.70) (2.49) (1.64) (2.07)
Lagged labor 0. 186*** 0.266*** 0.003 -0.002
productivity (4.23) (4.10) (1.20) (-0.42)
Latent R&D intensity 1.951*** 0.082*** 1.114*** 0.058***
(5.67) (5.23) (3.99) (4.55)
Mill’s inverse -0.660** -0.022* -0. 612*** -0.025**
(-2.55) (-1.86) (-2.97) (-2.65)
Lagged imports 0.518*** 0.013*** 0.116*** 0. 080***
(10.62) (7.24) (5.57) (6.43)
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.4 The determinants of innovation output: by type of innovation and source of knowledge (continued)
Controlled for lagged TE Controlled for lagged labor productivity
Product innovation Process innovation Product innovation Process innovation
R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as
an input an input an input an input an input an input an input an input
ICT 0.990** 0.456 0.091*** 0.057*** 0. 759*** 0.760** 0.071*** 0.052***
(3.23) (1.56) (6.50) (4.36) (2.75) (2.96) (5.72) (4.33)
External financing 1.304*** 0.783** 0.033*** 0.018 1. 097*** 1. 005** 0.033*** 0.015
(4.64) (2.84) (2.59) (1.47) (4.63) (4.52) (3.11) (1.46)
Market share 2.217** 1.045 0.174*** 0.127 *** 0.698 0.497 0.102*** 0.100***
(2.48) (1.30) (4.70) (3.85) (1.13) (0.81) (3.51) (3.46)
Liquidity 0.331 -0.153 0.019** 0 014 -0.056 -0.088 0.002 0.003
(1.00) (-0.48) (2.14) (1.56) (-1.06) (-1.12) (0.55) (0.64)
Medium size -1.297** -0.969** -0.036* -0.055 *** -0.247 -0.241 -0.010 -0.036**
(-2.95) (-2.31) (-1.89) (-3.11) (-0.95) (-0.90) (-0.81) (-2.76)
Small size 0.294 0.308 -0.004 -0.039 -0.306 -0.217 0.060** 0.005
(0.30) (0.32) (-0.10) (-1.04) (-0.51) (-0.40) (2.23) (0.18)
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.4 The determinants of innovation output: by type of innovation and source of knowledge (continued)
Controlled for lagged TE Controlled for lagged labor productivity
Product innovation Process innovation Product innovation Process innovation
R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as
an input an input an input an input an input an input an input an input
Age -0.012** -0.009** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.013*** -0.006 -0.001*** -0.000**
(-2.89) (-2.32) (-3.87) (-3.11) (-3.15) (-1.56) (-3.36) (-2.50)
FDI -2.654*** -0.797 -0.200 0.028 -2.314*** -0.714 0.003 0.048**
(-5.03) (-1.58) (-0.84) (1.20) (-4.38) (-1.45) (0.12) (-2.50)
State 1.008 0.180 0.069** 0. 011 0.141 -0.236 0.034 -0.001
(1.44) (0.29) (2.19) (0.41) (0.21) (-0.41) (1.15) (-0.06)
Subsidized 0.172 -0.391 -0.024 -0.037* 0.387 0.055 -0.013 -0.023
(0.33) (-0.78) (-1.01) (-1.67) (0.77) (0.12) (-0.58) (-1.09)
Holding -1.204** 0.182 0.000 0.035** -0.455 0.423 0.020 0.043***
(-2.90) (0.56) (0.03) (2.41) (-1.22) (1.41) (1.18) (3.09)
City size 0.280 -0.338 0.044*** 0.012 -0.352 -0.519* 0.006 -0.001
250 - 999 th.p.. (0.81) (-1.01) (2.84) (0.79) (-1.24) (-1.93) (0.46) (-0.05)
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.4 The determinants of innovation output: by type of innovation and source of knowledge (continued)
Controlled for lagged TE Controlled for lagged labor productivity
Product innovation Process innovation Product innovation Process innovation
R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as
an input an input an input an input an input an input an input an input
City size -1.074** -1.834*** 0.014 -0.011 -0.768*** -0.944*** -0.011 -0.017
less 250 th.p (-3.18) (-5.72) (0.90) (-0.74) (-2.72) (-3.61) (-0.87) (-1.43)
Specialization -0.003 -0.009 0.000 -0.000 -0.009 -0.014*** 0.001** 0.000
(-0.44) (-1.35) (1.16) (-0.73) (-1.60) (-2.79) (1.96) (0.09)
Entry rate 0.991 -0.144 0.015 -0.060 0.920** -0.181 -0.008 -0.052
(0.30) (-0.04) (0.22) (-0.83) (2.42) (-0.31) (-0.41) (-1.35)
Constant -7.113*** 0.124 -0.229*** 0. 086** -2.294* 0.180 -0.115** 0.129***
(-3.91) (0.14) (-2.90) (2.57) (-1.70) (0.27) (-1.86) (3.71)
Number of 1427 1519 1458 1583 2069 2156 2124 2243
observatiions
Note: The results stem from estimating the system of two -stage least-squares equations (2SLS on the panel data) for each year for the factors which affect product
and process innovations depending on knowledge input through predicted R&D or imports. Only the second stage IV regressions are reported. TE refers to the TFP
distance to the best performing plant in the sector and ranges from 0 to 1. t statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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TABLE 4.5: The impact of innovation on TE and labor productivity by type of innovation and source of input
TE Labor productivity
Product innovation Process innovation Product innovation Process innovation
R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as
an input an input an input an input an input an input an input an input
Lagged 0.019*** 0.011*** 0.365*** 0.548***
product innovation (6.15) (5.08) (4.75) (7.77)
Lagged 0.026 0.304** 6.631*** 7.663***
process innovation (0.29) (3.13) (4.27) (5.90)
Medium size 0.038** 0.028** -0.001 0.028 -0.668** -0.678*** -0.769*** -0.744***
(2.53) (2.22) (-0.06) (1.49) (-3.17) (-3.44) (-3.89) (-4.80)
Small size -0.041 -0.047* -0.060 -0.035 -1.130** -1.205** -1.639*** -1.390***
(-1.31) (-1.71) (-1.59) (-0.97) (-2.38) (-3.05) (-3.82) (-4.80)
Age -0.000** -0.000** -0.001** -0.000* -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001
(-2.88) (-3.07) (-3.23) (-1.83) (-0.50) (0.26) (-0.43) (0.61)
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.5 The impact of innovation on TE and labor productivity by type of innovation and source of input (continued)
TE Labor productivity
Product innovation Process innovation Product innovation Process innovation
R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as
an input an input an input an input an input an input an input an input
FDI 0.060*** 0.029** 0.034 0.013 1.018** 0.589* 0.077 -0.121
(3.59) (1.98) (1.62) (0.58) (2.38) (1.66) (0.21) (-0.44)
State 0.031 0.046** 0.039 0.048* 0.066 0.287 -0.173 0.187
(1.42) (2.56) (1.40) (1.90) (0.12) (0.68) (-0.37) (0.67)
Subsidized -0.028* -0.031** -0.022 -0.028 -0.069 0.035 0.260 0.319
(-1.72) (-2.15) (-1.06) (-1.34) (-0.17) (0.10) (0.72) (1.33)
Liquidity -0.007 0.002 0.001 -0.007 -0.200*** -0.181** -0.245*** -0.290***
(-0.69) (0.25) (0.15) (-0.76) (-4.69) (-3.14) (-5.57) (-4.99)
Holding 0.011 0.018** 0.016 0.011 0.029 -0.012 -0.242 -0.038
(1.04) (1.98) (1.03) (0.76) (0.11) (-0.05) (-0.93) (-0.22)
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.5 The impact of innovation on TE and labor productivity by type of innovation and source of input (continued)
TE Labor productivity
Product innovation Process innovation Product innovation Process innovation
R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as
an input an input an input an input an input an input an input an input
Market share -0.081** -0.035 -0.043 -0.065* 2.180*** 1.290** 1.493** 0.355
(-2.80) (-1.51) (-1.20) (-1.89) (4.41) (2.87) (3.07) (1.02)
Specialization 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 0.000* 0.006 0.006 -0.002 -0.004*
(3.33) (2.86) (1.39) (1.72) (1.18) (1.54) (-0.54) (-1.67)
City size -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.079*** -0.078*** 0.166 0.414** -0.003 0.049
250 - 999 th.p. (-6.97) (-7.75) (-5.56) (-5.52) (0.73) (2.08) (-0.01) (0.35)
less 250 th. people -0.005 -0.026** -0.035** -0.037** 0.390* 0.556** 0.137 0.143
(-0.42) (-2.64) (-2.57) (-2.69) (1.65) (2.75) (0.66) (1.03)
Entry rate -0.011 -0.068 0.023 -0.049 2.411*** 1.925*** 2.905*** 2.307***
(-0.10) (-0.73) (0.37) (-0.72) (7.71) (4.62) (9.35) (5.43)
Constant 0.650*** 0.677*** 0.717*** 0.658*** 5.896*** 5.469*** 6.288*** 6.185***
(28.62) (37.17) (24.96) (22.80) (12.16) (13.46) (14.71) (20.08)
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.5 The impact of innovation on TE and labor productivity by type of innovation and source of input (continued)
TE Labor productivity
Product innovation Process innovation Product innovation Process innovation
R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as R&D as Imports as
an input an input an input an input an input an input an input an input
Number of 1427 1519 1458 1583 2069 2156 2124 2243
observations
Number of groups 532 583 543 608 735 809 756 844
Chi-squared 132.308*** 150.524*** 64.885*** 67.884*** 211.532*** 188.342*** 209.823*** 221.484***
Panel-level 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.123*** 0.120*** 2.783*** 1.995*** 2.372*** 1.209***
standard deviation
Standard deviation 1.309*** 0.470*** 0.094*** 0.101*** 0.576*** 0.634*** 0.553*** 0.559***
of epsilon
Rho 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.629*** 0.588*** 0.959*** 0.908*** 0.948*** 0.824***
Note: The results stem from estimating the system of two-stage least-squares equations (2SLS for the panel data) for each year for the effects of innovation on TE and
productivity. Only the second stage IV regressions are reported. TE refers to the TFP distance to the best performing plant in the sector and ranges from 0 to 1. t
statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Referring to labour productivity, both types of innovation irrespective of knowl-
edge source make firms more productive: the elasticity of labour productivity in
relation to product innovation accounts for 0.37-0.55%. This result is consistent with
the finding by (Roud, 2018) for Russian firms on CIS data (he reports a mean 0.3%
elasticity ranging from 0.1% among so called national innovators to 0.4% among in-
ternational innovators). Comparable estimations for 18 OECD countries produce an
elasticity of 0.3-0.7% (Criscuolo, 2009).
The effect of process innovation on labour productivity is high: a radical im-
provement of the technological structure of the hardware stock, such as a doubling
of the share of machines and equipment installed no later than 5 year ago condi-
tional on a positive answer to the question about the introduction of new technolo-
gies, leads to a 7-8% increase of labor productivity. The established large coefficient
(when compared to peers) for process innovation with respect to labour produc-
tivity compared to peers7 is explained by our measurement strategy where we did
not use a conventional process innovation dummy, typical for most studies, but in-
stead quantified it by recent investments in machinery and equipment – the standard
source for technologies among Russian manufacturing firms.
The implication of our results for productivity equations is that product inno-
vation is most beneficial as a tool to increase TFP and shorten the distance to the
frontier, while process innovation, which mostly rely on knowledge embodied in
new hardware stock, critically increases labour productivity.
Regarding the remaining control variables, it is remarkable that subsidized firms
are significantly behind other manufacturing firms in TE. This finding brings with it
some implications concerning the focus of innovation policies. Foreign subsidiaries,
which were not found to be superior innovators, nevertheless lead in technical effi-
ciency and labour productivity, well in line with the theory by Melitz, 2003. Younger
firms trail behind incumbents in TE.
7The finding that product innovation are more beneficial for labor productivity than process inno-
vation are reported in (Crespi, Tacsir, and Vargas, 2016) (36 vs 19 %) and (Morris, 2018) (30 vs 13%)
though in both papers process innovations were measured as dummies.
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4.5.3 Growth equation
In this section, we estimate the growth effects of innovation and productivity gains
on the short panel of post-innovation performance – the econometric method which
is found most appropriate for high-frequency variations in a firm’s growth rates
(Geroski et al., 2003). We address the issue of the endogeneity of innovation and
productivity by estimating the IV 2SLS model, thus expanding the logic of the struc-
tural multi-stage modelling to the growth equation8 . In this part of the study, only
firms that are in existence in the beginning and at the end of the observation period
have been examined to avoid selection bias. The determinants of survival are stud-
ied separately in the next section 5.4. to check if the impact of innovation on growth
is not biased by the higher mortality of risky innovating firms. The main variables
of interest are product and process innovations in t-1 period and achieved technical
efficiency. In this way, we aim at separately analysing the effects of innovation and
technical efficiency, the last we believe to be a mechanism to transmit innovation
impulse to growth (Nelson and Winter, 1982b). All regressions are controlled for the
real mean growth rate at the 4-digit sectoral level to account for the business cycle,
which could have driven the growth dynamics of firms in turbulent years (Table 4.6).
Both product and process innovations produce a significant improvement in the
growth performance of manufacturing firms: a 1% increase in the share of novel
products’ sales per worker is associated with a 0.05% increase in the growth rate.
Process innovations are somewhat less beneficial for growth with a 0.02% effect.
Contrary to expectations, technological superiority, achieved as a result of product
and process innovation, is not advantageous for growth (the coefficient on TE is pos-
itive, though insignificant). The lack of positive causation between TE and growth
may reflect the general inefficiency of allocative mechanism in the Russian manufac-
turing industry, where firms that could exploit scarce resources in the most efficient
way have limited access to resources and therefore are not able to unfold their full
productive potential (Coad, 2009).
8We have also experimented with quantile regressions, which are extensively used in growth anal-
yses on micro data based on the assumption about the conditional distribution of growth rates (Coad
and Rao, 2008; Distante, Petrella, and Santoro, 2018). However, the coefficient estimates on our data
remain more or less constant across various quantiles.
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TABLE 4.6: Sales growth following innovation and productivity gains
Product TE from Process TE from
innovation product innovation process
output innovation output innovation
with R&D input output with R&D input output
Lagged 0.053**
product innovation (2.96)
Lagged 1.619***
process innovation (3.47)
Lagged TE 3.147 8.591
(1.55) (1.00)
Lagged turnover -0.026** 0.000 -0.045*** -0.050
(-2.50) (0.02) (-3.34) (-1.39)
Liquidity 0.025 0.001 0.029 0.128
(0.73) (0.01) (0.80) (1.01)
Age 0.001** 0.002* 0.002** 0.004
(2.17) (1.67) (2.81) (1.23)
Industry 0.263*** 0.393*** 0.254*** 0.658*
growth rate (4.03) (3.86) (3.77) (1.66)
Other controls included
Const 0.085 -2.322* 0.226 -5.566
(0.74) (-1.68) (1.64) (-0.96)
Number of 1961 1801 2022 1919
observations
Number of groups 676 655 698 699
Chi-squared 32** 21** 37*** 7
Panel-level 0.270** 0.000** 0.344*** 0.398
standard deviation
Standard deviation
of epsilon
0.409** 1.880** 0.423*** 0.425
Rho 0.304** 0.399*** 0.467
Note: The sales growth following innovation and productivity gains are calculated conditional on firm sur-
vival. The results are from estimating the system of two -stage least-squares equations (2SLS on the panel
data) for each year and relate to how innovation affects growth. Only the second stage IV regressions are
reported. TE refers to the TFP distance to the best performing plant in the sector and ranges from 0 to 1. t
statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Industry dynamics are the most influential factor which determines firm growth:
an increase in the sectoral growth rate by 1% leads to an increase in the firm growth
rate of about 0.25–0.66%, depending on the specification. Thus, our study confirms
that the performance of firms is critically shaped by the conditions of technology
and demand in underlying industries (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Audretsch,
1991) and that innovation is an important, if only second-rate factor contributing to
growth.
As far as the size-growth connection is concerned, when we measure the size
by the real lagged sales, we find that smaller firms grow faster conditional on their
survival. Age is beneficial for growth when size is controlled for: the finding is
not supportive of the “bad controls” argument (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Coad,
2018), whereby the advantages which come with age are controlled by the size. Our
result also suggests that there is no clear evidence for the validity of the Gibrat’s law
(Gibrat, 1931) on the basis of our data. The change in firm size is not independent
from its initial size.
4.5.4 Does innovation support survival?
Table 4.7 shows the regression results estimating the survival time of the surveyed
manufacturing firms. The post-innovation survival was tracked three years after
the survey was conducted. We use the Cox proportional hazard model and report
hazard rates - the rate of failure at which a firm will exit at time t on the condi-
tion that it survived at t − 1. The aim of this examination is to test the H4 which
expects innovation and productivity gains to increase survival time. Moreover, we
also seek to confirm the power of our previous results regarding the growth equa-
tion, which was estimated on the sub-sample of surviving firms in order to preclude
the selection of non-innovating firms into survivors. First, we report the hazard
rates of firms depending on their R&D intensity (column 1), product (3) and pro-
cess innovations (5), technical efficiency (7), labour productivity (9), and growth rate
(11). Additionally, building on the previous literature which establishes higher mor-
tality rates among small firms and overall significant structural barriers to survival
erected by low economies of scale (Audretsch, 1995), we seek to understand if in-
novation and productivity gains condition the survival of small firms. For this, we
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use the same proportional Cox-Hazard model and add interactions of our main pre-
dictors of interest with a dummy for the small size of the firm (columns 2, 4, 6, 8,
10). We use the universal set of controls, which capture the market share, location,
and firm-specific characteristics such as ownership, economies of scale, and special-
ization. Industrial dynamics proxied by the entry rate at the 4-digit sectoral level
suggests that the exposure of manufacturing firms to risk of failure are smaller in
highly dynamic expanding sectors.
Our main finding from estimating equation 4.6 is that there is a significant sur-
vival premium conferred by product innovation: the survival time increases for
firms which are persistent in the introduction of new products to the market and
manage to build a new product market portfolio rather than make minor refresh-
ments of the product line: if the firm increases the sales of novel products per em-
ployee by 1%, the survival time increases by 5.7%. The hazard rate of exit is negative
for all our main predictors of interest, though it is not always statistically significant:
neither for R&D expenditures, nor for process innovation.
However, labour productivity strongly determines firm demography. A 1% in-
crease in labour productivity decreases the hazard rate by 30%. The productivity
advantage, measured through TE, is also positively, though not significantly, related
to survival time (while controlling for profitability). It means that exiting firms do
not necessarily have a lower efficiency than surviving firms, as is the case if the
selection mechanism functions well. Therefore, the argument of the evolutionary
literature according to which innovators can improve their survival chances as a re-
sult of higher efficiency (Griliches, 1979) holds only partially — namely for labour
productivity — in our data.
Table 4.7 also reports that the firm growth rate has a positive effect on survival
(column 11). Comparable results are reported in the relevant literature (Cefis and
Marsili, 2006; Ugur, Trushin, and Solomon, 2016).
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TABLE 4.7: The impact of innovation, productivity and growth on survival
R&D and survival Product innova-
tion and survival
Process innova-
tion and survival
TE and survival Labor productiv-
ity and survival
Sales growth and
survival
R&D Small
size in-
teraction
Product
innova-
tions
Small
size in-
teraction
Process
innova-
tion
Small
size in-
teraction
TE Small
size in-
teraction
Labor
produc-
tivity
Small
size in-
teraction
Sales
growth
Small
size in-
teraction
R&D 0.973 0.966
(-0.43) (-0.49)
R&D x 0.372**
small size (-2.84)
Product 0.943* 0.953
innovation (-1.83) (-1.46)
Product 0.664**
innovation x
small size
(-2.55)
Process 0.612 0.588
innovation (-0.99) (-0.93)
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.7 The impact of innovation, productivity and growth on survival (continued)
R&D and survival Product innova-
tion and survival
Process innova-
tion and survival
TE and survival Labor productiv-
ity and survival
Sales growth and
survival
R&D Small
size in-
teraction
Product
innova-
tions
Small
size in-
teraction
Process
innova-
tion
Small
size in-
teraction
TE Small
size in-
teraction
Labor
produc-
tivity
Small
size in-
teraction
Sales
growth
Small
size in-
teraction
Process 0.433
innovation x
small size
(-0.46)
TE 0.502 0.964
(-0.58) (-0.03)
TE x 17.215
small size (0.86)
Labor 0.694*** 0.843
productivity (-4.66) (-1.38)
Labor 0.661**
productivity
x small size
(-2.42)
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.7 The impact of innovation, productivity and growth on survival (continued)
R&D and survival Product innova-
tion and survival
Process innova-
tion and survival
TE and survival Labor productiv-
ity and survival
Sales growth and
survival
R&D Small
size in-
teraction
Product
innova-
tions
Small
size in-
teraction
Process
innova-
tion
Small
size in-
teraction
TE Small
size in-
teraction
Labor
produc-
tivity
Small
size in-
teraction
Sales
growth
Small
size in-
teraction
Sales growth 0.630*** 0.592***
(-4.91) (-4.35)
Sales growth
x
1.032
small size
dummy
(0.17)
Small size 3.351*** 0.381 3.633*** 1.741 3.455*** 3.621** 2.565 0.388 1.549 11.149** 1.533 1.494
dummy (3.32) (-1.26) (3.54) (1.18) (3.34) (3.18) (0.90) (-0.41) (0.98) (2.17) (0.88) (0.76)
Entry rate 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(-4.94) (-5.01) (-4.47) (-4.37) (-4.78) (-4.79) (-2.18) (-2.14) (-4.07) (-4.01) (-4.46) (-4.43)
Controls Controls for firm liquidity, ownership, age, specialization, market share and host city size are included
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.7 The impact of innovation, productivity and growth on survival (continued)
R&D and survival Product innova-
tion and survival
Process innova-
tion and survival
TE and survival Labor productiv-
ity and survival
Sales growth and
survival
R&D Small
size in-
teraction
Product
innova-
tions
Small
size in-
teraction
Process
innova-
tion
Small
size in-
teraction
TE Small
size in-
teraction
Labor
produc-
tivity
Small
size in-
teraction
Sales
growth
Small
size in-
teraction
Number of 6192 6192 5606 5606 5904 5904 5018 5018 6664 6664 5699 5699
observations
Number of 6170 6170 5584 5584 5882 5882 4996 4996 6642 6642 5677 5677
subjects
Note: All estimations use the Cox proportional hazard model. Regression coefficients are the hazard ratio (exponentiated coefficients). Z statistics are reported in
parentheses beneath the coefficients. Robust standard errors are used. Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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The estimated hazard rates for industry dynamics, measured by the entry rate
at the 4-digit sectoral level, are negative and highly significant, indicating that firms
grouped in dynamic sectors with increasing demand tend to have a low hazard of
exit. This result is consistent with (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2008) and
finds that demand variations across producers are the dominant factor in determin-
ing survival.
The controls have the expected signs: the survival time increases for profitable
firms and for firms which report larger market share, while specialization and own-
ership do not matter.
Next, we study whether the gap between the firm size and the minimal efficient
scale, which is found to be critical for survival in the literature (Audretsch, 1995),
shrinks when the firm innovates and achieves productivity advantages. Table 4.7
shows that our measurement of R&D intensity interacting with the dummy for the
small size of the firm is negative and significant (column 2), meaning that a growth
of R&D intensity by 1% increases the survival time of the small firm by 62.8%. Simi-
lar effects are observed for product innovation and labor productivity. Neither pro-
cess innovation, nor TE and growth improve the demography of small firms. These
results demonstrate that small firms, being most vulnerable to disinvestment risks,
live longer when they undertake R&D investments and sell new products. The find-
ing that innovation is most beneficial for the survival of small firms may also be
found in (Cefis and Marsili, 2006) in the case of Dutch firms, who also report that
small firms are the most exposed to the risk of exit and that they benefit most from
innovation as it relates to surviving in the market.
To sum up, we find that innovation is efficient in reducing firms’ exit probability,
though the effect is weaker than the economic return from innovation in terms of
productivity and growth and is mostly important for small firms.
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4.6 Concluding remarks
Raising productivity and changing the production structure remain the main chal-
lenges transition economies are facing. This paper aims to find new evidence con-
cerning the effects of innovation on the performance of the Russian manufactur-
ing firms and presents an empirical comparison of economic payoffs from various
sources of knowledge input and for different types of performance. The available
support of the predictions of the evolutionary literature on the Russian data is min-
imal and non-conclusive. Manufacturing firms are regarded as weak innovators
focused on technology adoption and positioned far from the technological frontier,
operating in a fragile economic and institutional setting. All this may suggest a
low significance of innovation in catching up and growth, as is often the case in
other transition and developing countries (Hall and Mairesse, 2006). On the other
hand, imitation and low risk strategies may have some rationale, since technologi-
cal progress foreshadows a different use of inputs at different levels of development
(Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir, 2006).
The findings in this paper provide new arguments regarding the process of knowl-
edge evolution in the context of an emerging economy. The innovation-performance
link in Russia does not differ much from the regularities established in the literature
for other countries: firms that invest in R&D or learn from knowledge embodied in
imported hardware are superior innovators; innovating firms are furthermore supe-
rior in labour productivity and technological efficiency. Innovative and productive
firms are more likely to survive and grow conditional on their survival. However,
weak market selection mechanisms and an inefficiency of resource allocation has
some consequences: greater technical efficiency is not rewarded by growth and sur-
vival.
There are several remaining problems concerning Russia’s technological devel-
opment. The government still controls a large share of research resources and this
hardly helps the technical upgrading of manufacturing firms. Our data confirm that
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neither subsidized nor government firms stay at the forefront of innovation. In gen-
eral, firms respond weakly to government initiatives and the policies involve pri-
vate firms incompletely. This may be partly explained by the obvious mismatch be-
tween the government tools to stimulate technological progress and the actual tools
which the firms use for technological upgrade and growth. Thus, the government
mostly seeks to support large and high-tech projects in the inward-looking policy
environment and largely overlooks mid-tech innovation and technology adoption.
Our research shows that firms’ behaviour conforms to more fundamental economic
incentives than the ones considered by government policy and that knowledge is
generated through in-house R&D and imports in the presence of stronger foreign
competition and trade integration.
Next, this paper confirms that economies of scale, both internal (size of the firm)
and external (size of the host city) decide the successful conversion of knowledge
input into innovation and innovation into productivity. Only a handful of advanced
locations which generate agglomeration forces (large cities at most) host efficient
innovators. Therefore, the policy of mushrooming technoparks in distant locations
seems to disregard this reality.
We consider there to be some limitations of the data and research. First, our
dataset is biased towards larger firms. Our econometric approach addresses the
problem of underreporting of R&D expenditures by smaller firms in the survey but
is not able to cope with underreporting of SME accounting data, while the estima-
tions of performance are conditional on data availability. Weighting is only partly
helpful because the actual full population of small firms is simply not known. Next,
some inconsistency in the data may be caused by the absence of a full set of disag-
gregated deflators (firm level prices are always unobserved). This is an issue which
could result in the mis-measurement of growth indicators during periods of high
economic turbulence. Therefore, we urge caution in the interpretation of growth re-
sults because the variation of growth rates may be partly caused by a variation in
input price dynamics. A short panel for productivity and growth equations may
also underestimate the notion that firms have natural life cycles (Binder, Hsiao, and
Pesaran, 2005).
There are various extensions to the line of research suggested in this paper. A
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longer time period of analysis may bring additional insight and allow the use of a
more nuanced econometric methodology because firms in our dataset were severely
hit by exogenous destructive shocks which obviously interfered in the innovation-
performance link. It would be interesting to find out whether the obtained results
hold for a growing rather than for a stagnating industry when the growth is balanced
by commodities’ prices and more favourable terms of trade. The duration of the
performance effects of innovations is also an interesting topic for analysis, especially
in a comparative perspective.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
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FIGURE A.1: Globalisation trends in Russia
Note: Trade openness is calculated as the share of the sum of exports and imports of goods and services
in the GDP in 2017.
Source: World Bank
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TABLE A.1: Transition outcomes
Country GDP 1992, GDP 2000 / GDP 2017 / Type of Part of the Group Group EBRD EBRD
Name in billion US$ GDP 1992 GDP 1992 transition world average average indicator indicator
in 2000 in 2017 in 2000 in 2014
Albania 4037.34 1.72 3.46 Aborted big bang FSU 0.97 2.43 3.17 3.50
Armenia 3267.34 1.32 3.78 Gradual FSU 0.97 2.43 2.94 3.44
Azerbaijan 17159.11 0.77 3.34 Gradual FSU 0.97 2.43 2.67 2.89
Belarus 28943.97 0.99 2.14 No Reform FSU 0.97 2.43 1.67 2.17
Bulgaria 30811.15 1.05 1.91 Aborted big bang FSU 0.97 2.43 3.39 3.72
Croatia* 39547.13 1.18 1.60 Gradual CEEC 1.29 2.18 3.44 3.83
Czech Republic 127113.23 1.19 1.90 Big bang CEEC 1.29 2.18 3.83
Estonia* 10507.17 1.34 2.38 Big bang CEEC 1.29 2.18 3.78 4.05
Georgia 7338.08 0.86 2.17 Gradual FSU 0.97 2.43 3.33 3.50
Hungary 89012.80 1.20 1.72 Gradual CEEC 1.29 2.18 3.89 3.89
Kazakhstan 81159.67 0.82 2.42 Gradual FSU 0.97 2.43 3.06 3.06
Kyrgyz Republic 3818.72 0.84 1.74 Gradual FSU 0.97 2.43 3.28 3.39
Latvia* 12774.50 1.29 2.36 Big bang CEEC 1.29 2.18 3.50 3.94
Lithuania* 19315.60 1.26 2.46 Big bang CEEC 1.29 2.18 3.44 3.94
Macedonia, FYR 6744.62 1.04 1.62 Aborted big bang FSU 0.97 2.43
Poland 216032.59 1.51 2.78 Big bang CEEC 1.29 2.18 3.66 4.00
Romania 98478.43 1.12 2.20 Gradual FSU 0.97 2.43 3.28 3.67
Russian Federation 1147448.09 0.83 1.46 Aborted big bang FSU 0.97 2.43 3.00 3.28
Slovak Republic 40719.12 1.36 2.66 Big bang CEEC 1.29 2.18 3.78 3.94
Slovenia* 29973.08 1.23 1.77 Gradual CEEC 1.29 2.18 3.50 3.56
Tajikistan 4472.98 0.58 2.03 Gradual FSU 0.97 2.43 2.72 2.95
Turkmenistan 11096.84 0.97 3.80 No Reform FSU 0.97 2.43 1.56 1.78
Ukraine 170185.71 0.53 0.75 Gradual FSU 0.97 2.43 2.89 3.28
Uzbekistan 18077.74 1.11 3.64 No Reform FSU 0.97 2.43 2.17 2.28
Notes: Since the transition encompasses a lot of various reforms, it is often difficult to clearly define which group the country belongs to. The classification adopted here is based on
Lenger, 2008. Other sources include: World Bank for the data on real GDP and EBRD for the transition indicator.
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Trade openess
1 − 25 (2)
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FIGURE A.2: Trade openness by country in 2017
Note: Trade openness is calculated as the share of the sum of exports and imports of goods and services in the GDP in 2017. The number of countries in each category is shown
in parenthesis in the legend. Transition countries are marked by red boarders.
Source: World Bank
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Export share, in %
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FIGURE A.3: Russia’s export share by trade partner in 2017
Note: The number of countries in each category is shown in parenthesis in the legend. Transition countries are marked by red boarders.
Source: World Bank
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Import share, in %
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FIGURE A.4: Russia’s import share by trade partner in 2017
Note: The number of countries in each category is shown in parenthesis in the legend. Transition countries are marked by red boarders.
Source: World Bank
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FIGURE A.5: Russia’s exports to the EU (left) and imports from the EU (right)
Note: The data shows the trade structure with the EU-28 in 2017. The trade structure before the crisis differs insignificantly.
Source: Own calculations
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TABLE A.2: Aggregated FDI data for Russia
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Russia’s political risk 34 34.3 36.8 36.1 38 40.5 42 43.8 44.2 43.5 .
Inward FDI
FDI inflow, EUR bln 40.2 51.7 19.9 23.9 26.5 23.5 40.2 22 10.7 33.6 23.1
FDI inflow, in % of GDP 4.2 4.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.4 2.3 1.4 0.9 2.9 1.7
FDI inward stock, EUR bln 335.5 150.9 256 350.8 316 330.8 343.1 238.8 240.3 374.5 368.9
Number of FDI affiliates 14783 16396 17372 . 24080 21417 24025 23520 17565 . .
Number of people employed 3166 3282 3179 3215 3402 3321 3468 3445 3255 . .
by foreign subsidiaries, thosand
Structure of FDI inflows, in EUR mn
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing . . . 239.4 169.5 179.6 466.1 -22.7 243.3 -126.9 -242.4
B Mining and quarrying . . . 2833.8 3266.6 3739.9 5345.8 3436.0 10331.9 20139.2 7377.8
C Manufacturing . . . 7420.8 5995.0 4966.9 12416.3 886.8 6150.5 4410.4 2539.6
D-E Electricity, gas, water supply . . . 1075.5 1595.7 1466.9 1350.5 1281.5 -1763.2 -96.7 1007.1
F Construction . . . 297.0 2708.2 3055.4 2179.2 2054.7 -945.2 -309.0 1835.8
Services (G-S) . . . 20677.4 25822.2 25944.3 30348.9 9018.2 -7854.3 5364.1 12890.3
Outward FDI
FDI outflow, EUR bln 33.5 38.7 24.7 31 34.9 22.1 53.2 48.5 24.4 24.3 32.3
FDI outflow, in % of GDP 3.5 3.4 2.8 2.7 2.6 1.3 3.1 3.1 2 2.1 2.3
FDI outward stock, EUR bln 252.9 139.9 200.9 254.2 244 251.3 280.4 271.5 258.5 317.8 317.9
Notes: Political risk is calculated as a sum of 12 political and social attributes of the business environment in the home country (higher score indicates higher risk), based on the data
provided by PRS group. The inward FDI stock is the value of foreign investors’ equity in and net loans to enterprises resident in Russia. Values are indicated in current prices. Structure
of FDI inflows is presented in accordance with the NACE Rev. 2 classification. Sources: FDI data are from wiiw FDI Database (2019). Number of affiliates and number of employees is
reported by the Russian statistical agency.
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FDI inflows, bln of euros
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FIGURE A.6: FDI inflows by economy in 2017
Note: FDI inflows are measured in billion Euro. The number of countries in each category is shown in parenthesis in the legend. Transition countries are marked by red
boarders.
Source: World Bank
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TABLE A.3: Biggest FDI hosts in 2013 and 2017
Country name Inflow
Rank in
2017
Inflow
Rank in
2013
Inflow
Rank
in 2017
among
tran-
sition
coun-
tries
Inflow
Rank
in 2013
among
tran-
sition
coun-
tries
FDI in-
flow in
2013, in
bln Euro
FDI in-
flow in
2017, in
bln Euro
United States 1 1 243.70 151.42
China 2 2 120.64 93.17
Hong Kong 3 4 92.33 55.86
Brazil 4 8 55.50 40.27
Singapore 5 6 54.87 43.20
Netherlands 6 11 51.29 38.43
France 7 16 44.07 25.77
Australia 8 7 41.03 42.68
Switzerland 9 87 36.27 0.87
India 10 17 35.32 21.20
British Virgin Islands 11 3 33.95 82.39
Cayman Islands 12 12 33.13 38.38
Germany 13 24 30.73 11.71
Mexico 14 13 26.28 36.46
Ireland 15 14 25.64 35.06
Russia 16 9 1 1 22.38 40.15
Canada 17 5 21.45 52.17
Indonesia 18 22 20.41 14.15
Spain 19 15 16.89 28.15
Israel 20 30 16.77 8.90
Czech Republic 35 46 2 4 6.56 2.74
Poland 41 58 3 8 5.69 2.06
Romania 44 47 4 5 4.57 2.71
Kazakhstan 46 31 5 2 4.10 7.76
Azerbaijan 56 62 6 9 2.54 1.98
Serbia 57 72 7 11 2.54 1.54
Hungary 62 51 8 6 2.20 2.56
Turkmenistan 63 55 9 7 2.05 2.15
Slovakia 65 194 10 28 2.01 -0.45
Ukraine 66 42 11 3 1.95 3.38
Croatia 68 96 12 15 1.86 0.72
Georgia 70 95 13 14 1.65 0.77
Belarus 80 65 14 10 1.13 1.68
Albania 86 86 15 13 0.99 0.95
Source: UNCDAT. Data are converted to EUR using official exchange rates by ECB.
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FDI outflows, bln of euros
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FIGURE A.7: FDI outflows by economy in 2017
Note: FDI outflows are measured in billions of euros. The number of countries in each category is shown in parenthesis in the legend. Transition countries are marked by red
boarders.
Source: World Bank
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TABLE A.4: Biggest FDI suppliers in 2013 and 2017
Country name Outflow
Rank in
2017
Outflow
Rank in
2013
Outflow
Rank
in 2017
among
tran-
sition
coun-
tries
Outflow
Rank
in 2013
among
tran-
sition
coun-
tries
FDI out-
flow in
2013, in
bln Euro
FDI out-
flow in
2017, in
bln Euro
United States 1 1 302.89 228.14
Japan 2 2 141.99 102.07
China 3 4 110.29 81.09
United Kingdom 4 11 88.15 30.44
Hong Kong 5 5 73.31 60.73
Germany 6 10 72.86 31.78
Canada 7 8 68.13 43.14
British Virgin Islands 8 3 62.64 82.97
France 9 19 51.43 15.31
Luxembourg 10 18 36.42 16.61
Spain 11 25 36.09 9.64
Russia 12 6 1 1 31.89 53.15
Korea, Republic of 13 16 28.03 21.32
Cayman Islands 14 26 26.88 8.92
Singapore 15 9 21.84 33.41
Sweden 16 13 21.51 22.77
Netherlands 17 7 20.64 52.41
Belgium 18 14 18.52 22.17
Thailand 19 27 17.06 8.78
Ireland 20 15 16.47 22.08
Poland 36 177 2 25 3.18 -1.01
Azerbaijan 39 49 3 5 2.27 1.12
Czech Republic 44 38 4 2 1.44 3.02
Kazakhstan 51 42 5 3 0.70 1.72
Croatia 53 167 6 21 0.57 -0.13
Slovakia 58 172 7 24 0.31 -0.24
Hungary 59 47 8 4 0.28 1.42
Bulgaria 61 78 9 12 0.26 0.14
Georgia 64 84 10 13 0.24 0.09
Serbia 73 68 11 9 0.13 0.25
Slovenia 78 168 12 22 0.09 -0.16
Latvia 79 62 13 8 0.08 0.31
Bosnia and Herzegovina 93 96 14 14 0.04 0.03
Belarus 97 73 15 10 0.03 0.18
Albania 102 98 16 15 0.02 0.03
Armenia 106 105 17 17 0.02 0.02
Estonia 108 59 18 6 0.02 0.39
Montenegro 110 109 19 18 0.01 0.01
Romania 111 171 20 23 0.01 -0.21
Republic of Moldova 114 113 21 19 0.01 0.01
Ukraine 115 61 22 7 0.01 0.32
Kyrgyzstan 158 156 23 20 0.00 0.00
Macedonia 160 103 24 16 0.00 0.02
Lithuania 166 76 25 11 -0.03 0.14
Source: UNCDAT. Data are converted to EUR using official exchange rates by ECB.
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FIGURE B.1: EU-exports to Russia over total European exports be-
tween 2000 and 2016, in %
Source: Eurostat
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2013 export, mln EUR
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FIGURE B.2: EU-27 exports to Russia, in million Euro
Note: EU-27 exports to Russia in absolute values before the Ukraine conflict in 2013 (left) and in the second sanctions year, 2015 (right). The number of countries in each
category is shown in parenthesis in the legend.
Source: Eurostat
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TABLE B.1: VAR lag selection
all exports AtB C 15t16 17t18 19 20 21t22 24 25 26 27t28 29 30t33 34t35 36t37
Austria 6 12 6 2 6 6 3 6 6 2 2 6 2 6 6 6
Belgium 6 6 6 2 6 6 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 2 6 7
Bulgaria 6 2 6 7 2 6 3 11 2 6 8 7 7
Czech Republic 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 6
Germany 6 6 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 6 6
Denmark 2 6 2 2 6 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 2
Spain 6 6 6 2 6 6 2 7 6 2 6 6 3 2 6 6
Estonia 6 2 6 6 2 6 7 2 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 2
Finalnd 6 2 2 6 6 2 6 2 6 6 3 6 2 2 6 3
France 6 6 2 6 9 6 2 2 6 6 2 2 6 2 6 6
Great Britain 2 4 6 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 2 7 4 6 4
Greece 6 11 12 6 2 6 11 6 6 12 11 6 2 3
Hungary 2 1 2 1 6 1 6 1 2 1 7 2 1 6 2
Ireland 2
Italy 7 2 6 6 6 11 6 6 2 6 6 3 6 7 6 7
Lithuania 6 2 6 2 11 10 2 6 2 6 6 6 6 2 3 7
Luxembourg 6
Latvia 2 2 12 2 3 11 7 6 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 6
The Netherlands 6 6 2 6 6 6 2 6 2 6 6 6 6 2 6 6
Poland 2 2 1 2 2 7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Portugal 6
Romania 2
Slovakia 2
Slovenia 6
Sweden 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 2 2 2 2 2 2
Notes: ISIC Sectors are abbreviated as follows: AtB - Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; C - Mining and Quarrying; 15t16 - Food,
Beverages and Tobacco; 17t18 - Textiles and Textile Products; 19 - Leather, Leather and Footwear; 20 - Wood and Products of Wood and Cork; 21t22
- Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing; 24 - Chemicals and Chemical Products; 25 - Rubber and Plastics; 26 - Other Non-Metallic Mineral;
27t28 - Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal; 29 - Machinery; 30t33 - Electrical and Optical Equipment; 34t35 - Transport Equipment; and 36t37 -
Manufacturing, Recycling
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TABLE B.2: AIC criterion for each chosen lag. Part 1
Sector AUT BEL BGR CZE DEU DNK ESP EST FIN FRA GBR GRC HUN
all exports -10.834 -10.712 -10.087 -10.424 -11.492 -10.579 -10.594 -10.358 -11.338 -10.119 -10.077 -10.303 -9.577
AtB Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry
and Fishing
-7.822 -10.016 -7.362 -7.75 -9.31 -7.791 -8.666 -6.862 -8.321 -8.798 -7.052 -8.405 -7.222
C Mining and Quarrying -7.599 -5.68 -7.499 -8.459 -7.504 -7.917 -7.608 -7.823 -6.188 -6.116
15t16 Food, Beverages and Tobacco -10.328 -10.11 -9.248 -9.369 -10.458 -9.606 -9.889 -8.852 -10.9 -10.277 -8.84 -8.492 -8.963
17t18 Textiles and Textile Products -9.515 -10.001 -8.321 -9.152 -10.771 -9.296 -9.839 -8.867 -10.323 -10.665 -9.72 -9.452 -7.973
19 Leather, Leather and Footwear -8.862 -8.591 -7.021 -9.894 -6.669 -8.861 -6.395 -8.272 -9.129 -8.435 -5.157
20 Wood and Products of Wood and
Cork
-9.343 -8.235 -8.041 -10.231 -6.436 -8.813 -8.647 -9.676 -8.295 -6.323 -6.719
21t22 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and
Publishing
-9.535 -8.952 -6.746 -9.35 -10.983 -8.351 -9.239 -8.572 -11.08 -9.725 -8.625 -5.419 -8.103
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products -9.151 -9.64 -8.551 -9.168 -11.174 -9.295 -9.796 -8.73 -10.13 -10.719 -9.523 -9.128 -8.586
25 Rubber and Plastics -10.27 -10.086 -8.451 -9.258 -10.963 -8.923 -9.696 -8.596 -9.929 -10.111 -9.864 -8.455 -9.175
26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral -9.773 -8.465 -8.25 -9.889 -10.749 -7.27 -10.731 -8.885 -10.696 -9.988 -9.103 -7.632 -7.103
27t28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal -9.399 -9.246 -7.105 -8.74 -9.831 -8.297 -9.268 -8.592 -9.727 -8.738 -8.514 -8.083 -7.656
29 Machinery, Nec -9.535 -9.223 -9.556 -9.385 -10.947 -9.099 -9.369 -8.582 -10.167 -9.84 -9.44 -7.563 -7.601
30t33 Electrical and Optical Equipment -9.263 -9.268 -8.662 -8.702 -10.804 -9.756 -9.034 -8.456 -9.735 -9.844 -9.595 -6.415 -7.713
34t35 Transport Equipment -8.044 -8.791 -7.096 -8.5 -10.147 -8.584 -8.092 -8.839 -8.675 -7.339 -8.72 -5.887 -6.945
36t37 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling -8.931 -9.312 -7.568 -9.134 -10.56 -8.429 -9.299 -8.347 -10.009 -9.458 -7.413 -6.919 -7.14
Notes: Country codes are abbreviated as follows: AUT - Austria, BEL - Belgium, BGR - Bulgaria, CZE - Czech Republic, DEU - Germany, DNK - Denmark, ESP - Spain, EST - Estonia, FIN
- Finalnd, FRA - France, GBR - Great Britain, GRC - Greece, HUN - Hungary. Due to infinitesimal exports with numerous monthly breaks from Cyrus and Malta, VAR models were not
calculated for these countries. Only spillover effects could be calculated for these countries.
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TABLE B.3: AIC criterion for each chosen lag. Part 2
Sector IRL ITA LTU LUX LVA NLD POL PRT ROU SVK SVN SWE
all exports -9.488 -11.109 -11.15 -8.368 -10.803 -11.259 -10.871 -9.117 -9.272 -9.944 -10.211 -10.024
AtB Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry
and Fishing
-8.845 -9.418 -7.654 -10.138 -8.84 -4.895
C Mining and Quarrying -7.801 -7.65 -6.68 -7.928 -6.455 -6.066
15t16 Food, Beverages and Tobacco -10.054 -10.189 -9.74 -10.194 -10.153 -8.846
17t18 Textiles and Textile Products -10.753 -9.246 -9.487 -9.518 -9.816 -8.71
19 Leather, Leather and Footwear -10.034 -6.414 -6.849 -8.537 -7.667 -7.159
20 Wood and Products of Wood and
Cork
-10.121 -9.42 -8.378 -7.6 -10.28 -7.483
21t22 Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and
Publishing
-10.138 -10.51 -9.233 -9.958 -10.605 -9.697
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products -10.264 -9.813 -9.375 -10.361 -10.545 -9.816
25 Rubber and Plastics -10.593 -10.036 -9.645 -10.168 -10.603 -9.479
26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral -10.418 -9.766 -8.827 -8.729 -10.504 -8.565
27t28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal -9.939 -9.821 -8.65 -9.8 -9.718 -8.929
29 Machinery, Nec -10.305 -9.628 -9.186 -9.682 -9.58 -9.507
30t33 Electrical and Optical Equipment -10.142 -9.514 -9.168 -9.92 -9.431 -7.963
34t35 Transport Equipment -8.828 -9.118 -8.595 -8.671 -7.717 -8.135
36t37 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling -10.601 -9.824 -8.298 -9.412 -10.687 -8.433
Notes: Country codes are abbreviated as follows: IRL - Ireland, ITA - Italy, LTU - Lithuania, LUX - Luxembourg, LVA - Latvia, NLD - The Netherlands, POL - Poland, PRT -
Portugal, ROU - Romania, SVK - Slovakia, SVN - Slovenia, SWE - Sweden. For several countries (IRL, LUX, PRT, ROU, SVK, and SVN) only total export forecasts could be
calculated. Due to infinitesimal exports with numerous monthly breaks from Cyrus and Malta, VAR models were not calculated for these countries. Only spillover effects could
be calculated for these countries.
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FIGURE B.3: Forecasted exports in levels for selected countries
Note: The countries are depicted as follows. First row (from left to right): Belgium, Germany, Spain, Greece, the Netherlands. Second row (from left to right): Austria, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia. Third row (from left to right): Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Sweden
A
ppendix
B.
A
ppendix
to
C
hapter
2
182
2015 loss, in million Euro
loss of more than 2000 (3)
loss between 1000 and 2000 (4)
loss up to 1000 (13)
trade gain up to 150 (2)
trade gain between 150 and 300 (1)
trade gain above 300 (2)
2015 loss, in million Euro
loss of more than 2000 (3)
loss between 1000 and 2000 (7)
loss up to 1000 (13)
trade gain up to 150 (3)
trade gain between 150 and 300 (1)
trade gain above 300 (0)
FIGURE B.4: EU-27 export losses due to sanctions in 2015, in million Euro
Note: EU-27 export losses: direct + indirect impact (left) and direct + indirect + spillover (due to intra-EU trade connectedness) impact, 2015 (right). The number of countries in
each category is shown in parenthesis in the legend.
Source: own calculations
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2014 loss, in million Euro
up to 500 (13)
500 to 1000 (4)
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2000 to 4000 (3)
more than 4000 (2)
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FIGURE B.5: Export losses due to sanctions in 2014 (left) and 2016 (right), in million Euro
Note: EU-27 export losses without considering for the intra-EU trade connectedness. The number of countries in each category is shown in parenthesis in the legend. The scale
shows the biggest losses on the top, countries recovered from losses to a different extent are depicted in blue.
Source: own calculations
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TABLE B.4: Summary of direct, indirect and spillover losses by country, in million Euro, per year and cumulative
2014 2015 2016 2 Years 3 Years
Direct + Direct + Direct + Direct + Direct + Direct + Direct + Direct + Direct + Direct +
indirect indirect + indirect indirect + indirect indirect + indirect indirect + indirect indirect +
spillover spillover spillover spillover spillover
Austria -508 -782 -711 -852 -613 -556 -1,218 -1,634 -1,831 -2,190
Belgium -558 -956 392 125 1,313 1,410 -166 -831 1,147 579
Bulgaria -173 -199 -107 -125 -19 -19 -280 -324 -299 -343
Cyrus -3 -2 -1 -5 -6
Czech Republic -1,792 -2,053 -1,724 -1,891 -1,707 -1,704 -3,515 -3,944 -5,222 -5,647
Germany -5,648 -7,514 -292 -1,674 8,486 7,951 -5,940 -9,188 2,546 -1,237
Denmark -262 -374 -165 -269 239 214 -426 -643 -188 -429
Spain -476 -870 -420 -610 261 412 -896 -1,480 -634 -1,068
Estonia -984 -1,027 -469 -540 -328 -380 -1,453 -1,567 -1,781 -1,947
Finalnd -1,311 -1,484 -930 -1,073 346 286 -2,241 -2,557 -1,896 -2,271
France -3,014 -3,654 -1,044 -1,404 3,003 3,179 -4,058 -5,057 -1,055 -1,879
Great Britain -121 -685 351 -20 125 299 230 -705 355 -406
Greece -136 -151 112 100 103 104 -24 -51 79 53
Hungary -408 -566 -1,315 -1,410 -1,531 -1,532 -1,723 -1,976 -3,254 -3,508
Continued on the next page
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Table B.4 Summary of direct, indirect and spillover losses by country, in million Euro, per year and cumulative (continued)
2014 2015 2016 2 Years 3 Years
Direct + Direct + Direct + Direct + Direct + Direct + Direct + Direct + Direct + Direct +
indirect indirect + indirect indirect + indirect indirect + indirect indirect + indirect indirect +
spillover spillover spillover spillover spillover
Ireland -412 -490 -546 -593 -25 -3 -959 -1,083 -984 -1,087
Italy -4,116 -4,834 -4,618 -4,927 693 856 -8,734 -9,762 -8,042 -8,905
Lithuania -2,608 -2,641 -5,627 -5,663 -4,657 -4,685 -8,235 -8,304 -12,892 -12,989
Luxembourg -51 -89 -50 -70 -5 9 -102 -159 -106 -150
Latvia -300 -377 -620 -741 -766 -863 -919 -1,118 -1,685 -1,981
Malta -4 -4 -2 -8 -10
The Netherlands -1,331 -1,828 -1,050 -1,367 797 914 -2,381 -3,194 -1,584 -2,280
Poland -3,099 -3,577 -2,021 -2,497 -1,760 -1,945 -5,120 -6,074 -6,880 -8,019
Portugal -162 -215 74 46 36 59 -88 -169 -52 -110
Romania -263 -331 -531 -581 -525 -533 -794 -912 -1,319 -1,445
Slovakia -508 -646 -991 -1,105 -1,305 -1,356 -1,499 -1,751 -2,803 -3,107
Slovenia -353 -387 219 193 265 263 -134 -193 132 70
Sweden -172 -464 -496 -696 -393 -396 -668 -1,160 -1,061 -1,556
TOTAL -28,768 -36,199 -22,577 -27,650 2,033 1,981 -51,345 -63,850 -49,313 -61,869
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TABLE B.5: List of EU-27 countries, grouped by their overcoming of
the crisis
Group 1. “less dependent” countries: Group 2. “more dependent” countries
Countries, recovered from the crisis
until 2016
Countries with sustainable losses until
2016
Belgium * Austria
Germany Bulgaria
Denmark Czech Republic
Spain Estonia
Finland Hungary
France Ireland
Great Britain * Lithuania
Greece * Latvia
Italy Poland
Luxembourg Romania
The Netherlands Slovak Republic
Portugal * Sweden
Slovenia * Cyprus **
Malta **
Notes: * denotes countries that recovered already in 2015, ** denotes two countries, for which only losses
due to the EU-interconnectedness could be considered
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Appendix C
Personal contributions to the
papers of the cumulative thesis
EU and Russian sanctions: how big is the economic impact within the European
Union?
This paper was designed solely by myself, including data collection, analysis
and writing. The work has benefited from valuable advise and comments from the
colleagues and participants of the numerous conferences where I had a chance to
present this paper.
Impact of political risk on FDI exit decisions: the case of Russia
This paper is a joint work with Dr. Ksenia Gonchar, Leading Research Fellow at
the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies at the Higher School of Economics in
Moscow, and Dr. Philipp Marek, Economist at the Research Centre of the Deutsche
Bundesbank. This study develops further the series of analyses, that were performed
in the working group of Prof. Jutta Günther, on the decisions of foreign investors in
transition economies, including the work by Gonchar and Marek 2014. The new
paper addresses the issue that is not sufficiently researched in the existing empirical
literature. In particular, the impact of political risks on the disinvestment decision
has been rather generally scarcely studied in economics and international business.
Therefore, we decided to contribute to closing this research gap.
The research was conducted jointly by Ksenia and myself. Specifically I have
contributed to the construction of the microeconomic database, the development
of hypotheses, the development of the econometric strategy, as well as by running
the regressions and further description of findings. Ksenia contributed specifically
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with the initial design, and most of the writing. Whereas Philipp contributed to the
compilation of the dataset.
How innovation affects performance
This is the latest paper, elaborated together by Ksenia Gonchar and myself. It
was designed, and conducted jointly from scratch. The distribution of labour was
minimal and fully balanced. Thus, Ksenia contributed by providing the survey and
registry data, deriving hypotheses and writing, while I carried out the literature
review and worked on the empirical design, applying the three-stage CDM model
to the cross-section and panel data, as well as other models employed in the study.
Also, I put together the strategy and the results discussion in the light of the existing
empirical literature.
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